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Abstract
Human language is both a cognitive and a cultural phenomenon. Any evo-
lutionary account of language, then, must address both biological and cultural
evolution. In this thesis, I give a mainly cultural evolutionary answer to two main
questions: firstly, how do working systems of learned communication arise in pop-
ulations in the absence of external or internal guidance? Secondly, how do those
communication systems take on the fundamental structural properties found in
human languages, i.e. systematicity at both a meaningless and meaningful level?
A large, multi-disciplinary literature exists for each question, full of apparently
conflicting results and analyses. My aim in this thesis is to survey this work, so
as to find any commonalities and bring this together in order to provide a minimal
account of the cultural evolution of language.
The first chapter of this thesis takes a number of well-established models of
the emergence of signalling systems. These are taken from several different fields:
evolutionary linguistics, evolutionary game theory, philosophy, artificial life, and
cognitive science. By using a common framework to directly compare these mod-
els, I show that three underlying commonalities determine the ability of any pop-
ulation of agents to reliably develop optimal signalling. The three requirements
are that i) agents can create and transfer referential information, ii) there is a sys-
temic bias against ambiguity, and iii) some mechanism leading to information loss
exists.
Following this, I extend the model to determine the effects of including refer-
ential uncertainty. I show that, for the group of models to which this applies, this
places certain extra restrictions on the three requirements stated above.
In the next chapter, I use an information-theoretic framework to construct a
novel analysis of signalling games in general, and rephrase the three requirements
in more formal terms. I then show that we can use these 3 criteria as a diagnostic
viii
for determining whether any given signalling game will lead to optimal signalling,
without the requirement for repeated simulations.
In the final, much longer, chapter, I address the topic of duality of patterning.
This involves a lengthy review of the literature on duality of patterning, combi-
natoriality, and compositionality. I then argue that both levels of systematicity
can be seen as a functional adaptation which maintains communicative accuracy
in the face of noisy processes at different levels of analysis. I support this with
results from a new, minimally-specified model, which also clarifies and informs a
number of long-fought debates within the field.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of four chapters, two main topics, and one overarching theme:
the cultural evolution of language. This is, of course, a vast area of ongoing
research, and in this thesis I address only a small subset of the many pressing
questions in the field. Nevertheless, the two main topics are (I think) central and
important ones, namely: 1) In groups of agents capable of learned signalling, how
do shared, functional signalling systems self-organise? 2) How do signalling sys-
tems take on the fundamental aspects of combinatorial and compositional struc-
ture found in human languages, i.e. duality of patterning?
Both of these topics are well-established. They have been the subject of many
studies in several disciplines; they have used a variety of methodologies with mul-
tiple different theoretical underpinnings, and have attained results and drawn con-
clusions which sometimes appear to be completely at odds with each other. This
underlines my main motivation in preparing this thesis: to investigate how much
these seemingly contradictory accounts actually share in terms of both results and
theory: to work out a minimal account for the cultural evolution of language.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: the first three chapters look at differ-
ent aspects of the emergence of learned signalling, and the fourth (much longer)
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chapter is devoted to duality of patterning. In the first chapter, I directly compare
and contrast a number of well-established computational models of signalling. I
use a minimal framework which is capable of replicating all these models, and in-
vestigate the effects of incrementally adding mechanisms to discern their effects.
My main finding here is that only three properties are required to ensure the devel-
opment of optimal signalling: the creation and transfer of referential information,
a systemic bias against ambiguity, and a mechanism leading to information loss.
This chapter is presented in the form of the final edit of a journal article in Cog-
nitive Science. The second chapter is an extension of the work in the first, where
I investigate the effects of introducing referential uncertainty to the previously
investigated models, which has implications for the three requirements for sig-
nalling. The third chapter draws this work together in the language of information
theory. I show that when we use the correct information-theoretic description of
any learned referential signalling model, we can re-cast the three requirements as
a set of formal requirements, and that we can use these to diagnose whether any
given model will reliably converge on a signalling system.
In the final chapter, I turn to duality of patterning. This commences with an
extended review of the literature concerning the nature and evolution of duality of
patterning and its component parts, combinatorial and compositional structure. I
then argue that we can provide a simple, unified account of the emergence of du-
ality which appeals to the role of functional adaptation for communicative success
in the face of noisy processes at different levels of analysis. I present a simple,
minimally-specified model as a proof-of-concept for these arguments, and show
how this more abstract account can unify and dispel a number of apparent contro-
versies found in various parts of the literature.
My main methodology is computational modelling, but I reference theoretical,
comparative, and both field-based and lab-based empirical work throughout. I use
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basic mathematical notation in parts, but nothing in the way of formal proofs, and
my intention is for any formalism to increase rather than decrease clarity.
Chapter 2
Minimal requirements for the
emergence of learned signalling
The following is an exact reproduction of an article as accepted for publication in
Cognitive Science. It represents my original work, as supervised by Simon Kirby
and Kenny Smith, and discussed with Kevin Stadler. Simon Kirby, Kenny Smith,
and Kevin Stadler all assisted in the preparation and editing of the article, but I
take full responsibility for any and all mistakes.
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Abstract
The emergence of signaling systems has been observed in numerous experimental and real-
world contexts, but there is no consensus on which (if any) shared mechanisms underlie such phe-
nomena. A number of explanatory mechanisms have been proposed within several disciplines, all
of which have been instantiated as credible working models. However, they are usually framed as
being mutually incompatible. Using an exemplar-based framework, we replicate these models in a
minimal configuration which allows us to directly compare them. This reveals that the develop-
ment of optimal signaling is driven by similar mechanisms in each model, which leads us to pro-
pose three requirements for the emergence of conventional signaling. These are the creation and
transmission of referential information, a systemic bias against ambiguity, and finally some form
of information loss. Considering this, we then discuss some implications for theoretical and exper-
imental approaches to the emergence of learned communication.
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1. Introduction
Human language provides a uniquely flexible and expressive system of communication,
but we are not the only species capable of communication. Signaling behavior is found
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throughout nature: Virtually every species has a means of communicating about, for
example, the presence of food or predators, potential as a mate, or presence of a competi-
tor. However, only human communication displays such open-endedness (Tomasello,
2010) in the number of signals learned, the contexts in which they are elicited, and the
responses they effect. This flexibility arises because the basic building blocks of human
language—words—are learned socially, by observing word use by others. In contrast, the
articulatory form of signals in the vast majority of animal communication systems are, as
far as we know, not socially learned. For instance, among our closest relatives, the form
of alarm calls (distinctive calls used to warn conspecifics of the presence of particular
types of predators) are thought to be largely genetically determined (Fedurek & Slo-
combe, 2011); even among the other apes, while the decision to employ a given call may
be intentional (Slocombe et al., 2010), there is only limited evidence for any flexibility or
group-level variation in the form of those calls (Crockford, Herbinger, Vigilant, &
Boesch, 2004; Seyfarth & Cheney, 1986). There are of course obvious exceptions; for
instance, many bird species are capable of both learning and innovating songs (Podos,
Huber, & Taft, 2004). However, vocal learning in birds (and in other animals where it
has been observed, such as cetaceans, elephants, and bats: Janik, 2014; Poole, Tyack,
Stoeger-Horwath, & Watwood, 2005; Boughman, 1998) is most probably a case of con-
vergent evolution, rather than reflecting some ancestral cognitive capacities shared by the
extremely distant common ancestor of all vocal learning species.
Innately specified communication systems are presumably the product of natural selec-
tion (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003). As such, the major questions concern the nature
of the evolutionary route to signaling, as well as the selective pressures involved. The
emergence of learned communication, on the other hand, is less well understood. First,
we might ask when and why a learned system would replace an innately specified signal-
ing system (Lachlan, Janik, & Slater, 2004; Ritchie & Kirby, 2006). Second, socially
learned communication systems are potentially shaped by an entirely different set of pres-
sures. In a learned communication system, unlike its innate equivalent, natural selection
cannot directly tune the structure of the signaling system; rather, socially learned signal-
ing systems are shaped by the processes through which they are learned and used (see lit-
erature review in next section). Their functional properties are then determined by the
nature of the learning and usage mechanisms involved (which are themselves potential
targets for biological evolution). Understanding the nature of these mechanisms is crucial
to understanding when and how a learned communication system such as human lan-
guage might evolve.
Our focus in this study is therefore: What are the necessary social and psychological
adaptations which allow populations to develop, via processes of learning and use, func-
tional learned communication systems? Semiotic experiments (such as surveyed by
Galantucci & Garrod, 2011) demonstrate that human subjects can rapidly bootstrap com-
municative conventions across a range of modalities and interactive conditions. Moving
beyond the laboratory, the recent emergence of indigenous sign languages (e.g., Nicara-
guan Sign Language and Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language: Senghas, Senghas, & Pyers,
2005; Sandler, Meir, Padden, & Aronoff, 2005) is a compelling reminder that functional
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communication systems are able to self-organize in human populations in the absence of
any explicit, centralized coordination. Presumably, the same mechanisms also underlie
the development of other human signaling conventions, including all other human lan-
guages. Identifying these mechanisms—which must be particular to human cognition and
interaction—will shed light on what enables Homo sapiens to be such a fundamentally
communicative species.
The emergence of functional learned communication has been studied across a number
of seemingly loosely related disciplines, including Classical and Evolutionary Game The-
ory (e.g., Lewis, 1969; Nowak, Krakauer, & Kingdom, 1999; Skyrms, 2010), Artificial
Life (e.g., Steels & Loetzsch, 2012), Cognitive Science (e.g., Barr, 2004), and Evolution-
ary Linguistics (e.g., Oliphant, 1996; Smith, 2002). The assumptions made and conclu-
sions drawn in these various fields regarding the prerequisites for functional
communication appear on the surface to be quite different, if not mutually incompatible.
To cut through a rather confusing mesh of approaches, models, and results, we have cre-
ated a framework to replicate a representative selection of the approaches outlined above.
Having done this, we then identify a basic framework—an urn-model—which strips the
individual models back to the simplest set of common underlying mechanics.
We then employ an additive approach to this framework: We first add the characteris-
tic features of each model in terms of interaction and learning. None of these basic
instantiations reliably lead to optimality; as such, we then investigate which particular
mechanisms are responsible for doing so. By adding each mechanism in isolation, we are
able to investigate exactly which are responsible for driving the behavior of each model.
The subsequent direct comparison reveals that the apparent diversity of mechanisms driv-
ing the emergence of functional learned communication is overstated in the literature; in
fact, the same fundamental processes underpin all of the current accounts.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the issues of
conventionality and optimality, and how these are tackled in models drawn from the vari-
ous disciplines mentioned above. We first motivate and then describe the exemplar-style
framework which we have used for our model replications in Section 3, before discussing
each replication in more detail in Section 4, along with the adjustments we have made
for comparison, and which aspects of each model are necessary for the development of
optimal communication. In Section 5 we propose that three fundamental principles—the
creation and propagation of referential information, a bias against ambiguity, and a mech-
anism leading to information loss—determine whether any system is able to bootstrap
functional communication. Finally, this leads into a discussion in Section 6 regarding
how this can help us interpret the various theories of the emergence of communication
outlined above.
2. Past approaches to the emergence of functional learned signaling
For any form of communication to be functional, it must be conventional; in particular,
there must be consensus within a population about how signals are produced and inter-
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preted. Conventions are widespread in human populations and extend far beyond the
communicative domain (we have, for instance, conventions about what to wear to work,
what side of the road to drive on to get to work, what times one should work at, and
appropriate language at work).
In his classic study, Lewis (1969) analyzes convention as a type of game-theoretic co-
ordination problem: Two or more agents have a choice of behaviors, and coordinating
those behaviors leads to mutual benefit. Even working under the assumption that such
coordination provides a mutual benefit, the mechanisms leading to the establishment of
conventions are not immediately obvious. Lewis proposed a critical role for common
knowledge (Lewis, 1969; p. 56): All agents are aware of a set of propositions, each agent
knows that every other agent also knows those propositions, and so on recursively ad
infinitum. Populations of agents can employ this knowledge to create conventions by
making rational choices targeting maximal individual payoffs. However, in the case of
these simple conventions (where an atomic choice is made from an unordered set of alter-
native behaviors, such as the side of the road we drive on), Vylder (2008) shows that
such sophisticated reasoning is unnecessary: Whenever agents strongly amplify observed
behavior, population-wide agreement on a single convention is assured. (This is where
agents sample from each other’s behavior, and the suite of behaviors is represented as a
ranked probability distribution. In strongly amplified copying, the ratio of likelihoods
between any two subsequently ranked behaviors is strictly increased in favor of the more
highly ranked one.)1
However, being conventional is not enough to ensure a functional communication sys-
tem. Lewis’s Signaling Game (1969) is the canonical problem in the emergence of
learned communication. In its most basic form, the Signaling Game involves a single sig-
naler and a single hearer. The signaler must communicate one of two possible world-
states to the hearer with two available signals, and the hearer has a choice of two possible
responses. Each world-state has a corresponding “matched” response which triggers a
mutual payoff; mismatched responses provide no payoff. Lewis showed that even this
simple game has several Nash equilibria, where a Nash equilibrium is any state where
the best payoff for any given player is to continue with her current strategy, leading to a
global stasis where no further change in play can occur. Only two of these Nash equilib-
ria are optimal strategies, designated by Lewis as signaling systems, which guarantee that
the hearer will select the appropriate response based only on the signaler’s signal. The
others—pooling equilibria—are stable but non-optimal strategies; for example, if the sig-
naler sends the same uninformative signal for every world-state and the receiver always
chooses the action with the greatest average payoff. This ambiguity of signal-to-response
mapping will be referred to below as homonymy.
Moving beyond the simplest scenario of two world-states, two signals, and two
responses results in a drastic increase in the number of possible system states, and the
chance of multiple partial pooling equilibria: These are stable states that are a mixture of
informative strategies and pooled, non-informative ones (see Fig. 1). As such, in addition
to being conventional, a functional communication system must be at least somewhat
informative; in Lewis’s terms, it must allow the hearer to select the correct response with
4 M. Spike et al. / Cognitive Science (2016)
greater than chance frequency. The most functional systems are optimal; in Lewis’s
terms, such systems require that all world-states must map to at least one signal, and each
of those signals must be unambiguously associated with a matched response. Identifying
how conventional, optimal, learned signaling systems develop has therefore become the
benchmark problem in this field; the existence of many non-optimal stable states in the
face of Lewis’s rational behavior suggests that the reliable development of optimal signal-
ing occurs via some other means. In the sections that follow, we review the proposals
made in various fields as to what that mechanism might be.
2.1. Payoff-based accounts
Game-theoretic accounts are driven by the idea of a payoff, which is instantiated
through either increased evolutionary fitness (e.g., Nowak et al., 1999) or reinforcement
learning (e.g., Skyrms, 2010), where individuals modify their behavior in response to the
payoffs they receive.
Nowak et al.’s model involves the natural selection of cultural variants (Boyd & Rich-
erson, 1985) and rests on two assumptions: First, the fitness of individuals (i.e., the num-
ber of their offspring) is determined by their communicative success within a population,
and second, the resulting children learn from their parents (with some error), thereby
inheriting their communication system via social learning. Numerical simulations show
that, under these conditions, while some populations evolve optimal systems, many stabi-
lize at partial pooling equilibria, some signals being associated with more than one mean-
ing. However, these suboptimal states occur less as the chance of learning error
increases: Error knocks the systems out of previously stable states. Note that the mecha-
nism at play here—natural selection—is the same as that invoked to explain the evolution
of signaling systems which are not socially learned, the only difference being that the
Fig. 1. An example of a partial pooling equilibrium. The first two states, signals and actions, are pooled and
mutually uninformative: The speaker always produces the Signal A and the receiver always uses Action 1.
State 3, however, leads to the informative Signal C and hence Action 3.
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mechanism through which behaviors are inherited is social learning, rather than genetic
transmission.
Skyrms (2010) surveys a type of reinforcement learning devised by Roth and Erev
(1995). Many forms of reinforcement learning (e.g., Bush & Mosteller, 1953) are essentially
“memoryless”: Each available behavior can be completely characterized by a single (proba-
bilistic) value which describes its current state. The effect of any learning experience recal-
culates this value using a parameterized function. Roth–Erev reinforcement, on the other
hand, models memory as a collection of tokens which gradually accumulate over a learner’s
lifetime; as such, calculating both behavior and the effects of learning must take into
account not just the relative proportion of memory tokens, but their absolute count as well
(experiences in later life contribute relatively little to the overall store of tokens, whereas
early experiences have larger effects). Skyrms (2010) motivates the Roth–Erev model by
showing that learners in a non-signaling scenario—one where they must learn to modify
their behavior to maximize their expected returns when presented with an initially unknown
distribution of world-states—are able to escape pooling equilibria by using Roth–Erev rein-
forcement learning, whereas parametric forms of reinforcement learning (Bush & Mosteller,
1953) are not. Incorporating this into the basic Lewis signaling game, Skyrms (2010)
describes a simple iterative strategy: Each time a pair of agents successfully communicate,
the associations involved are strengthened by both. A proof of convergence to optimality
using Roth–Erev learning in the minimal signaling game (two world-states, signals and
responses) is given in Beggs (2005). However, Barrett (2006) shows that including more
states, signals, or responses immediately increases the possibility of non-optimal equilibria,
and that simple reinforcement no longer leads to guaranteed convergence on optimal signal-
ing. Barrett (2006) goes on to propose two solutions to this problem: the addition of negative
reinforcement (also known as punishment, the term we shall use henceforth), where unsuc-
cessful associations are decremented, and forgetting (which is further investigated in Barrett
& Zollman, 2009). Both strategies greatly increase the likelihood that optimal signaling
develops and guarantee it for certain parameter regimes.
Also using Roth–Erev reinforcement (but looking at pragmatic implicatures rather than
signaling games), Franke and J€ager (2012) investigate the effects of lateral inhibition:
After successful communication, competing associations are dampened. With this effect
included, they show via simulation that optimal states are reached far more quickly. We
draw attention to the role of lateral inhibition here, as it plays an important factor in sev-
eral other models described below.
2.2. Interaction-based accounts
The program of artificial life research as set out in Steels (2012) and the neural network
populations of Barr (2004) place a critical emphasis on the fundamental roles of feedback
and alignment. Agents interact with each other multi-modally: Repeated attempts at local
alignment ultimately lead to a globally functioning communication system.
As part of a larger program to investigate the evolution of language, Steels (2012)
shows that multi-modal negotiations between embodied robotic agents situated in a com-
6 M. Spike et al. / Cognitive Science (2016)
plex environment lead to the development of multiple levels of language-like structures.
The seminal Naming Game described in Steels and Loetzsch (2012) is a core element in
this process. A population of agents is situated in an environment containing a number of
objects. Pairs of randomly chosen agents are presented with a limited context of objects
observable by both parties, with one particular target object chosen for a designated sig-
naler to attempt to communicate to the hearer. The agents then execute a scripted series
of actions. A signal is sent, the hearer’s interpretation is checked, and the intended ref-
erent is indicated by the speaker in the event of failure. Both agents then potentially
adjust their internal representations by strengthening and weakening associations, with
these weight adjustments determined according to the particular scenario (success or
failure) which has just occurred—these updates can be carried out by speaker, hearer, or
both agents involved in the interaction. In addition, agents possess the ability to inno-
vate terms for previously unseen objects, chosen from a very large signal space. This is
a potentially critical difference with the other models discussed in this section, which
assume limited signal spaces, and in which processes which eliminate homonymy are
critical to establishing optimal signaling. In contrast, in a typical Naming Game simula-
tion involves an initial stage in which the number of terms for any given object
explodes, before a single term wins out for each, as the result of gradual lateral inhibi-
tion of competing terms. A consequence is that homonymy is very rare: “optimality”
for these games tends to be defined not in terms of successful communication, but by
when the lexicon is reduced to a minimal size. De Vylder and Tuyls (2006) show that,
as shown with simple conventions in Vylder (2008), convergence on a minimal, unam-
biguous, conventional lexicon is guaranteed if agents utilize a strongly amplifying imita-
tion function (as described in Section 2). Baronchelli (2010) further shows that hearer
update (i.e., hearers updating their internal representations based on the success or fail-
ure of an interaction) is critical in the development of optimal lexicons, while speaker
update plays a lesser role.
Barr (2004) looks at the role of common knowledge in the emergence of conventional
communication. Employing populations of interacting agents (both neural network based
and simpler association based), he showed that not only was common knowledge (about
the signaling behavior of the population as a whole) unnecessary, but that population-
wide convergence on a single system was significantly more likely when agents used only
the information from individual interactions. The neural network model is rather sophisti-
cated, but it includes a type of parametric reinforcement learning similar to Bush and
Mosteller (1953) (outlined in Section 2.1). Also included is a form of lateral inhibition,
(although described as a mutual exclusivity bias) which acts to promote one-to-one sig-
nal/meaning mappings. Barr’s simulations reliably lead to states of optimal signaling: In
a second set of results, Barr aims to counter a possible objection to his neural networks:
as they sample over time from the whole population, they could be argued to be accruing
a type of common knowledge. To this end, he uses a modified association-based model
(based on Steels, 1997) which employs a “stay/switch” strategy—agents stick to success-
ful strategies with some chance of switching to less successful ones. This model includes
a type of memory where agents can be restricted to knowledge of their last n interactions.
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In the end, both types of population, neural network and stay/switch, reliably arrived at
global convergence on an optimal system.2 A further observation was that stay/switch
populations proved more efficient at developing globally optimal signaling when their
memories were highly restricted, providing another strong counterexample to common
knowledge-based explanations.
2.2.1. Reinforcement versus feedback learning: An aside
It is worth clarifying the differences between reinforcement and feedback accounts, as
they actually share much in common. Another complicating point is that the models in
Barr (2004) and, to a lesser extent, Steels and Loetzsch (2012) are described at different
times in terms of both Reinforcement and Feedback learning.
One of the main factors distinguishing reinforcement (in its classic form) and feedback
involves the availability of referential information. This describes how agents associate
meanings with signals, both for when signals are sent and interpreted. In fact, in classic sig-
naling games, referential information is irrelevant. Mutually available “meanings” are split
into two: world-states perceivable by the speaker, and actions taken by the receiver. How-
ever, as every state has a single matched action which triggers a payoff event, we can (for
the sake of direct comparison) temporarily overlook this distinction and see matched state/
action pairs as directly equivalent to meanings in the other models. In any case, in reinforce-
ment accounts the equivalent of referential information is only made available after a suc-
cessful interaction, and it is provided by the environment: Signaler and receiver know that
the intended and interpreted meaning have coincided, because they receive reinforcement
from the environment; more subtly, in the event of failure the absence of positive reinforce-
ment informs each party that his or her choice has been unsuccessful. In feedback learning,
on the other hand, the environment cannot provide this information. Instead, the agents
themselves must furnish it via “pointing” behavior: Simple social interactions, presumably
via another modality, which are able to resolve reference. As such, although there is a near
equivalent to the reinforcement described above, it is analyzed in terms of the interaction
between the agents; the receiver must point at its interpreted referent, providing Interpreta-
tion Feedback, and the speaker must either indicate whether the receiver has selected the
correct meaning (what we shall term Yes/No Feedback) or provide richer information by
indicating its intended referent (henceforth Referential Feedback). With Yes/No Feedback,
then, the situation resembles reinforcement learning in that full referential information is
only made available after communicative success. The real difference between reinforce-
ment learning and Yes/No Feedback learning is seen after failure. In Reinforcement learn-
ing, the speaker can only know that his or her intended signal/meaning association was
unsuccessful. Similarly, the hearer is only aware that his or her interpreted association
failed. This is also true for Referential Feedback, but due to the availability of Interpretation
Feedback, extra information (about how the hearer interpreted the signal) is reliably avail-
able to the speaker. In Reinforcement learning this information is only available after suc-
cessful communication. Referential Feedback plays a similar role, as it provides full
information about the speaker’s intended referent to the hearer; again, with reinforcement
learning this is only available after success.
8 M. Spike et al. / Cognitive Science (2016)
It is the availability of this extra information in feedback learning that allows for more
subtle strategies than in reinforcement learning. With Reinforcement learning, agents
must somehow promote successful associations and inhibit failed ones. This remains the
case with Feedback learning, but speakers and hearers have reliable sources of referential
meaning which are independent of communicative success. How this information is used,
of course, depends on the particular model.
Interestingly, then, although Barr (2004) describes what must be a feedback model—in
that alignment is verified through interaction—the interaction itself is placed in a black
box. Because of this, the model uses an exact equivalent to the reinforcement dynamic:
The extra information potentially available is not actually used. In models such as that of
Steels and Loetzsch (2012), the interaction has a more fine-grained realization which is
incorporated into the model, making the extra sources of information potentially usable.
The question, then, is to determine what role those extra sources of information do play;
this will be dealt with in Section 4.
2.3. Observational learning accounts
A third strand of work has focused on the evolution of communication via iterated learn-
ing (Kirby, 2001) — repeated cycles of production and observational learning, often but not
always with population turnover. In generational turnover models, one generation of learn-
ers learns from behavior produced by the previous generation of learners and goes on to
produce behavior which is observed and learned from by a subsequent generation of learn-
ers; alternatively, new agents acquire a signaling system by observing the existing popula-
tion produce and/or interpret signals, then replace an older member of the population,
implementing a gradual turnover of the population. This observational learning paradigm
typically de-emphasizes the role of communicative interaction (see e.g., Oliphant, 1996;
Smith, 2002): Agents are assumed to be unmodified by any further interaction after an ini-
tial phase of learning, and signaling conventions can therefore only develop during this ini-
tial stage of sampling and learning. For this reason, the models place a critical emphasis on
the learning process itself. Furthermore, unlike the reinforcement and interaction-based
models discussed above, these observational learning models typically do not include any
referential uncertainty: Learners learn from observing meaning-signal pairs, rather than sig-
nals produced in some context which leaves its intended meaning unclear.
The models in Smith (2002) investigate how individual learning biases shape the evo-
lution of signaling systems in populations through iterated learning. In this study, learners
are modeled as simple associative networks, who adjust association weights after each
learning exposure according to a particular learning rule: Smith varies these learning rules
parametrically, to explore both the properties of learning at the individual level and the
consequences of these individual-level processes for the signaling systems which develop
in populations. Smith used three criteria to classify the effect of each learning rule:
whether it produced agents capable of (a) learning, (b) maintaining, and (c) constructing
optimal signaling systems; each criterion is a strict subset of the previous one. A property
shared by all constructor-type rules is an implicit bias against homonymy in the form of
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lateral inhibition. Learners with such a bias are less likely to successfully learn homony-
mous meaning-signal mappings, and over many episodes of learning this bias eliminates
homonymy entirely, leading to optimal signaling. Learning rules which are neutral to
homonymy are sometimes capable of constructing functional signaling, but usually con-
verge on suboptimal pooling equilibria. In contrast, biases against synonymy alone do not
contribute toward the development of optimal systems, although they are required for the
learning of optimal systems under certain assumptions about the relative size of the
meaning and signal spaces (K. Smith, 2004).
Oliphant and Batali (1996) adopt an alternative approach within the observational
learning framework, exploring a rational approach which they dub obverter. Their work
starts from the observation that the rational approach to signaling is to maximize the
chances of being correctly understood, while rational receivers will attempt to maximize
the chance of correct interpretation. Obverter signalers leverage this fact by calculating
which signal is most likely to be correctly interpreted as their intended meaning, based
on the observed reception behavior of the population; similarly, obverter reception
involves identifying which meaning is most likely to be signaled using the received sig-
nal, again based on observations of the population’s production behavior. Oliphant and
Batali first show that when agents have perfect information about the signaling behavior
of the population (e.g., through unlimited observation of the production and reception
behavior of that population), the communicative accuracy of a population will necessarily
increase with every new generation of learners who apply the obverter approach to pro-
duction and reception, eventually leading to convergence on an optimal system. Numeri-
cal simulations show that approximating this perfect knowledge, by estimating the
population’s signaling behavior from a limited number of observations of population
behavior, is sufficient to guarantee optimal communication.
2.4. Summary
What conclusions can we draw from the above? First, there are clearly substantial dif-
ferences between the various models (see Table 1 for a brief summary of their key fea-
tures): What is striking is their heterogeneity, with each model having at least one unique
feature, and no obvious universally shared property which might drive the evolution of
functional signaling systems. Second, the models differ in the time-scales involved. Some
accounts employ intergenerational learning and natural selection, and describe a process
which takes place over multiple generations: Selective reproduction or language acquisi-
tion is the only mechanism of change. In contrast, in other models, signaling systems are
negotiated between individuals over much shorter time periods. Finally, and most impor-
tant from our perspective, the various models seem to require rather different cognitive
capacities in individual agents. Skyrms’ (and subsequently Barrett’s) reinforcement learn-
ers have no social or cognitive capacity beyond the capacity to retain a set of signal/
meaning association weights and the ability to recognize a payoff. Nowak’s evolutionary
model excludes even the requirement for individuals to recognize communicative success,
leaving natural selection to do the work of tuning the population’s communication
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system. In contrast, the cognitive apparatus required in the Naming Game and Observa-
tional Learning paradigms seems rather more demanding—they variously require mecha-
nisms of speaker–hearer feedback (often glossed in these models as “pointing”), various
processes of competition or lateral inhibition between signals and meanings, rational rea-
soning about the optimal signaling behavior, and possibly the ability to reliably infer a
signaler’s intended meaning. However, drawing strong conclusions as to the necessary
cognitive prerequisites for the emergence of functional learned signaling seems prema-
ture, since the numerous implementational differences between the existing models poten-
tially obscure a common underlying mechanism.
At this point some notions require clarification. In our simulations reported below, our
key criterion will be whether a particular type of model develops optimal signaling—a
completely unambiguous set of signals which cover all meanings—reliably, that is, 100%
of the time. Human lexicons are not optimal but are supported by contextual cues to dis-
ambiguate words which would be ambiguous out of context (e.g., Piantadosi, Tily, &
Gibson, 2012); Why, then, are we looking for reliable optimality when it does not appear
in natural language? The first reason is largely historical: There is a long tradition in
work looking at the evolution of signaling conventions to focus on the evolution of opti-
mal signaling, with the development of signaling systems which are near-optimal in con-
text being a more complex (and under-explored) question. Second, on a practical point,
the work which follows demonstrates that models which do not always produce optimal
systems actually very rarely do so, to an extent that would be highly dysfunctional in
human language.
3. An exemplar-based framework
To cut through this diversity of models, we have replicated four of the six models
above using a minimal framework.3 The two which have been excluded are Nowak et al.
(1999) and Barr (2004). The former is excluded simply because the mechanism driving
Table 1
A comparison of the major features of the models surveyed in Section 2
Nowak Steels Barrett/Franke Oliphant/Batali Smith Barr
Transmission Vertical Horizontal Horizontal Vertical Vertical Horizontal
Model Type Association
matrix
Associative Numerical Associative Neural Neural
Mod. Hearer/
Speaker?














Stochastic Deterministic Stochastic Deterministic Deterministic Deterministic
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the development of optimal signaling is the well-understood process of natural selection,
simply operating on traits which are inherited culturally rather than genetically; as
such, this work has relatively little to say about how the processes of learning and
use might shape signaling systems. Barr (2004) is not replicated primarily because,
unlike the other models reviewed above and presumably driven by his neural network
implementation, meanings and signals are not atomic, but are represented as dis-
tributed patterns of activation across both input and output nodes. This feature is hard
to reconcile with the other models presented here. However, as can be seen in
Table 1, Barr employs a mixed design, incorporating reinforcement and lateral inhibi-
tion. Since these features can be seen independently in one or more of the other mod-
els, we hope to derive insights into these processes in isolation which will also apply
to Barr’s model.
We employ a simple exemplar-based “urn model” as a general framework for a number
of theoretical and practical reasons. Although the replicated models involve several different
forms of representation, all of them treat a signaling system as a set of associations between
meanings and signals. The exemplar model captures this simply—meaning/signal pairs can
be seen as “meaning” balls in “signal” urns (or vice versa): Mechanisms of learning and
adjustment are equivalent to adding and removing the balls from the specified urn. This also
allows for an unlimited number of novel signals in the same manner as Steels and Loetzsch
(2012), unlike the fixed-size neural networks of, for example, Smith (2002). In addition, this
representation is identical to the reinforcement learning of Roth and Erev (1995). Roth–Erev
learning directly captures the first two of exemplar theory’s “central notions of similarity,
frequency, and recency” (Walsh, M€obius, Wade, and Sch€utze 2010), p.1. The third factor is
more problematic, as all stored tokens in Roth–Erev learning are equally weighted. This fac-
tor means that Roth–Erev learning is a simplified exemplar model. With that said, recency
effects are introduced by including forgetting, such as in Barrett and Zollman (2009). As
such, the exemplar framework can directly replicate game-theoretic work such as Skyrms
(2010) and Barrett (2006), as well as be easily extended to include the core mechanisms
from feedback and observational learning accounts.
In the sections that follow, we describe the various components of our exemplar frame-
work, before identifying a basic framework, a baseline instantiation of our model which
includes the minimal ingredients to replicate the various results from the literature. In
Section 4 we show these replications and explore various deviations from the minimal
model which illuminate the fundamental mechanisms driving the evolution of optimal
signaling.
3.1. Exemplars, agents, populations
Discrete meanings and signals m, s are drawn from unordered sets M, S. Each exemplar
represents a simple bidirectional association between a single meaning m and signal s.
Exemplars are atomic and unweighted. The population contains a set of agents A; each
agent a consists of an unstructured set of N exemplars. The current number of exemplars
of agent a associating meaning m with signal s is denoted by Nams.
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We assume that populations are fully connected: Each agent has an equal chance of
interacting with any other. During an interaction, two agents are chosen (the particulars
of this depend on the population dynamic, which is described in Section 3.1.5 below),
and designated speaker and hearer, respectively. A context C ⊆ M of c meanings is
selected with uniform probability. Also with uniform probability, a single topic meaning t
is selected from C. The speaker produces an utterance u 2 S associated with the topic
which the hearer turns into an interpretation i 2 M. Production and interpretation can be
described as stochastic functions over probability distributions for signal production p(u|t)
and reception r(i|u, C), where C is a context containing the topic t. The different ways in
which exemplar storage gives rise to these probability distributions is specified below.
3.1.1. Production and reception
During production, given a target meaning t, an agent a must select a signal. In all the
models we consider, each potential signal s 2 S has a weight proportional to the propor-
tion of stored exemplars which feature topic t paired with s. As shown in Fig. 2, in the




We can similarly define the reception weighting of a potential interpretation i 2 M,




To select a signal based on P, or a meaning based on R, an agent could apply either a
stochastic or winner-take-all procedure. A stochastic signaler (or receiver) simply samples a
meaning (or signal) proportional to P (or R), that is, p(u|t) / Patu, r(m|u, C) / RamuC. A sig-
naler applying a winner-take-all procedure selects with uniform probability among the set of
meanings (or signals, during reception) with the maximum value of P (R for reception); that is,




where S0 is the set of meanings for which Pamu is at a maximum, and r(m|u, C) is simi-
larly defined with respect to those signals for which RamuC is at a maximum.
The obverter mechanic differs from these standard production and reception procedures
in that the obverter weights for production are simply equivalent to the reception weights
in the standard model, and vice versa, that is, Pobverter = R, Robverter = P.
3.1.2. Communicative accuracy
Successful communication occurs when the hearer’s interpretation matches the speak-
er’s intended meaning, the topic (i.e., t = i). The communicative accuracy between a
speaker a and hearer b, where T is the set of all contexts of size c is4:
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CAða; bÞ ¼ 1







pðsjm;CÞ  rðmjs;CÞ ð4Þ
The communicative accuracy of a population is the mean value after Eq. (4) is calcu-
lated for all possible pairs of agents in the population, with each member acting as both
speaker and hearer.
3.1.3. Learning, deletion, inhibition, and memory
Learning always involves storing exemplars—after an interaction one or more mean-
ing-signal pairs is added to an agent’s memory. Memory limitations are modeled by
Fig. 2. An urn-model conceptualization of the notation for exemplar counts and production weights. Signal/
meaning associations are represented as balls (signals) in urns (meanings). The weighting function simply
counts the proportion of a given ball/signal in the urn/meaning chosen as topic, in this case meaning 1. For
this example, WTA production would always produce signal B, whereas stochastic production would produce
it 60% of the time. Although this diagram represents production weights Pams, visualizing the reception
weights RamsC simply involves swapping the roles of signal and meaning to urns and balls, respectively,
excluding any meanings which are not in the context C.
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enforcing a maximum allowed number of stored exemplars per agent. When this is sur-
passed, any newly stored exemplar results in the deletion of a randomly selected older
exemplar.
Some models also involve deletion of exemplars, for example, in some reinforcement
models to adjust the speaker and/or hearer’s memories after an unsuccessful interaction.
Simple deletion removes a single exemplar with a specific meaning-signal association.
Lateral inhibition represents competition between newly introduced exemplars and
already stored ones. This can be either anti-homonymy, which deletes exemplars which
share the same signal as a given focal exemplar but a different meaning, or anti-syno-
nymy for the converse process. Lateral inhibition can be either minimal, broad, or maxi-
mal inhibition. Minimal inhibition deletes only a single competing exemplar, selected
with uniform probability from all competing exemplars. Broad inhibition affects all com-
peting associations equally: A single exemplar is deleted for each competing type. In
maximal inhibition, all competing tokens are removed. When this method is applied
against homonyms and synonyms, it guarantees that all signal/meaning mappings will be
one-to-one. This instantly removes the problem of how signals become unambiguous
(although not the problem of how populations arrive upon a shared system), and as such
we do not investigate this mechanism here.
In all the cases where lateral inhibition proves necessary, minimal inhibition is suffi-
cient: As such, we use minimal inhibition in all the replications, which shows that stron-
ger forms are not necessary for the evolution of optimal signaling.
3.1.4. Feedback and referential information
“Feedback” is not defined consistently across the literature, but it always describes a
scenario in which referential information is transmitted after signaling (see Fig. 3). This
may be about either the speaker’s intended referent (referential information) or the
hearer’s interpretation (interpretive information). Further to this, feedback can be either
Fig. 3. Feedback: the referential elements that can make up the feedback found in the different models:
Speakers select a meaning and produce a signal, which is interpreted by the hearer. Information about the
intended and interpreted referent is, depending on the model, always, sometimes, or never transmitted.
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full (the referent is unambiguously indicated) or partial (some information about the ref-
erent is supplied, by limiting the set of candidates). Depending on the particular model,
neither, one, or both of the elements in may be involved.
In reinforcement learning, full referential and interpretive information is provided after
successful communication (i.e., the environmental payoff indicates to the speaker that the
hearer’s interpretation was identical to the topic, and this indicates to the hearer that its
interpretation was identical to the speaker’s intended meaning); the absence of payoff from
an unsuccessful communication provides partial referential and interpretive information (the
signaler knows that the receiver’s interpretation was not the topic; the receiver knows that
the topic was some meaning m 2 C; m 6¼ iÞ. Observational Learning models provide full
referential information: The hearer receives the topic plus the speaker’s utterance.
Finally, several flavors of feedback are provided in the Naming Game, as discussed in
Section 2.2.1. Interpretation feedback is when full interpretive information is provided
(i.e., the hearer points at its interpretation). We again note that the interaction in the
Naming Game requires that this information is always provided. With Yes/No Feedback,
full referential information is provided after successful interpretation, but only partial ref-
erential information otherwise (i.e., after the hearer points, the speaker says yes or no). A
richer alternative to this is Referential Feedback: Full referential information is provided
(if the hearer is correct, the speaker confirms; if not, the speaker points at its intended
referent).
3.1.5. Population dynamics
The population can be either closed or exhibit gradual replacement. Closed popula-
tions have no turnover: No agent leaves the population, no new individuals enter the pop-
ulation, and learning occurs after each interaction, such that all members of a population
continue to learn over the entire run of the model. Under gradual replacement, old agents
are continually replaced with new ones; a new agent is created and interacts with the
established population a given number of times before joining the population by replacing
the oldest agent. In this scenario, following the standard Observational Learning para-
digm, agents only learn during their initial set of interactions, on entering the population,
and do not learn in their subsequent interactions (when they are serving as language
model for some other new individual).
In both cases, the populations are fully connected: In the closed dynamic, each interac-
tion involves a new pair of agents selected at random from the population; with intergen-
erational turnover, the new learner is paired with a randomly selected member of the
established population.
3.2. The basic framework
We first establish the basic framework. This represents what we have identified as the
simplest abstraction of the models surveyed in Section 2. The purpose of this is twofold:
First, by providing a common framework, we can meaningfully compare the different
models. Second, and more important, we can apply the various mechanisms from those
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models to build up from the basic framework. This additive approach allows us to see,
both individually and (if necessary) in combination, the effects of each mechanism and
ultimately determine which factors are responsible for the development of optimal learned
signaling.
The basic framework is a type of Roth–Erev “urn” model. Agents are represented as a
collection of “meaning/signal” tokens. To produce a signal, for example, a ball is sam-
pled at random from all the balls with the specified meaning. When a new exemplar is
stored, a single new ball is added to the urn. Likewise, a deletion removes a single token.
As such, this minimal framework employs stochastic production and reception. All other
mechanisms are modifications of this base framework. As such, WTA production will
choose from the most frequent tokens instead of random sampling; broad lateral inhibi-
tion deletes a single token of each competing type.
In addition to stochastic production and reception, the basic framework has the follow-
ing properties which can be assumed to be true of all the following replications unless
otherwise stated: The population consists of 10 agents, and we fix the number of mean-
ings and signals at 5 each. There is no use of a restricted context (C = M). Agents have
no memory limitations or any other form of exemplar deletion such as punishment or lat-
eral inhibition. We employ a closed-group population dynamic unless otherwise stated.
When the gradual replacement population dynamic is used, each new agent interacts with
the existing population exactly 35 times.5
Before continuing, we must point out that we have made a number of necessarily arbi-
trary decisions about several parameters. For example, fixing the number of agents at 10
is problematic on at least two levels. The first is in terms of model comparison: In the
studies we replicate here, populations range in size between two and ten thousand. Sec-
ond, and perhaps more important, actual human populations are rarely limited to 10 indi-
viduals: We need to know whether the results we present here scale up in a reasonable
way. Similar concerns can be raised over the choice to model populations as being fully
connected (every agent can be called upon to communicate with every other agent) and
to limit the number of both signals and meanings to five. The number of signals, for
example, can be as low as two in the classic signaling Game of Lewis (1969) or be
practically unbounded in a more accurate reflection of human communication (Steels &
Loetzsch, 2012).
This being the case, we have opted to set these parameters at relatively small values.
The main benefit of this trade-off is computational efficiency: We are able to run very
large numbers of simulations, and this allows us to examine the aggregate behavior of
any given configuration. That said, the question of scaling must be addressed. Due to the
computational costs of running a large number of simulations, we are unable to provide
exhaustive results for much larger numbers of agents, signals and meanings. However,
results from smaller numbers of runs (see Section 5) indicate that the required number of
interaction to lead to optimal signaling appears to increase linearly with the size of the
population,6 and quadratic growth with the number of signals and meanings. As such, the
results presented here remain reasonable for, as an example, populations of 1,000 agents
negotiating signaling systems with 100 meanings and signals. We will return to issues of
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how our framework can address these and other simplifications in the discussion in Sec-
tion 5, in particular the fully connected network governing agent interactions and the uni-
form distribution of meanings.
4. Results: Exact and minimal replications
In each replication, our aim is twofold. The first is to confirm that our exemplar frame-
work can replicate the original results. To this end, we include all mechanisms from the
source paper. Second, and as our principal focus, we want to determine which of those
mechanisms are responsible for leading to the reliable development of optimal signaling.
This is the role of the basic framework: First, we add the base interaction of each model
type—that is, the reinforcement dynamic, the feedback dynamic, or the observational
learning dynamic as described in Section 3.1.4. We then test whether this alone leads to
reliable optimality. If this is not the case, features from the original models are then
added in, individually at first. For those individual features which do not individually lead
to optimality, we then investigate whether combinations of those features do.
The purpose of this methodology is to chart out the full range of interactions between
the different models and features. In the subsequent section, we provide an overview
which argues that despite the initially bewildering range of design choices, they can all
be seen as variations on three basic underlying themes. These three mechanisms are the
creation and transfer of referential information, a form of information loss, and a bias
against ambiguity.
4.1. Reinforcement models
We first replicate a basic reinforcement model using Roth–Erev learning as described
in Skyrms (2010), before including mechanisms of (a) negative feedback and (b) forget-
ting (following Barrett & Zollman, 2009), and finally, as an exploratory measure, (c)
gradual turnover. The basic reinforcement models require that one idiosyncratic feature is
added to the basic framework, initialization: All agents begin with one exemplar of each
possible association. This avoids a lock-in effect particular to reinforcement models,
where agents will only ever produce the first successful signal associated with any given
meaning (the result of this is that two agents who had initial success with different sig-
nal/meaning associations can never align with each other).
Our replication of Skyrms (2010), which we refer to as the Pure reinforcement model,
uses the basic framework with the reinforcement feedback dynamic described in Sec-
tion 3.1.4: After each successful interaction, both hearer and speaker update their exem-
plar store with the meaning-signal pair produced by the speaker. Following Barrett
(2006), we then add memory limitations and punishment. Results of this set of simula-
tions are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.7
Our replication reproduces the key features of the reinforcement models. Pure rein-
forcement learning as in Skyrms (2010) does not lead to optimality—no runs converge to
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optimal signaling. Fig. 4 indicates the proportion of 10,000 simulations that have con-
verged after a given number of iterations. Similarly, Fig. 5a displays the final stable dis-
tribution of communicative accuracy scores for the same set of simulations. Our normal
criterion for optimality is that CA = 1: even when a looser criterion is used (e.g.,
CA = 0.95), the number of populations which converge is small.
Fig. 4. Replication of classic reinforcement learning models. Here, we show the proportion of 10,000 simula-
tions which had converged to an optimal communication system after a given number of iterations. Results
are plotted for the pure reinforcement model (“Pure”), pure reinforcement with a memory limit of 35 exem-
plars (“Memory Limit”), pure reinforcement with punishment for both speaker and hearer (“Punish Hearer &
Speaker”), or for the hearer only (“Punish Hearer Only”).
Fig. 5. Reinforcement models: comparing (a) pure reinforcement learning with the effects of (b) enforcing a
memory limit of 35 exemplars or punishing failed associations for (c) both speaker and hearer or (d) only
hearer. Figures indicate the final, stable distribution of communicative accuracy scores for the 10,000 simula-
tions shown in Fig. 4 after 20,000 interactions.
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Our first addition to the pure reinforcement model is a memory limit of 35 exemplars
(Fig. 5b). We confirm that, as shown by Barrett (2006), this reliably leads to optimality;
furthermore (not shown), the time taken to reach optimality reduces as the size of mem-
ory reduces unless the memory limit is too low to permit a stable set of stored exemplars
(e.g., with 5 meanings and 5 signals, once the memory drops much below 25 exemplars).
Moving to the second mechanism, punishment, we replicate the result from Barrett
(2006). When punishment is employed by both speaker and hearer, this usually (but not
always) leads to optimality (Fig. 5c). However, as can be seen in Figs. 4 and 5d, if only
the hearer modifies his or her exemplar store after each interaction by reinforcement or
punishment, optimal signaling reliably develops.
Finally, we provide the novel result (Fig. 6) that a third mechanism—gradual popula-
tion turnover, rather than a closed group—also reliably leads to the emergence of optimal
signaling: Under this population model, different types of feedback and updating merely
impact on the time taken to convergence. This suggests that limited memory and negative
reinforcement are not the only mechanisms that can lead to convergence in a reinforce-
ment model—essentially any process that leads to the removal of stored exemplars
(either targeted removal, as is the case of negative reinforcement; random removal, in the
case of a memory limit; or wholesale removal, as effected by replacement of individuals)
leads to the emergence of optimal signaling within the framework of the reinforcement
paradigm.
Fig. 6. (Modification of Barrett, 2006) Gradual population replacement using pure reinforcement, punishment
of speaker only, hearer only, or both speaker and hearer.
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4.2. Naming game models
First, we replicate the Naming Game model of Steels and Loetzsch (2012) using the
exemplar framework. The original model Naming Game model is essentially a reinforce-
ment model with a number of added features. Core additions are as follows: (a) full inter-
pretive information is provided after every interaction (i.e., the hearer “points” at its
interpretation); (b) referential information is provided after every interaction, although the
quality of this referential information depends on the success of the interaction (full refer-
ential information is provided after successful interpretation, but only partial referential
information otherwise—that is, after the hearer “points” to its interpretation, the speaker
says yes or no); (c) lateral inhibition of homonyms and synonyms after storing a new
exemplar (see Section 3.1.3); (d) punishment of speaker and hearer after failed communi-
cation; (e) WTA rather than stochastic production and reception. Note that our replication
differs from the original by limiting the number of signals to 5 and including no
restricted context (c = |M|).
As can be seen in Fig. 7, we replicate the original Naming Game result, namely that
optimal communication reliably emerges. Furthermore, we replicate the finding of Bar-
onchelli (2010) that when only referential information is provided (i.e., the hearer does
not identify their interpretation), whether speaker or hearer updates his or her exemplar
Fig. 7. Replication of the Naming Game results of Steels and Loetzsch (2012) and Baronchelli (2010), show-
ing a replication of the full Naming Game (“Full”). We also replicate Baronchelli’s results (with a model
equivalent to the full Naming Game model, minus referential information), showing that when only the
speaker learns from each interaction (“Speaker Only”), convergence is significantly slower than when both
Speaker and Hearer learn from each interaction.
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store after interaction impacts on time to convergence: Hearer modification leads to rapid
convergence, convergence under speaker-only modification is far slower. This result sug-
gests that interpretative information (the hearer “pointing” to his interpretation) is not
required for the emergence of optimal signaling in the Naming Game, assuming the pres-
ence of referential information—since referential information is provided in Observational
Learning models, but interpretive information is not, this removes one source of differ-
ence between these models.
We are now in a position to explore the mechanisms of the model in isolation. As
there are actually two feedback dynamics (Yes/No and Referential Feedback), both were
investigated using the basic framework.
As discussed in Section 2.2.1, Yes/No Feedback is formally identical to reinforcement
learning except for one factor: With Yes/No Feedback, the speaker has access to informa-
tion about the hearer’s interpretation. The original feedback model of Steels and Loetzsch
(2012) uses a punishment mechanism which has two features: The first is the same as
“negative reinforcement” in Barrett (2006)—the speaker punishes the association it used
and failed with. The second, which is only available in this model, is that the speaker
also punishes the hearer’s failed association. In Section 4.1, we saw that punishing the
hearer after failed communication leads to reliable optimality, while punishing the
speaker does not always do so (although it usually does). In the case of Yes/No Feed-
back, however, we can see in Fig. 8a that when speakers only use interpretive informa-
tion as the basis for update and punishment—that is, when they only punish the hearer’s
failed association—populations do not reliably develop signaling systems. As shown in
Figs. 5b and c, restoring referential information does reliably leads to optimality. How-
ever, the importance of the punishment dynamic is illustrated by Fig. 5d, in which we
can see that, for Yes/No Feedback without any punishment, lateral inhibition of homo-
nyms and synonyms does not reliably lead to optimal signaling.
We can now look at the other feedback dynamic. While punishment is an effective
strategy for Yes/No Feedback, it is not effective for Referential Feedback (not shown).
Speaker-only learning and punishment only rarely leads to optimal signaling.8
Fig. 8. Yes/No Feedback models: investigating the effects of different forms of punishment (a–c) and the
application of lateral inhibition of both homonyms and synonyms for both speaker and hearer (d).
Figures indicate the final, stable distribution of communicative accuracy scores for 10,000 simulations after
20,000 interactions.
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Turning to Referential Feedback, the lateral inhibition mechanic (Fig. 9) proves to play
a more significant role; specifically, synonyms and homonyms must always be inhibited
in order for convergence to occur. A further observation (not shown here) is that the
importance of inhibiting synonyms depends on who learns in an interaction. When both
speaker and hearer are modified after an interaction, both homonyms and synonyms must
also be inhibited; when only the hearer learns, only homonyms must be inhibited.
In summary, the different types of feedback—neither of which leads to optimality by
themselves—require different additional mechanisms to do so. As Yes/No Feedback is a
modified type of reinforcement learning, it is no surprise that punishment is a successful
strategy. What is surprising, however, is that when only interpretive feedback (which is
the only difference between this model and basic reinforcement with punishment) is used,
it never produces a signaling system. Also unexpected is that lateral inhibition does not
consistently lead to optimality for Yes/No feedback, while it is highly effective in con-
junction with Referential Feedback. In contrast, we see the restricted circumstances in
which punishment reliably leads to optimality for Referential Feedback (hearer-only
learning, WTA production). In the final analysis, none of the mechanisms of the Naming
Game are unnecessary (except interpretive information for the purposes of punishment).
Instead, the model contains a suite of mechanisms, each most effective when applied to
the two types of feedback dynamic incorporated into the original model.
4.3. Observational learning: Biased learning
Smith (2002) models agents as (|M|9|S|) associative networks and explores the conse-
quences of a range of weight-updating procedures on these networks. In doing so, he
identifies two crucial features on which learning rules vary: presence or absence of biases
against synonyms and homonyms. Our minimal replication allows us to manipulate these
same biases, by enforcing different types of lateral inhibition. Employing a closed-group
dynamic instead of the original gradual turnover, we compare the effects of these manip-
ulations, as well as the role of WTA production/reception (as used in the original) and
stochastic production/reception. As this is an observational learning model, only hearers
Fig. 9. Referential Feedback models: investigating the effects of no lateral inhibition (a), only synonyms (b),
only homonyms (c) and both (d). Figures indicate the final, stable distribution of communicative accuracy
scores for 10,000 simulations after 10,000 interactions.
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are updated after any interaction, and full referential information is provided. Before pro-
ceeding, we point out the similarities between the Referential Feedback model of the pre-
vious section and the Biased learning model. The first difference is that the original
biased learning model uses gradual turnover instead of closed groups. Second is the pro-
vision of information: Both Observational Learning and Referential Feedback guarantee
the transmission of referential information, but the dynamic of referential feedback also
includes interpretive information. However, we have shown in Section 4.2 that utilizing
this information (by punishing failed associations) is not always an effective strategy
when referential information is guaranteed.
Using the basic framework, we are able to replicate the results of the original
(Fig. 10). The emergence of optimal signaling is dependent on learners employing the
right type of lateral inhibition; critically, as seen for the Naming Game, agents must
inhibit homonyms. Again, adding inhibition of synonyms has no additional effect, while
inhibiting synonyms alone does not reliably lead to optimal signaling, and optimality
never occurs when lateral inhibition is removed altogether. In further tests comparing
WTA and stochastic production/reception, no difference was found apart from slightly
faster convergence for WTA. This once again suggests that this difference between
Smith’s model and the Referential Feedback version of the Naming Game described in
the previous section is superficial only.
4.4. Observational Learning models: Obverter models
Our replication of Oliphant and Batali (1996) uses the Observational Learning version
of the basic framework, but also employs obverter weighting as described in Sec-
tion 3.1.1. In line with the observational learning paradigm (Section 3.1.4), only hearers
are updated after any interaction. Features of the original model which are not part of our
basic framework are (a) WTA production/reception rather than stochastic and (b) gradual
replacement population instead of a closed-group populations. We will examine the
effects of these mechanisms, as well as the effects of adding a memory limit. As the
Fig. 10. Biased learner models: investigating the effects of no lateral inhibition (a), only synonyms (b), only
homonyms (c) and both (d). Figures indicate the final, stable distribution of communicative accuracy scores
for 10,000 simulations after 10,000 interactions.
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effects of lateral inhibition on observational learning models have been fully explored in
Section 4.3, none of our replications include this mechanism.
We are able to replicate the original result of Oliphant and Batali (1996): A minimal
replication employing gradual population turnover reliably leads to the emergence of
optimal signaling when WTA production/reception is used. When stochastic production/
reception is used, we still have guaranteed optimality, albeit over much longer time-scales
(Fig. 11). Results for closed groups are strikingly different (Fig. 12). In particular, opti-
mal systems do not reliably emerge unless a memory limit (here, a maximum of 35
tokens) is added to the model.
Fig. 11. Obverter production/reception, with gradual population replacement, and stochastic or WTA produc-
tion/reception.
Fig. 12. Obverter learner models: investigating the effects of WTA production with and without a memory
limited to 35 exemplars (a, b), and stochastic production with and without a memory limited to 35 exemplars
(c, d). Figures indicate the final, stable distribution of communicative accuracy scores for 10,000 simulations
after 20,000 interactions.
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We see here an strong parallel with the results for Reinforcement Learning. Despite
the presence of a systemic bias toward functional communication, both strategies are
ineffective without the presence of some form of information loss, whether that is via
intergenerational transmission or explicit memory loss.
5. Minimal requirements for optimal signaling
Using our minimal exemplar framework we were able to replicate the results of all the
original models. As suspected, the internal representations of agents (network/associa-
tions/urn models, etc.) are not a factor behind the development of signaling; all that is
necessary is a way to model agents who can capture associations between meanings and
signals. Indeed, given the appropriate parameter settings, the replications using the basic
framework produce results which are strikingly similar or identical (Fig. 13) when we
compare a version of the Naming Game with hearer-only learning and only Referential
Feedback with the Biased Learning model (both using lateral inhibition of homonyms).
Beyond this, what conclusions can we draw? First, passing referential information (as
described in Section 3.1.4) from speakers to hearers is almost always essential. In the
case of Observational Learning and classic variants of the Naming Game where
referential information is provided, full referential information is always provided to the
Fig. 13. Model Comparison: Comparison of the different models instantiated using the basic framework
(stochastic production and reception, closed-group) of Reinforcement (with punishment, following [Barrett,
2006]), a minimal version of the Naming Game using only Referential Feedback, no punishment inhibition of
homonyms and hearer-only update (Steels & Loetzsch, 2012), Obverters with a limited memory of 35 exem-
plars (Oliphant & Batali, 1996), and Biased learners with inhibition of homonyms (Smith, 2002).
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hearer. This allows them to know with certainty which meaning the speaker intended to
convey; the only difference between the referential feedback models and observational
learning models is that, in the latter, the topic is immediately provided. In Naming Game
models with referential feedback, it is provided after the signal has been sent. However,
as evidenced by the reinforcement and Naming Game models with Yes/No Feedback
only, it is enough for referential information to only be provided sometimes. More inter-
estingly, reliable interpretive information (i.e., the hearer signaling its interpreted meaning
to the speaker) does not appear to play a significant role, as can be seen in Naming Game
models with Yes/No feedback where only the speaker learns from each interaction.
Second, information loss about previously stored associations must be present in some
form. In reinforcement learning and the obverter instantiations of the observational
learning model, this can be due to deletion, limited memory, or population turnover. In
the case of Naming Game and Biased Learning models, this can be achieved via lateral
inhibition.
In the Naming Game and Biased Learning models, lateral inhibition of homonyms also
serves to provide a bias against ambiguity. This bias seems to be intrinsic to the rein-
forcement model and obverter models; we discuss this in greater detail below.
A summary of these findings can be seen in Fig. 14, which indicates how the different
models relate to each other in terms of the basic framework, and which mechanisms are
required for each model to reliably develop optimal signaling.
5.1. Referential information
One requirement for optimal communication is conventionality: A population agrees
on how signals map to meanings. The problem is that while signals are overt, meanings
are not. If only signals passed between agents, arriving at a convention for how meanings
and signals are associated would be impossible; a mechanism for sharing this referential
information therefore must exist. Fig. 3 in Section 3.1.4 shows the two types of informa-
tion that can be made available in any interaction between agents. Referential information
details how a speaker provides an intended referent; interpretive information pertains to
how a hearer interprets a given signal. How does this apply in the models above?
In Observational Learning models, full referential information is always provided
(guaranteeing transfer of meaning as well as signal between speaker and hearer), and
interpretive information is never provided. In basic reinforcement learning, the environ-
ment provides full referential information and interpretive information after communica-
tive success, and partial information of both types after failure (although in the latter case
this information is only utilized when deletion of exemplars after unsuccessful communi-
cation is employed, i.e., punishment). The Naming Game model of Steels and Loetzsch
(2012) involves two flavors of feedback. Referential Feedback ensures that, whether a
given interaction has been a communicative success or a failure, full referential and inter-
pretive information is always provided. With Yes/No Feedback, full interpretive informa-
tion is always provided (as the hearer always indicates their interpretation), and the
amount of referential information provided depends on the success of the interaction—full
M. Spike et al. / Cognitive Science (2016) 27
referential information is only provided after success (as the speaker confirms the hearer’s
interpretation), whereas partial referential information is provided after failure (some
other member of the context must have been the intended meaning). Note again that this
is almost equivalent to Reinforcement learning except for the fact that full interpretive
information is always provided via the hearer’s pointing action.
This analysis in terms of information flow rather than agent interaction clarifies a num-
ber of issues. First, the reason Reinforcement models and Yes/No-only variants of the
Naming Game are slower to converge is simply that full referential information is not as
frequently provided (i.e., only after successful communication, rather than after every
interaction). Second, the identical behavior of the minimal instantiations of the Naming
Game and biased Observational Learning models shown in Fig. 13 is no surprise; in
both—despite the different sequencing of information transfer—hearers are always sup-
Fig. 14. An overview of how the different models (in blue) relate to each other in terms of the availability
of referential information (guaranteeing either partial or full referential information), and the model mecha-
nisms (in orange) which reliably lead those models to optimal signaling. Vertical learning and limited mem-
ory are grouped together as being types of information loss; the two forms of lateral inhibition are also
grouped together. Green squares represent the impact of Speaker and Hearer update, respectively; for exam-
ple, only hearer-directed punishment drives reinforcement to optimality, while both hearer and speaker-direc-
ted punishment are effective for Yes/No feedback models. For Referential Feedback, the * denotes the fact
that a specific configuration (hearer-directed punishment with WTA production) does lead to optimality, but
this is not otherwise indicated.
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plied with full referential information about the speaker’s signaling behavior. Finally,
while both Naming Game and Reinforcement models are often implemented so as to pro-
vide interpretive information, this is not a necessary component for the development of
optimal signaling, as shown in Fig. 7 in Section 4.2, in agreement with the conclusions
of Baronchelli (2010). The only exception to this is versions of Reinforcement and Feed-
back learning where only speakers learn; in this case, the guaranteed transfer of interpre-
tive information proves to be critical in ensuring optimality.
Crucially, conventionality is established in a population whenever speakers propagate
referential information to hearers. This is backed up by a mathematical result from Xue
(2006). Xue employs populations of interacting Polya urns; this is essentially a general-
ized version of our basic framework described in Section 3.2. Xue shows that whenever
information is passed from speaker to hearer with positive probability, a state of confor-
mity will always result. This, then, is the fundamental role of the various channels of
information transfer between speaker and hearer: ensuring conformity primarily via the
transfer of referential information about the topic from signalers to hearers.
5.2. Bias against ambiguity
With the spread of referential information, we can expect the development of conven-
tionality in a population. Unless other pressures are at play, however, these conventions
are unlikely to be optimal, as illustrated by the “imitation learner” of Oliphant and Batali
(1996) and the “maintainers” of Smith (2002). A pressure toward optimality is created in
various ways: when only successful associations are strengthened, when obverter weight-
ing is used, or when there is inhibition of homonyms. What do these mechanisms have in
common?
Our definition of optimality requires that an unambiguous signal exists for each mean-
ing and that all signals are unambiguous. Ambiguity indicates the presence of some
degree of homonymy: It is no surprise that the explicit deletion of homonyms leads to an
unambiguous system. This lateral inhibition of homonyms is the pressure that drives opti-
mality in biased Observational Learning (Smith, 2002) and Naming Game (Steels &
Loetzsch, 2012) models.
In Reinforcement models, reinforcement strengthens successful associations, therefore
preferentially increasing the weight of less ambiguous associations for the hearer. That
association is then more likely to be used again, by the hearer when later acting as a
speaker. This rich-get-richer process provides the necessary pressure against ambiguity.
Obverters also have an inherent bias against ambiguity, manifested by picking the least
ambiguous signals. However, in the absence of some form of memory loss, this bias is
either never strong enough (with stochastic production) or not reliably so (WTA) to lead
to guaranteed optimality.
We draw attention to the fact that the bias against ambiguity has multiple possible
interpretations. In Reinforcement learning the bias in incorporated in both the environ-
ment (which provides a payoff when states and acts are matched), and the ability to rec-
ognize that payoff—or, when punishment is employed, the lack of a payoff. Similarly, in
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the nearly equivalent Naming Game model with Yes/No Feedback, information about
success is established through interaction. In the Naming Game with referential feedback,
as with observational learning models, the guarantee of referential information requires
an internal bias in the form of lateral inhibition of homonyms. More sophisticated still
(but mechanistically identical) is the “rational” approach of the obverter Observational
Learning model.
As a final remark, we point out a parallel between this pressure against ambiguity and
the “amplifying function” described in De Vylder and Tuyls (2006) (outlined here in Sec-
tion 2.2), which works to eliminate synonyms and guarantees convergence in the homo-
nymy-free naming game. The true function of the bias against ambiguity is seen in the
way input meaning/signal distributions map to output meaning/signal distributions, that is,
from what an agent learns, to what an agent produces. While De Vylder’s amplifying
function acts to always privilege more common variants in the mapping from input to
output, the required bias against ambiguity applies slightly differently. Instead, the bias
ensures that the least ambiguous variants be amplified via repeated cycles of learning and
production.
5.3. Information loss
Section 4.1 highlighted the necessity of information loss in the development of optimal
communication. This can take several forms: simple forgetting through limited memory
size, the sampling effects of gradual replacement of members of the population, or more
targeted processes of deletion and lateral inhibition.
Why should information loss be beneficial, rather than a hindrance? In all models, the
initial state of the population is highly disorganized: Individual agents have maximally
ambiguous meaning/signal associations and are driven in many different, mutually incom-
patible directions as a result of their early interactions. If an optimal signaling system is to
be established, the influence of these early disorganized states must be eliminated. In stan-
dard Roth–Erev learning (and hence also exemplar learning), learners have an effectively
infinite memory and place an equal weight on all observations. Because the effect of new
information is proportional to the count of previous observations, the learning rate steadily
decreases over time. In the case of classic instantiations of the Reinforcement model—and
also in obverter Observational Learning without population turnover or forgetting—we
observe a slowing effect. In the long term, populations are trapped into non-optimal pool-
ing equilibria. The only way to avoid this is some form of information loss. It provides a
“plasticity” whereby non-optimal states can always be escaped.
As in the previous section, we note that the mechanisms which lead to information loss
can have very different interpretations and apparent functions. However, they all share
two key properties: (a) new information is privileged over old, and (b) the chance that a
particular association “survives” (either within an individual or within the population as a
whole) is proportional to its relative frequency, making possible the stability of frequent
associations against noisy loss.
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5.4. Comment: Simplifications and extensions
Our framework involves a number of simplifications. To expand on our comments in
Section 3.2, increasing the population size appears to result in roughly linear growth in
the number of interactions required for convergence, but quadratic growth when increas-
ing the number of meanings and signals. To measure the effect of increasing the popula-
tion, we took the average time to convergence over 10 simulations for the original
population size. We then successively doubled that size to attain values for populations
of 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640, and 1,280. The time to convergence was found to
roughly double for each doubling in population. A similar method was used for meanings
and signals, with 5, 10, 20, 40, 80, and 160 tested. In this case, each doubling resulted in
a roughly fourfold increase in time to convergence. However, due to the time constraints
imposed by computational limitations, we are not able to make any strong claims on this
basis, particularly in light of the fact that Barr (2004) observed something more like loga-
rithmic growth when he increased the number of agents in his simulations. In any case,
the linear or slower growth resulting from increased population sizes seems less problem-
atic than the quadratic increase which occurs when more meanings and signals are used.
The emergence of novel sign languages such as NSL involves large signal and meanings
inventories. These results suggest that this process might necessarily be piecemeal, first
establishing small number of conventional meaning-signal mappings and then expanding.
It would be an interesting direction for future research to empirically verify whether this
is indeed the case.
Moving away from matters of simple scaling, the fully connected populations used in
the model are quite unlike the social structures found in actual human societies, which
tend to exhibit the “small-world” property identified by Milgram (1967). This is a very
rich area of study and impossible to treat thoroughly here, but we draw attention to the
possibility of an interaction between the agent model and the network type; indeed, Barr
(2004) shows that one very simple strategy (stay/switch, described in Section 2.2) is inef-
fective in fully connected populations but seemingly optimal in more sparsely connected
networks. In some further preliminary work, we have investigated the effects of placing
agents on small-world networks and also very sparsely connected lattice networks. For
small-world networks, it appears that the short average path-length between any two
agents leads to no great divergence from our observations above. For lattice networks,
however, where any two agents can be separated by a significant number of intermedi-
aries, we found that the global emergence of a single set of optimal signaling conventions
was not guaranteed for the majority of simulation runs even under parameter setting
which lead to convergence in fully connected populations; rather, populations converge
on a series of local optimal conventions (as also seen in Smith, 2003). This certainly war-
rants further investigation, but we are encouraged by the fact that the more realistic net-
work structures do not appear to conflict with our proposed general requirements.
Finally, as observed by Zipf (1936), words in natural languages tend to roughly follow
a power law distribution; that is, the frequency f (w) of a word scales more or less
according to its frequency r rank r, so that f ðwÞ / 1r. We amended our model so that the
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presentation of meanings had such a distribution, first for the case of 5 meanings and sig-
nals, and then for 50 meanings and signals, and compared the resulting number of itera-
tions to convergence with those for uniform meaning distributions. These investigations
found a distinct effect whereby the power-law distributions led to slower convergence,
but within the same order of magnitude (1.5 times as long for 5 signals and meanings,
and 3 times as long for 50). As such, we are content that—at least in this case—our
results are robust to manipulations of meaning frequency.
6. Conclusions
To reiterate the remarks of Section 5, we argue that the necessary requirements leading
to the reliable development of optimal signaling conventions in populations of interacting
agents are as follows:
1. A way of propagating referential information
2. The presence of a bias against ambiguity/homonymy
3. Some form of information loss
One way to look at these requirements is as a solution at Marr’s computational level
of analysis (Marr & Poggio, 1976). There are, however, multiple solutions at the repre-
sentational level—presumably more than the four we have surveyed here. With this in
mind, what can we say about which strategies are actually employed by humans, whether
in naturalistic or experimental settings? At this point, it is worth re-examining two of the
requirements—reference and bias—as there is a discernibly common pattern in how they
are treated.
In contrast to Lewis’s (1969) proposal that common ground must play a role in the
establishment of optimal signaling, none of the theories here require global knowledge
beyond agreement on a set of shared meanings and signals. Where they differ is in how
reference is established through individual interactions. Reinforcement learning requires
environmental cues to create reference where none existed before; models in the Naming
Game framework assume the existence of referential meaning but concern themselves
with how pairs create shared reference; in observational learning models, the salience of
reference is assumed. In all cases, referential information is shared during interaction.9
The different roles of reference in these models can be construed as involving increasing
degrees of cognitive sophistication: first environmental stimulus, then explicitly negoti-
ated, and finally implicitly available. Humans use all these strategies (Ashby, Maddox, &
Bohil, 2002; Fay, Arbib, & Garrod, 2013; Scott-Phillips, Kirby, & Ritchie, 2009). Rein-
forcement learning is arguably the simplest account here in cognitive terms.
A similar trend can be seen with the bias against ambiguity. Reinforcement learning
requires only recognition of variability in stimuli:Operant conditioning (surveyed in Staddon
& Cerutti, 2003) has long been established as a common animal behavior. Inhibition of homo-
nymy is a type of mutual exclusivity bias (Markman & Wachtel, 1988), and more complex
pragmatic inference resembling obverter learning has been experimentally observed in lan-
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guage games by Frank and Goodman (2012). Again, reinforcement learning appears to pre-
sent the simplest strategy, while not necessarily the most efficient one.
Modern humans can utilize all the cognitive abilities described above. Which, then, are
involved in the self-organization of functional communication systems we see in the wild
(e.g., in the emergence of homesign or indigenous sign languages such as NSL or ABSL
and in the lab (e.g., in studies on experimental semiotics)? Presumably, there must be
some interplay between the individual task demands of the particular communicative set-
ting—whether naturalistic or experimental—and the cognitive expenditure which is
required. It is very likely, for example, that certain communicative settings will favor a
particular strategy where others favor a different one, perhaps selected depending on the
type and quality of feedback available. We suggest that this may be a fruitful line of
enquiry for future experimental work.
What we hope our comparative approach has shown is the multiple realizability of
behavior that leads to the emergence of signaling conventions. Compelling evidence for
the explanatory role of any particular mechanism (e.g., learning bias or feedback) should
not be taken as evidence for that being the only explanation. Hopefully, we can instead
integrate these numerous insights and gain a richer understanding of the tapestry of
human communicative behavior.
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Notes
1. This is essentially a type of conformist frequency-dependent bias (Boyd & Richer-
son, 1985).
2. This is in the case of well-connected populations: Neural network populations did
not arrive at global convergence when they were placed on “small neighborhood”
network topologies.
3. The source code for the model can be found at https://github.com/matspike/
Cogscisignaling
4. Formally, T = {C  PðMÞ| |C| = c}.
5. This sufficiently reduces the probability that any given meaning is not sampled.
6. Note, however, that Barr (2004) observed non-linear, logarithmic growth when
using expanded populations.
7. In subsequent figures, we will make use of time-course graphs when we feel some
indication of relative speed of convergence is necessary. The final distribution of
communicative accuracy scores will be shown otherwise. We point out that these
distributions are stable and are not to be taken as intermediate stages which may
yet develop optimality.
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8. On closer inspection of individual simulation time-courses, hearer-only learning
and punishment reliably tends toward optimality but almost never reaches it. This
is due to the stochastic nature of the basic framework: Because minority meaning/
signal associations are less likely to be used by the population, they are also
increasingly less likely to be deleted (a type must be used to be unsuccessful). In
the specific case of WTA hearer-only learning and punishment, this effect is
avoided. This is the only time when WTA instead of stochastic processes prove to
be a critical factor in the development of optimal signaling.
9. There is an issue we have not addressed here, which Smith (2005) refers to as the
“signal redundancy paradox”; that is, why signal if meaning can be transferred
otherwise, for example, via pointing? There are a number of approaches to this
problem, ranging from the observation that signaling, once established, allows for
both displaced reference and communication out of the line of sight, to the pro-
posal by Smith (2005) that most meaning transfer must not be explicit but require
sophisticated inference. This is very interesting work, but we follow the precedent
in much of the earlier work on the evolution of signaling systems by deferring the
study of this important question.
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3.1 Signalling games review
In the previous chapter, we looked at the problem of how learned signalling sys-
tems come into being. The main accounts seeking to explain this — reinforcement
learning, feedback learning, biased observational learning and rational ‘obverter’
learning — appear at first sight to be mutually incompatible. However, by 1) using
a simplified exemplar-style framework to directly compare the different theories,
and 2) investigating the effect of incrementally adding individual features, we
have seen that only 3 requirements underlie the ability of any system to reliably
self-organise optimal signalling: the ability to create and transmit referential infor-
mation, a systemic bias against ambiguity, and finally some form of information
loss.
Of course, this is not the end of the story. As with any model, the framework
presented in the previous chapter represents a significant simplification of real-
ity, and there are a number of ways in which we could relax its assumptions. In
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this chapter, I address one of these: referential uncertainty. I investigate its im-
plications on the previously investigated models, and show that it places further
restrictions on the three requirements outlined above.
3.2 Signalling with referential uncertainty
Referential uncertainty is a feature which appears in some of the previous mod-
els, namely the signalling games with reinforcement and feedback learners but,
notably, not models which involve observational learning. However, even in these
cases, there is always some mechanism which allows reference to be resolved.
In reinforcement learning (allowing for the fact that ‘reference’ is not defined
in the relevant source literature) reference is only completely resolved after suc-
cessful communication: for feedback learning, the various analogues of pointing
behaviour provide the necessary referential information.
However, as famously pointed out by Quine (1960), for any utterance heard
for the first time there are many possible references. Some mechanism must ac-
count for how language learners are able to solve this problem with such apparent
ease, as is the case with children’s ability to fast-map (Carey & Bartlett, 1978) new
words with their referents after only a few exposures. One candidate mechanism
(which has appeared in several guises) is that humans employ some cognitive or
behavioural strategy which leads to a significant reduction in referential uncer-
tainty. For example, phenomena such as a shape bias (Landau et al., 1988) and
other biases for colour, size, and relevance may play some role in reducing uncer-
tainty about the intended reference. Another candidate is joint attention— which
Tomasello (2010) and others argue for being a prerequisite for the evolutionary
emergence of human language — which, by directing the focus of both interlocu-
tors towards the same topic, provides a natural reduction in uncertainty.
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Even with such mechanisms in place, Quine argues that some meanings will
always remain indistinguishable from each other as they always refer to the same
stimuli.1 What is necessary, then, is some principled way of acquiring words in
the face of this uncertainty. While this is particularly pertinent for theories involv-
ing observational learning (where the transfer of referential information is simply
assumed), it may also be of relevance to feedback and reinforcement learning ac-
counts: in the former, for example, pointing behaviour may not be reliable, and
even if it is Quine’s essential problem remains (what exactly is being pointed at?)
and in reinforcement learning it may be that different states of the world (i.e. dif-
ferent referents) both reward the same behaviour, leaving no way to distinguish
between them.
Cross-situational learning strategies (e.g. Pinker, 1984; Siskind, 1996; Frank
et al., 2009; Blythe et al., 2010; K. Smith, 2011) rely on an ability to track words
along with some subset of the meanings with which they have co-occurred (de-
pending on the strategy, this can be all co-occurring meanings, a memory-limited
subset, or the current best guess). By doing this over many exposures, the correct
mappings become statistically inferable (usually by simply choosing the most fre-
quent meaning/label co-occurrences). As shown by Siskind (1996) and Blythe
et al. (2010), strategies like this succeed with high probability when applied to
the problem of learning a static set of associations, as long as there are enough
exposures.
A. Smith (2001) provides an early investigation into how communication sys-
tems can be established without explicit meaning transfer. In a crucial difference
from the models which we have already surveyed, Smith models the simultaneous
development of an agent’s internal representation of meaning alongside the lexi-
1See Blythe et al. (2014) for a discussion of what Quine intended to say and how it has been
subsequently interpreted.
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con. Using the obverter strategy from Oliphant & Batali (1996), Smith finds that
some degree of communication does develop between agents in the absence of
feedback. However, due to the fact that agents’ internal representations of mean-
ing categories are highly unlikely to ever be shared, stable and optimal communi-
cation is never attainable. In a simpler model in which agents share a categorial
representation of the world, Vogt & Coumans (2003) investigate what they term
the ‘selfish game’, a direct analogue of cross-situational learning in which agents
never establish joint attention or provide any feedback. Vogt & Coumans employ
populations of Bayesian learners which are also roughly equivalent to obverter
learners. They conclude that these populations are able to bootstrap signalling
conventions even when constrained by uncertain reference, but only when an iter-
ated learning paradigm is employed.
Fontanari & Cangelosi (2009) use two-agent populations to investigate how
two different types of learners negotiate a communication system in the face
of referential uncertainty, what they refer to as ‘unsupervised’ and ‘supervised’
learners. Both supervised and unsupervised learners are simply represented: a
single association matrix which determines their signal production and reception
behaviour; a type of obverter reception2; and finally, a limited memory. Unsu-
pervised learners use a learning algorithm which is roughly equivalent to that in
Blythe et al. (2010), where a received signal is associated with every item in the
provided context. Supervised learners, on the other hand, enact a type of Naming
Game in which Yes/No feedback is provided and also punish failed associations.
Interestingly, neither type of learner leads to the reliable development of signalling
conventions: Fontanari & Cangelosi observe some differences between their rela-
2They descibe this using the term ‘introverted obverter’, coined by K. Smith (2003a). This
refers to an obverter strategy which relies on personal observations instead of global knowledge,
and is basically identical to the obverter learners described in the first chapter.
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tive error rates, but shown them to behave identically in the limit.
At this point, I would like to make two key observations. Firstly, neither of
Fontanari’s learners instantiates a strategy which drives a pressure against homo-
nyms. Lateral inhibition is used but only against synonyms, and as we have seen
before, some pressure against ambiguous terms must exist for a population to con-
verge on an optimal signalling system. Likewise, obverter reception alone does
not lead to the elimination of ambiguity, as only production can lead to a change
in signalling behaviour. And while the inhibition of homonyms is certainly not
present in the unsupervised configuration, one might expect the punishment em-
ployed by the supervised learner to be sufficient, given that it also has a limited
memory. As can be seen in the previous chapter, these mechanisms are sufficient
for the Yes/No signalling game to reach an optimal state for both speakers and
hearers. My suspicion here is that the way that lateral inhibition of synonyms
in this model interacts with cross-situational learning interferes with the devel-
opment of optimal systems. However there is a more substantial problem: the
supervised learner is not engaging in cross-situational learning. If we analyse the
interaction, it is identical to that of Steels & Loetzsch (2012) except for the fact
that only Yes/No feedback is used. As soon as a mechanism is able to eliminate
referential uncertainty, the essential problem of cross-situational learning evapo-
rates. As an example, Steels’ original model also included a restricted context,
but is not described as requiring cross-situational learning. Because feedback is
reliant on the hearer’s interpretation of a signal, restricting the context can only
serve to further decrease referential uncertainty, which is no longer necessary. For
this reason, I will only investigate the behaviour of the unsupervised learner pop-
ulations in the following section.
Finally, De Beule et al. (2006) observe that although the simulations of Vogt
& Coumans (2003) do result in populations of optimal signallers, they never set-
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tle upon an efficient set of one-to-one signal/meaning conventions. Also using
a type of ‘introspective obverter’ alongside a rather complex parametric update
rule3 which leads to the suppression of homonyms alongside the lateral inhibition
of synonyms, they show that populations are able to reliably bootstrap optimal
and efficient lexicons under referential uncertainty.
3.2.1 Notes on previous models
The models surveyed in the previous section are not a significant departure from
the signalling games mapped out in Section 3.1, and all in fact use some form of
obverter production or reception. Apart from the ‘supervised’ learner of Fontanari
& Cangelosi (2009), they all restrict themselves to forms of observational learn-
ing. As stated before, this is because cross-situational learning ceases to have any
relevance if there is a reliable mechanism for providing unambiguous referential
information. As a result, no form of feedback learning can be considered, as both
Yes/No feedback and Referential feedback result in the indication of a clear refer-
ent at least some of the time. Likewise, a modified form of reinforcement learning
in which hearers are provided with a limited context along with every signal (as
well as feedback on success) is still more informative than observational learn-
ing, in which only context and signal are ever received4. This being the case, we
can restrict ourselves to the two main forms of observational learning, the biased
learner and the Bayesian/obverter learners.
The models surveyed in the previous section don not explicitly refer to the
3One of the sources of this complexity is a method which ensures that agents remain responsive
to new data which contradicts their current state but are unchanged by confirmatory data.
4In fact, for any model which includes the occasional provision of full referential information,
reducing the context is always informative. It is only the case in observational learning that the
only available referential information is via differential contexts.
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idea of a ‘biased learner’. However, both Fontanari & Cangelosi (2009) and De
Beule et al. (2006) do feature lateral inhibition, although in both cases this affects
synonyms instead of homonyms. All three of the models employ some form of
obverter, on the other hand: in Vogt & Coumans and De Beule et al. an obverter
function is used for production only, while in Fontanari & Cangelosi for reception
only. This leads to to a prediction, based on the work of the previous chapter, that
the inability of Fontanari’s models to develop optimal systems can be likely be
partially attributed to the fact that neither of the key mechanisms (i.e. inhibition of
homonyms or obverter production with information loss) which lead to optimality
for the standard observational learning models are present. The following section
will investigate the effects of the main mechanisms which apply to observational
learning, i.e. lateral inhibition, obverter learning, and information loss: this will
be done in the context of the models we have just discussed, which requires the
addition of a small number of extra features.
3.2.2 The exemplar framework extended
We will continue with the basic signalling game framework as outlined in Spike
et al. (2016), with minimal adjustments.
The first decision we have to make is the choice of how to represent an obser-
vational event as an exemplar. In previous models, an unambiguous link between
a specific meaning/topic m = t and signal s created a single exemplar. In this new
condition, only signals are presented unambiguously. Meanings, however, are
only ever presented as a size c context C ∈M, and the topic t is never explicitly
communicated. As such, we are presented with a choice between:
1. Given the set of meanings {mi, . . . ,m j} ⊂ C, create c new exemplars, one
for each m, each associated with signal s, or;
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2. Create only a single new exemplar by using some procedure to select the
best candidate meaning mbest ∈C and associate that with signal s. This can
be done stochastically, proportionally to the weights of exemplars, or using
winner-takes-all, which always takes the most heavily weighted candidate.
All previous models utilised the first approach, but the second approach is also a
viable solution as will be seen in the following section.
We must also make a decision about how lateral inhibition can be instanti-
ated. If we use the first procedure, creating a large amount of new exemplars with
each observation, there is likely to be an interaction with the number of exemplars
which are deleted. Previously, we distinguished between minimal inhibition —
where a single competing exemplar is deleted — or broad inhibition — where one
competing exemplar of each competitor type is deleted (e.g. for synonym inhibi-
tion, one exemplar with the same meaning but a different signal for all competing
signals). In section 3.1, we demonstrated that there is no significant difference be-
tween the two: where inhibition is required, both reliably lead to optimality. But
this is only when a single exemplar is added. In this case, we cannot assume that
a single deletion will still be sufficient to drive towards optimality, and as such
should look again at the difference between the two.
If we use the second procedure, on the other hand, and only add a single exem-
plar, we must consider how homonym inhibition might work. After being provided
with a signal s and a context C (but not a topic t), and if we then wish to inhibit a
competing homonym for mbest we need to determine if there is any difference be-
tween inhibiting any competing homonym, or only competing homonyms which
are in the context, or only those which are not in the context. More formally,
should we inhibit an exemplar X = 〈mk,sk〉 where:
1. X = 〈mk 6= mbest , sk = s〉 or
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2. X = 〈mk 6= mbest & mk ∈C , sk = s〉 or
3. X = 〈mk 6= mbest & mk /∈C , sk = s〉
Finally, we can look at the implications for the obverter strategy. As before,
there is a distinction between obverter production and reception. We know from
our previous work that obverter reception alone never leads to optimality. How-
ever, for obverter production, we must decide whether the context is taken into
account during the process. That is, when selecting the most communicative sig-
nal, should the obverter disregard meanings which are not in the current context?
Looking at Table 3.1, we can see how this can be an issue. When obverters pick a
signal, they choose the one which is most likely to be interpreted correctly accord-
ing to their observations. It is possible that a different signal could be more likely
to be interpreted as the intended meaning if another meaning, not in the current
context, were taken into account.5
3.2.3 Results
As in the previous section, the basic underlying framework is an urn-model. On
top of this, we add individual mechanisms so that we can observe their effect, and
in particular whether they reliably lead to optimal signalling. To recapitulate, as
all models are necessarily observational learners, the main mechanisms are i) the
Biased Learner which uses lateral inhibition of homonyms and/or synonyms, and
ii) the Obverter learner. Additional mechanisms which can apply to both types
of learner are the inclusion of a limited memory, closed group populations vs.
vertical learners and WTA vs. stochastic production and reception.
5The corollary is trivial: obverter reception should only consider meanings present in the con-
text (in this simplified model at least).
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(A) S1 S2 S3
t → M1 0.4 0.3 0.1
M2 0.3 0.4 0.0
M3 0.3 0.3 0.9
(B) S1 S2 S3
C

t → M1 1 0 0
M2 0 1 0
M3 0 0 1
(C) S1 S2 S3
C
 t → M1 0 0 1M2 0 1 0
M3
Table 3.1: Matrices demonstrating the process of obverter production where C is
the context and t = M1 is the topic. (A) is a reception matrix and is used as the
basis of obverter production in (B) and (C). If there an unrestricted context as in
(B), the best signal is S1. If there is a restricted context as in (C), the best signal
is now S3 (assuming WTA production/reception for simplicity).
For both biased learners and obverters, I investigate the difference between
context-recorders which add an exemplar for each meaning in the context, and
the interpretation-recorders which add only a single exemplar, representing the
most likely interpretation. For context recorders, the strength of lateral inhibi-
tion (i.e. how many exemplars are removed) now needs to be taken into account.
Interpretation-recorders only need to inhibit one competing homonym or syn-
onym; for these, I look at whether competitors from only within or without the
current context (or both) should be inhibited.
Applying only to obverter learners, I will look at whether it is important
whether signallers consider only the meanings in the context, or all possible mean-
ings.
All other model parameters are the same as the previous exemplar framework,
with 10 agents and 5 signals and meanings. The context is now kept at three
CHAPTER 3. SIGNALLING WITH REFERENTIAL UNCERTAINTY 51
Figure 3.1: Context-recorder biased learners with lateral inhibition of homonyms.
Images (a), (b), and (c) demonstrate WTA models, and the effects of increasing
the lateral inhibition from 1 to 3 competing exemplars. Image (d) demonstrates
that Stochastic models are incompatible with the context-recorder strategy.
meanings (including the topic) randomly selected with uniform probability at each
signalling event.
Biased Learners
We can first separate the cross-situational biased learners into the context-recorders
and the interpretation-recorders. While both types of learner are able to develop
optimal signalling, the mechanisms which allow each to do so are not the same.
To summarise the results: interpretation-recorders specifically require that both
homonyms and synonyms are inhibited, and the inhibition of homonyms must in-
clude meanings which are present in the context. Context recorders, on the other
hand, require only that homonyms are inhibited. However, lateral inhibition must
ensure that more than one deletion is made for each competing token. Further-
more, while both stochastic and WTA production and reception are both effective
for the interpretation-recorders, context-recorders necessitate WTA. As would be
expected from the results from the models of simple signalling, the inclusion of a
limited memory or vertical transmission has no effect: the information loss pro-
vided by lateral inhibition provides sufficient plasticity to the system.
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Figure 3.2: Interpretation recorder biased learners. For both WTA and Stochastic
agents, lateral inhibition of both homonyms and synonyms is necessary to guar-
antee the emergence of optimal signalling, otherwise there is a small possibility
that some meanings are left uncovered (see below).
Figure 3.1 shows WTA closed-group context-recorders and the effects of in-
creasing the amount of lateral inhibition. When only one or two exemplars are
deleted for each competitor, optimal systems do not develop, but increasing it to
three exemplars tips the balance. The reason for this is simple: the probability of
a competing homonym being inhibited Pi is smaller than Pr, the chance of being
reinforced (in the case of these parameter settings, Pi = 0.4 and Pr = 0.6). This is
simply the ratio between the size of the context and the number of meanings. If
lateral inhibition is not strong enough, it appears that it populations are unable to
overcome this imbalance and optimality never develops.
Similarly, the context-recorders in Figure 3.1(d) demonstrate that while WTA
production and reception will always develop optimal signalling when enough
lateral inhibition of homonyms is applied, stochastic agents are never able to do
so. On reflection, this is also an obvious result: optimal systems for stochastic
agents can only exist when each signal is associated with only exemplars of a sin-
gle meaning. As context-recorders always associate multiple meanings with each
received signal, optimal systems are necessarily impossible for this configuration.
Figure 3.2 shows interpretation-recorders, once again in closed groups with
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Figure 3.3: Interpretation recorder biased learners, demonstrating the importance
of inhibiting meanings which are presented within the same context as the inter-
pretation. This is the case for both WTA agents (a-c) and Stochastic agents (d).
minimal inhibition. For both stochastic and WTA production/reception, we can
see that while inhibiting homonyms does not reliably lead to optimal signalling,
inhibiting both homonyms and synonyms does. However, as we will see in more
detail shortly, this is only as long as competing exemplars whose meaning is
within the presented context are (at least some of the time) the target of inhibi-
tion.
The explanation for why synonyms must be inhibited is slightly difficult. In
standard observational learning, every meaning is almost guaranteed to be asso-
ciated with a signal. Because every meaning will be prompted at some stage,
and due to the explicit presentation of the meaning/signal pair to the learner, each
learner will reliably be presented with exemplars associated with all meanings.
For interpretation-recorders, only signals are presented explicitly, whereas mean-
ings are only available via context. The upshot of this is that biased learners are
able to develop vocabularies which consist entirely of unambiguous signals, but
because synonymy is permitted, certain meanings remain ‘uncovered’ with no as-
sociated exemplars. Table 3.2 provides an illustrated example of such a situation.
As can be seen, an anti-synonymy bias is required to ‘free-up’ a signal for use
with an uncovered meaning, as we see in the modelling work above.
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Speaker S1 S2 S3
M1 2 0 3
M2 0 1 0
M3 0 0 0
Hearer S1 S2 S3
M1 4 0 1
M2 0 3 0
M3 0 0 0
Table 3.2: Interpretation-recorders and uncovered meanings. An example of a
speaker-hearer pair where a sub-optimal state has been reached where one mean-
ing is not covered. The speaker has no associations for M3, and will send any
of the its repertoire of signals with uniform probability. The hearer will never
interpret any signal as M3, and hence is incapable of recording a new exemplar
associated with M3. This situation can only be remedied by including a bias
against synonyms. Not that this situation would be the case if speaker and learner
changed positions, and that no difference in behaviour would be expected between
WTA and stochastic agents.
Finally, for interpretation-recorders, it is necessary for inhibition to apply to
meanings which have been presented in the same context, as can be seen in Fig.
3.3. If within-context meanings are not inhibited, too much ambiguity is allowed
to remain within the system for the development of optimal signalling: this may
be due to the fact that meanings in this parameter set-up are more likely to appear
within a context than without, hence the chance of reinforcement is always higher
than the chance of being inhibited. Also, when inhibition does not occur within-
context it may allow for pairs of homonyms to develop which remain stable over
time.
Obverter Learners
Obverter learners can also be separated into context-recorders and interpretation-
recorders. For obverters, however, the second strategy requires an extra consid-
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eration. When we looked at the models with explicit meaning transfer in Spike
et al. (2016), we observed that only obverter production was a factor in the de-
velopment of optimal signalling. As discussed earlier, this is because the gradual
change in a signalling system towards optimality relies upon the production of new
meaning/signal associations. When meaning transfer is explicit, it is the process
of production which is entirely responsible for the creation of new associations.
When there is indeterminacy of meaning, however, and interpretation is used as
the basis of creating new exemplars, we must consider whether obverter reception
might now play a role.
As such, the main parameters which I want to examine are whether obverter
strategies lead to optimal signalling, and to re-confirm previous results that this
also requires some form of information loss (either vertical learning or a limited
memory). Additionally, we need to see whether it is necessary to confine obverter
production to only those meanings which are present in the context.
Our results are as predicted: all obverter models which were able to create
functional signalling systems required some form of information loss, whether
this was a limited memory or vertical transmission. Also as expected, context-
recorder obverters resemble the biased learners in that only WTA production leads
to optimal signalling. Once again, this is a simple consequence of the fact that
several exemplars are added with each exposure, meaning that stochastic produc-
tion/reception will never lead to one-to-one mappings.
Staying with context-recorder obverters, another (perhaps surprising) result is
that observational learning in which only the hearer is modified — as has been
the case for all previous observational models — does not drive the development
of optimal signalling. However, as can be seen in Fig. 3.4, if the speaker is also
modified after every interaction to record an exemplar by associating the signal
with its intended meaning, it does reliably drive the emergence of signalling sys-
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Figure 3.4: Context-recorder obverter learners with a memory limit of 150 ex-
emplars (a larger memory is necessary because every meaning in the context
is recorded), demonstrating for WTA agents the difference between modifying
only the hearer after an interaction (a), or modifying both speaker and hearer (b).
Stochastic agents (c) are once again incompatible with the context-recorder strat-
egy, while (d) shows the necessity of using an obverter which considers possible
meanings which are not within the provided context.
tems. This particular configuration is actually the same as the learners in Vogt
& Coumans (2003). Exactly why this is the case is not clear, but it seems that
the obverter bias against ambiguity is not strong enough to promote one-to-one
mappings without the extra nudge provided by this type of speaker update. This
intuition will be further explored in the next chapter.
This seems to be supported by the fact that for interpretation-recorders, only
modifying the hearer is necessary. As seen in Fig. 3.5, as long as a type of
information loss exists optimal signalling will reliably develop. This occurs over
a longer time-scale than would be the case without referential uncertainty, but this
is unsurprising given the extra noise and impoverished information transfer that
characterises these models.
For both context-recorders and interpretation-recorders, a novel result (illus-
trated in Fig. 3.5) is that it is important for the obverter producer to not restrict
themselves to only the meanings present in the context, but consider all possi-
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Figure 3.5: Interpretation-recorder obverter learners with a memory limit of 35
exemplars, showing that WTA obverters which do not consider meanings out-
side of the current context (a) are unable to reliably develop optimal signalling,
but WTA obverters which do consider out-of-context meanings (b) are able to do
so. Stochastic obverters (c) and (d) show the same pattern, but take significantly
longer.
ble interpretations of their signal. In purely communicative terms this may seem
highly unintuitive: as can be seen in Table 3.1, different contexts can make for
crucial changes in interpretation. To understand why it is important to consider
all possible meanings, we should keep in mind that an optimal system is defined
across all possible contexts: while the obverter procedure which restricts itself to
a particular context may be more effective at guaranteeing communicative suc-
cess for that particular instance, it does not drive the overall signalling system
towards optimality. To expand upon this: in standard referential signalling games,
an obverter is not just trying to provide the most communicative signal for a given
meaning. What obverter production really provides is information about the opti-
mal signal for other agents to use to communicate the topic meaning to itself. In
essence, the procedure is as much a form of teaching as it is learning. When ref-
erence is uncertain, the intended topic is now uncertain. If the obverter only takes
into account the current context, it is equivalent to saying ‘given this particular
context, this is the best signal to communicate my intended meaning’, as opposed
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to; ‘given any context, here is the best way to communicate my intended mean-
ing’. For this reason, ignoring the current context is actually an optimal strategy.
3.2.4 Discussion
Clearly, referential uncertainty does not require a radical rethink about which
strategies lead to the development of optimal signalling. Besides the fact that
it narrows the field to models of observational learning, the same requirements
remain: the transfer of referential information, a bias against ambiguity, and a
form of information loss. The role of information loss remains unchanged: this is
provided by lateral inhibition in the case of biased learners, and a limited memory
or vertical learning for obverters.
One place we see a slight difference is that a straightforward bias against am-
biguity is, by itself, no longer a sufficient criterion of optimality. This manifests
in different ways particular to each model. For context-recorders, whether the
biased learners or obverters, this is because the act of adding multiple exemplars
blocks the ability of the system to successfully settle on one-to-one mappings.
Biased learners and obverters tackle this problem in necessarily different ways:
biased learners must increase the effect of lateral inhibition to compensate. Ob-
verters have no mechanism of deletion except for information loss, and so must
compensate in the opposite way: the speaker simultaneously strengthens the one-
to-one association between the signal and the intended meaning. In any case, both
strategies lead towards the reliable development of optimal signalling.
For interpretation-recorders the pattern is slightly different. Biased learners
can fall into a trap where certain meanings are left ‘uncovered’, i.e. they will
never be the interpretation of any given signal. This is a case where, unlike in
earlier models, synonymy is detrimental to communication. Because of this, the
lateral inhibition of synonyms becomes an important factor for these models. By
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doing away with shared labels, they free words up which can be used for meanings
which have been left uncovered. Interpretation-recorder obverters, on the other
hand, are able to deal with this problem for the simple reason that information
loss is already necessary for obverters: when multiple signals are spread out over a
single meaning, there are less exemplars for each signal/meaning association than
for meanings which have no synonymy. As such, they are a much more likely
candidate for total loss at some point, freeing them up again for an uncovered
meaning.
The most obvious difference between these models and those of Spike et al.,
of course, is that the amount of referential information available in these models is
— by definition — less. Context-recorders and interpretation-recorders deal with
this in seemingly different ways. In the former case, agents record all available
information about the possible associations between meanings and signals, and
then bootstrap this information by relying on mechanisms similar to the cross-
situational learning algorithms presented in work such as Blythe et al. (2010). Al-
though it might seem that interpretation-recorders jettison this same information
when they record only their interpretation, which is quite likely to be incorrect.
One way of understanding this is to first look at a simpler case: how can an al-
ready optimal shared signalling system remain stable? Agents will always use
an unambiguous signal for the topic regardless of the context; that association
will continue to be reinforced and the system will persist. How could a new agent
learn this optimal system via interpretation-recording? Basically, the correct asso-
ciations are more likely to be strengthened over time than incorrect ones: they will
be in more of the presented contexts. Once we factor in information loss, there
is surprisingly little to separate the two strategies. Context-recorders use all the
available data to infer the most likely hypothesis, whereas interpretation-recorders
use less memory to keep track of the best current hypothesis.
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A final observation related to interpretation-recorders is that as long as the
method of learning includes some bias against ambiguity — whether that is lat-
eral inhibition or the obverter strategy — along with a way of ensuring that all
meanings are covered (i.e. anti-synonymy or obverting) individual agents will be
able to settle on personal vocabularies which are completely optimal even when
no referential information is ever supplied, i.e. when the size of the context is
equal to the number of meanings. The catch, of course, is that none of the per-
sonal systems are ever likely to be shared by other agents. This fits in well with
the conclusions of the previous chapter: only two of the ingredients required for
the development of optimality are present, namely the bias against ambiguity and
information loss, while referential information transfer is not.
We can now look at the extra features which are required to allow observa-
tional learners to construct optimal signalling in the face of referential uncertainty.
For biased learners and for obverters, we have seen that both the context-recording
and the interpreter-recorder strategies will lead to reliable development of sig-
nalling, but with certain provisos. For context recorders using biased learning,
inhibition must be strong enough to overcome the increase in the number of ex-
emplars. Obverters using the same strategy cannot overcome the weight of the
extra exemplars through inhibition: the only strategy left open is for speakers to
solve the problem by strengthening their intended association. For interpretation
recorders, on the other hand, the story is slightly more involved: biased learners
must inhibit both homonyms and synonyms, and meanings within the presented
context must be the target of this inhibition. The context plays another role for
obverters, but in a seemingly counter-intuitive manner: optimal signalling only
develops when obverters (during production) essentially behave as if there were
no context.
How can we draw this together? The seemingly disparate features outlined
CHAPTER 3. SIGNALLING WITH REFERENTIAL UNCERTAINTY 61
above all have one thing in common: they counteract referential uncertainty and
drive the emergence of globally unambiguous signals, and provide a solution to
the problem of how one-to-one mappings can emerge when they are never ex-
plicitly available. As stated before, context-recorders and interpretation-recorders
both rely on a simple inference from data, but just time this inferential step dif-
ferently. As for the other necessary features, they all ensure that the inference is
driven towards one-to-one mappings from signal to meaning.
Finally, as with the previous section, I’d like to stress that all of these accounts
are feasible. Once again, it is the shared features which are worth emphasising. In
fact, all of these are a modification of the bias against ambiguity. When reference
is uncertain, we further require 1) a way of inferring unambiguous mappings from
ambiguous data, and 2) a production mechanism which minimises the ambiguity
of any given context. In other words, speakers need to create and select signals
which are explicit as possible, and hearers need to be sensitive to the speaker’s
strategy.
Chapter 4
Information dynamics of learned
signalling
4.1 Overview
My aim in this chapter is to cast the three requirements (referential information,
bias against ambiguity, and information loss) presented in previous chapters in a
more abstract, formal way. My motivation for this is generality.
The requirements are observations about the behaviour of computational mod-
els. A criticism often levelled against models like this (or modelling in general)
is that there is always at least some element to their design which is an arbi-
trary choice. Despite the purpose of the exemplar/urn-model framework being
to reduce this as much as possible, it is hard to prove that any or all of the re-
quirements might be specific to some aspect of that model. For example, I have
previously referred to the fact that urn-models use a type of Roth-Erev learning
(Roth & Erev, 1995): Skyrms (2010) himself devotes some time to demonstrating
their difference from another popular type of parametric1 reinforcement learning,
1This is where learning directly affects the probability distributions which describe agent be-
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namely that of Bush & Mosteller (1953). A very reasonable question to ask is
whether the requirements still hold for a framework based around that type of
learning. One response to this would be to repeat all of the previously detailed
experiments around a new framework. This not only requires time, but wouldn’t
avoid the problem: any new proposed type of learning (or any other adjustment
to the model) would again threaten to invalidate the observations. What is needed
is a way to phrase the requirements in a general way which can avoid having to
repeat the experiments ad infinitum.
In this chapter, I’ll propose a simpler way of capturing the dynamics of any
population of learning signallers, provided they are modelled as a single set of
meaning/signal associations. My main tools in doing this are borrowed from in-
formation theory. Despite its relevant-sounding name, information theory has
proven to be ill-suited for any theory of human communication, because it has no
way of describing semantic/referential content (Shannon & Weaver, 1964), as we
shall see later in this chapter. In this case, I am able to avoid this problem by en-
forcing a small number of extra constraints which apply specifically to signalling
games. This allows me to construct a simplified state-space based on the idea of
conditional entropy, and then show that we can represent the current state of any
population of signalling agents as one point in this space. I then show how differ-
ent types of learning and interaction determine the way in which the population
navigates this space: in fact, the overall dynamic of any given model can be deter-
mined entirely by the mean-field effect of an interaction between two agents spec-
ified within that model. In this way, the micro-level — the basic pairwise interac-
tion — can be used as a diagnostic of the global, macro-level dynamic. By doing
this, I am able to cast the three requirements in more technical terms, namely:
haviour. In Roth-Erev learning, the probability distributions are produced as a function of other
data, i.e. the relative numbers of exemplars.
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1) agents must imitate with positive probability:, 2) pairwise interactions must
reduce individual meaning/signal conditional entropy, and 3) individual learning
rates must retain plasticity.
This chapter will proceed as follows: firstly, I will provide an overview of
some dynamical analyses which have been applied to signalling games in the past,
which has mainly (but not entirely) taken place within disciplines which use game-
theoretic methodologies, both classical and evolutionary. In Section 4.2.1, I take a
quick look at how the conventional way of measuring the optimality of a popula-
tion’s signalling system (communicative accuracy) does not lend itself to this kind
of dynamical analysis. In Section 4.3, I provide an account of some basic infor-
mation theoretic terms, and how they have been applied in the past to problems of
human communication. After some preliminary definitions, I will then detail how
we can construct the state-space, how we can situate the current state of a popu-
lation as a point within that space, and how we can avoid the usual problems with
information theory’s indifference to reference. Next, in Section 4.5, I rephrase the
first two requirements in terms of the dynamics of this space. Specifically, I will
show that 1) referentially signalling agents which imitate each other in a specific
way will always converge on a set of globally-shared signalling conventions, and
2) the mean-field pairwise interaction specified by any model will push the state
towards certain parts of this space representing greater or lesser optimality. I will
also tackle the plasticity problem, i.e. how information loss determines whether
the state-space is actually navigable. Section 4.7 provides a visualisation of the
space, the dynamics of processes like drift and bias, and a depiction of the non-
uniform structure of that space. Finally, I show how the new criteria can be put
into action in Section 4.8, and give an example of how we can analyse the global
behaviour of any model in terms of the way it defines individual interaction and
learning.
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4.2 The dynamics of learned signalling
In game-theory, a typical concern is trying to discern whether optimal strategies
exist for one or more players. For some types of game, for example signalling
games, there is also interest in finding the most mutually beneficial2 equilibria.
However, as Huttegger et al. (2014, p.10874) point out, it is not enough to simply
identify these optimal equilibria and then ‘rely on faith’ that they will be reached:
we need to consider the dynamics of those games. What is true of the game-
theoretic models is true of all models of the emergence of signalling: as we have
seen in the previous chapter, even some configurations which superficially appear
to contain the necessary requisites to ensure reliable optimal signalling do not.
Similarly, we sometimes see models which do attain optimality, but only some
of the time. It should be possible to determine the behaviour of models prior
to running an exhaustive set of simulations: to do this, we need to have some
understanding of the overall dynamics.
Huttegger et al. (2014) survey a number of dynamical analyses of game-theore-
tic signalling games which involve both the replicator dynamic and reinforcement
learning. Despite the rich literature associated with the replicator dynamic, our
focus on associative learning agents restricts our focus to the latter. Game theo-
retic treatments usually begin with analyses of the basic Lewis signalling game
(one signaller and one receiver, two each of world states, signals and actions).
Argiento et al. (2009) proves (for Roth-Erev reinforcement learners) that all games
will converge on either a signalling system or a sub-optimal pooling equilibrium,
and that only signalling systems are long-term stable: optimal signalling is guar-
anteed. Unfortunately, this neat result doesn’t seem to hold for more agents, sig-
nals, meanings, states or actions: Huttegger et al. (2014, p.10879) state; “The
case of M = N = 2 is very special”. There is, as of yet, no dynamical analysis
2Also known as Pareto Optimal
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which shows that pooling equilibria are not stable, and hence no way to ensure
the emergence of optimality for reinforcement learning.
The Naming Game (Steels, 1997) has also been subjected to a number of dy-
namical analyses. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, the Naming
Game focusses on how optimal vocabularies can be reached when there is an
open signal space: the main consideration is how synonymy can be eliminated,
and these analyses do not consider the possibility of homonyms. The proof in
De Vylder & Tuyls (2006) shows that populations of interacting agents which
employ an amplifying function will always settle on a minimal vocabulary, free
of synonymy. Amplifying functions are defined as follows: if a given meaning m
produces a set of signals according to probability vector Pi = 〈p1, . . . pn〉 ordered
such that pk ≥ pk+1 (i.e. in decreasing order of probability), then an amplifying
function between the input vector Pi and the output vector Po is such that ratio be-
tween any pk/pk+1 is always larger in the output than the input. More succinctly,
the ratio between the relative frequency of any signal and the next most frequent
will always increase in the output, as can be seen in Table 4.1.
Input pi pi/pi−1 Output po po/po−1
0.5 1.67 0.6 2
0.3 1.5 0.3 3
0.2 n/a 0.1 n/a
Table 4.1: An example of an amplifying function, where Input probabilities Pi are mapped to
Output probabilities Po. Note that individual probabilities can be increased, remain the same, or
be decreased: amplification requires that the ratio between any probability and the one with the
next lower rank increases between the input and output.
Other work investigating the dynamics of the Naming Game looks at the im-
pact of different types of feedback on convergence rates, for example Baronchelli
(2010), or the effects of different update strategies and network topologies (as
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surveyed in Loreto et al., 2011). As with De Vylder & Tuyls, the studies are
also restricted to versions of the Naming Game without homonymy, and so do not
directly address our topic, the issue of reliable optimality.
Beyond these studies, there has been no more general attempt to study the dy-
namics of populations of learning agents bootstrapping signalling systems. This
is probably largely for historical reasons. For example, in game-theory, dynam-
ical analysis tends to be the domain of either economists or evolutionary game
theorists. As observed by Mühlenbernd (2013), these both take a macro-level
perspective of populations employing pure strategies. For example, populations
employing the replicator dynamic switch between a predefined set of signalling
strategies and, critically, this requires perfect information about the current state
of the whole population. The overall dynamic of such systems is directly driven
by the macro-state of that system. Reinforcement learning, on the other hand (and
all of the other models we have considered so far in this thesis), focuses on micro-
level interactions which cause incremental adjustments to individual behavioural
strategies. The numerous tools which are used to analyse the macro-level dynam-
ics do not apply to the micro-level. Although there is evidence that some forms
of reinforcement learning may converge to the replicator dynamic under certain
conditions (Bergers & Sarin, 1995), this is likely to only hold for certain types of
reinforcement learning (Beggs, 2005). For this reason, we are not able to employ
these tools with any confidence. On the other hand, the statistical physicists who
study Naming Game dynamics certainly are interested in the interaction between
micro-level and macro-level processes. However, their focus (understandably)
tends to be on things like convergence rates, evidence of symmetry-breaking and
phase-transitions, and the effects of network topologies.
Our criterion is simpler than that of either the game-theoreticians or the statis-
tical physicists: does a given model reliably converge upon a optimal signalling?
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This means that our focus is simpler than in game-theory, which is concerned
with various sub-optimal states, and the physically-inspired analyses of the Nam-
ing Game. This is the motivation for creating a space which is directly constructed
around a micro-level interpretation of optimality. This allows us to chart a popu-
lation’s position within that space, and determine whether a model will always be
drawn towards optimality. Before we move onto this, I need to address the issue
of communicative accuracy.
4.2.1 Communicative accuracy
If we’re looking for a measure of optimal signalling, why not use the ubiquitous
communicative accuracy? It is the measure which is traditionally used in the field,
and the one we have been using up until now. There are simple and computation-
ally efficient ways to calculate it, even for large populations. However, CA is not a
useful index for calculating the overall dynamic of a population of learning agents.
This is because CA is a macro-level measure, instead of a micro-level one, as we
shall see.
As an illustration, we can look at how CA would define an internally optimal
language for a single agent. The definition of optimality from Chapter 1 is:
∀ m ∈M ∃ s ∈ S s.t. p(m|s) = 1.0 (4.1)
i.e. all meanings are covered by at least one signal and all signals are unam-
biguous. We visualise optimality in terms of the formula for CA by using matrices
for production P(S|M) and reception P(I|S) as illustrated in Fig. 4.1. The trivial
definition of an optimal language, then, is any two production and reception ma-
trices which lead to perfect interpretation, represented here by an identity matrix3
3An identity matrix is in which every entry on the leading diagonal is 1, and all other values
are 0.
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P(S|M) =
s1 s2 s3( )
m1 0.5 0 0.5











−→ P(I = M) = 1.0
Figure 4.1: An example of an optimal signalling system (with some synonymy). Using a single
production and a single reception matrix, we take the product of the two and then take the mean
of all values on the diagonal, assuming a uniform distribution over P(M).
on P(I|M). Calculating CA is a multi-stage process which must consider both
production and reception behaviour together, both of which are derived from an
internal set of signal/meaning associations. The important point is that, even for
a single agent, optimality defined in terms of CA is an emergent as opposed to
an internal property: it requires a sequence of calculations, as opposed to being a
lower level description, i.e. some clear property of the agent itself.
We can see another aspect of the problem when we consider an agent with an
internally sub-optimal system. Looking at Fig. 4.2, consider the question of how
can this system become more optimal. An answer of ‘maximise P(I = M)’ has
no explanatory power: as already discussed, CA is a higher-level measure, and
not itself an adjustable property of the system. Moving down a level, we run into
more problems: ‘adjust the production and reception matrices so that P(I = M)
is maximised’ is just as uninformative: even this minimal production/reception
system has four degrees of freedom4 — which should be adjusted? Moreover,
4Because both the production and reception matrices are normalised over rows, adjusting one

















−→ P(I = M) = 0.58
Figure 4.2: An example of an internally non-optimal signalling system. Starting with the set of
internal, learned associations, we derive (using a stochastic function) a production and reception
matrix, take the product of the two and then take the mean of all values on the diagonal, assuming
a uniform distribution over P(M).
although we can calculate the effect of any adjustment on the CA, there is no
immediate correspondence between the lower-level adjustments and the higher
level CA measurement.
However, it is possible to describe optimality using agent-internal properties
instead of the higher-level CA measure. As can be seen in Fig. 4.3, for a stochas-
tic agent to have an internally-consistent optimal language, each signal must as-
sociate only with a single meaning, and each meaning must be associated with at
least one signal. Winner-take-all agents are slightly more complex: each signal
value simultaneously adjusts the other value in that row, leaving two degrees of freedom per ma-
trix.




m1 22 0 0
m2 0 0 15




m1 22 12 7
m2 11 9 15




m1 22 21 7
m2 11 9 15
m3 17 19 18
Figure 4.3: Internal signal/meaning associations which map to (A) an optimal language for
a stochastic agent, (B) an optimal language for a WTA agent, and (C) a non-optimal language
for a WTA agent (or stochastic agent). Numbers in bold text are the maximum values for rows
(meanings), numbers in italics are the maximum values for columns (signals). (C) is non-optimal
because the reception system would not cover m2, despite the fact that there is no homonymy.
must associate with only a single maximum-value meaning, and that association
must also be a maximum value for that meaning. In both cases, we’re looking
for matrices which will be converted by production and reception functions into
stochastic matrices that have the optimal characteristic which has just been out-
lined.
The stochastic matrices we’ve been looking at, such as in Fig. 4.1, show the
conditional probability of signals given meanings, or vice versa. The optimal
characteristic is easy to recognise for reception matrices and can be seen in the
matrix for P(I|S): every signal-row must be populated by only zeroes and a single
1, and every meaning-column must contain at least one 1. Another way of saying
this is that every row of the matrix must be within at least one subset permu-
tation matrix. A permutation matrix is any row or column-based shuffling of the
identity matrix, as can be seen in Fig. 4.4. However, for reasons which will be
explained in a subsequent section, we need to focus on a type of matrix which is
derived from production, instead of reception, but all of the requirements for the
optimal characteristic are the same as just described.




s1 1 0 0
s2 0 1 0




s1 0 1 0
s2 1 0 0




s1 0 0 1
s2 0 1 0
s3 0 0 1
s4 0 1 0
s5 1 0 0
Figure 4.4: Stochastic matrices: (A) is the identity matrix, and (B) is a shuffled identity matrix,
or permutation matrix. (C) is a matrix with the optimal characteristic, as every row can be incor-
porated into a subset which forms a permutation matrix: the characters in bold give an example of
one of these subsets.
So, how do we move towards optimality? As summarised in the previous
chapter, the key factor is that homonyms are suppressed while ensuring meanings
are still covered. In reference to Fig. 4.3, internally optimal systems will look
something like (A) or (B), mapping to matrices with the optimal characteristic.
How do we describe this operation in terms of CA? We cannot: once again, com-
municative accuracy is an emergent measure, whose calculation requires all of the
steps described above. This is again is the reason why describing the dynamics re-
quires a different type of measure. A measure which relies on only agent-internal
associations would give a direct, micro-level perspective, unlike the macro-level
one given by CA.
This macro-level property of CA also renders it unsuitable for describing population-
level dynamics. When a population has an optimal signalling system, it means not
only that every agent has an internally optimal system, but also that all agents
share that system. To chart the dynamics of how a population reaches consensus
on one system, we need to be able to track how similar individual agents are to
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each other. Once again, this is not possible using CA. Not only is it a macro-level
measure, but the two aspects of optimality — internal optimality and population
consensus — are conflated within it. This is the second reason for using a micro-
level, agent-focussed measure.
4.3 Information theory and human communication
Modern information theory (Shannon, 1948) is a description of the relationships
between probabilistic data, channel capacities, compression, and noise. All of
these are deeply implicated in human communication, and tools from information
theory have been applied to problems connected to human language since they
first became available. This has led to numerous advances such as efficient and
robust transmission codes, new forms of encryption and code-breaking, and data-
compression, amongst many others. However, as pointed out early on by Shannon
& Weaver (1964), information theory is incapable of describing meaningful com-
munication: it is blind to any type of semantic content or reference. To understand
why, we first need to provide a brief sketch of basic information theory.
4.3.1 Basic information theory
Probability lies at the core of information theory. We can describe a system as
a collection of states, and then assign a probability to each state. By doing this,
we can then quantify the total amount of uncertainty associated with that system,
or entropy. Despite its name, the fundamental measure in information theory is
entropy, not information. Information is gained when entropy — uncertainty —
is lost. As an illustration, picture a fair coin. Before flipping the coin, we know
that the result will be one of two states, heads or tails. The probability of heads,
Ph = 0.5, and of tails, Pt = 0.5. The entropy of a system, H, is traditionally
CHAPTER 4. INFORMATION DYNAMICS OF LEARNED SIGNALLING 74
measured in bits, using the base-2 logarithm:
H =− ∑
pi∈P
pi log2 pi (4.2)







1 bit exactly. This understanding of information means that as the probabilities of
individual states shift, so does the entropy of the system. For example, if a coin is
99% biased towards heads, there is very little uncertainty about the result of a flip,
and the entropy is very low (H = 0.014 bits). Likewise, if there are more states,
the entropy increases: in both the case of four independent coin flips and in the
case of a fair 16-sided dice, the total entropy H = 4 bits: each system has sixteen
equally likely resulting states.
Conditional entropy is related to the idea of conditional probability. For ex-
ample, we’ll use some data from a month of summer weather in Scotland. The
weather in August, W , was recorded, with S denoting a sunny day, and R a rainy
day:
W = 〈RRSRRRSRSRRRSRRRSSSRRRRSRRRSRSR〉
First of all, we can calculate the overall probability of a sunny day, P(S) = 13 ,
and a rainy day, P(R) = 23 (ignoring the final day of the month for reasons which
will become clear shortly). We can also use the data to create a matrix which tells
us how many rainy days Rt and sunny days St were followed by rainy days Rt+1 or
sunny days St+1, and use this to build the conditional probability matrix showing
the probability of tomorrow’s weather given today’s (Fig. 4.5).
Now for some entropy measures. The overall entropy of weather in August,






3 = 0.92 bits. But we can also use the table of
conditional probabilities to calculate the entropy of weather tomorrow given a
sunny day, H(Wt+1|St) = −.2 log2 .2− .8 log2 .8 = 0.72 bits, or given a rainy








Figure 4.5: The conditional probability matrix showing the probability of tomor-
row’s weather given today’s.
day, H(Wt+1|Rt) =−.4 log2 .4− .6 log2 .6 = 0.97 bits.
Now, if we want to calculate the overall conditional entropy of the weather
tomorrow given that we know today’s weather, we need to combine the entropies
given a sunny day and a rainy day. Now, if there were an equal probability of
sunny or rainy days, we would just take the mean of the two values. But as rainy
days are twice as likely as sunny ones, we multiply each entropy value by its
overall probability (this is why we didn’t use the final day of the month, as it is







×0.97) = 0.89 bits
The example we’ve just worked through can be stated more formally:




p(x|y) log2 p(x|y) (4.3)
Note that the conditional entropy, 0.89 bits, is less than the overall entropy,
0.92 bits. In fact, the conditional entropy is never larger than the overall entropy.
When we add extra conditions, in this case what the weather was today, it can
never increase uncertainty, only decrease it or not affect it. Information is strictly
additive. Formally:
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H(X |Y )≤ H(X) (4.4)
4.3.2 Information theory and reference
How can we apply this to communication? Shannon (1948), was primarily con-
cerned with how much information could be transferred over a communication
channel. Consider the communication system in Fig. 4.6. There are two equally
likely messages, hence H(M) = 1 bit. An optimal communication system implies
that when I select a message and send a signal, it picks out a interpretation with
no uncertainty, i.e. H(M′|M) = 0.
Figure 4.6: A simplified communication system. There are two messages, m1 and m2, which
must be encoded and sent via one of two possible signals, s1 and s2, to be decoded into one of two
interpretations, m′1 and m′2.
We now see the fundamental problem with using information theory to de-
scribe referential communication: there is no connection between the initial mes-
sage and its interpretation. For example, while it is certainly true that the follow-
ing communication system preserves reference, i.e.
m1→ s1→ m′1 & m2→ s2→ m′2, H(M′|M) = 0,
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the same zero conditional entropy measure is also true of communication sys-
tems which are incorrectly interpreted 100% of the time!
m1→ s1→ m′2 & m2→ s2→ m′1, H(M′|M) = 0
In fact, there is no requirement for the messages and interpretations to have
the same identity at all. Fig. 4.7 displays an information theoretically optimal
system, but a nonsensical one in terms of referential human communication.
Figure 4.7: An ‘optimal’ communication system without any referential transfer. Although the
interpretations are completely specified by the intended message, e.g. transmitting the message
‘cat’ will always be interpreted as ‘angry monkey’, the intended referent is never transmitted.
In fact, the semantic properties of communication were never part of the math-
ematical theory of communication as laid out by Shannon (1948). Weaver (1964)
defines three levels of communication problems: (a) the technical problem, (b) the
semantic problem, and (c) the effectiveness problem. Weaver stresses that Shan-
non’s theory, by design, applies only to the first, technical level: in a final section,
however, he discusses his hopes that a similarly sophisticated theory of meaning
would soon be added to the framework. This did not prove to be the case.
There have been some more recent forays into incorporating meaning into in-
formation theory. Plotkin & Nowak (2000) consider the emergence of meaning in
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an evolutionary context, however they concentrate on how robust error-correcting
codes can emerge under a particular fitness function. The methodology of the
paper does not employ entropy or any related terms, and so does not address the
problem of reference within information theory. Corominas-Murtra et al. (2014),
on the other hand, focus exactly on this issue, and adapt standard measures of
entropy and information to encompass referential meaning. Their paper demon-
strates some interesting consequences of considering what they term consistent
information, i.e. information which preserves reference. For example, whereas
the entropy and information of a system are symmetric around their maximally
uniform distribution, this is not the case for consistent information. However,
while their exploration of the implications for reference of information theory is
thorough, the methodology Corominas-Murtra et al. employ to measure referential
transfer does not go as far as incorporating reference in a mathematically precise
way: the crucial term they use is a direct equivalent of CA, the same external mea-
sure that doesn’t provide us with an ability to track the micro-level dynamics of
the system. The aim of the next section is to outline a measure which is able to do
this.
4.4 Dynamics
We are interested in whether models reliably develop optimal signalling, which
corresponds to CApop = 1. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, there is no immediately
obvious way of tracking the dynamics of this process using CA.
To illustrate, we start by defining the change in communicative accuracy be-
tween the speaker and hearer in their current states sp,hr and their states after
their interaction;
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∆CA(sp,hr) =CA(sp′,hr′)−CA(sp,hr)
What we want to show is that the mean-field expected change in CA is positive,
i.e. that we can expect the communicative accuracy to steadily increase between
any two agents:
E[∆CA(sp,hr)]> 0 (4.5)
But more than this, we also want to guarantee that this micro-level process
leads to a macro-level increase in the communicative accuracy over the whole
population:
E[∆CA(sp,hr)]> 0→ E(∆CApop > 0) (4.6)
The difficulty of doing this can illustrated by using an example population of
two agents. Agents a1 and a2 have identical, maximally ambiguous signalling
systems with two shared signals and meanings, (CA(a1,a2) = 12 and CApop =
1
2 ).
If we assume that there is no systemic bias towards any particular system state, we
need to show that repeated interaction between the two agents will inevitably be
drawn towards an ‘optimal’ equilibrium state where CApop = 1).
Assuming that the only stable states of the system are pure strategies (where
every meaning elicits only a single signal, and where each signal is interpreted as
only a single meaning), and if we also permanently hold one agent as speaker and
the other as hearer, only two out of the 16 possible pure strategies are optimal.
How can we uniquely define these strategies in terms of (4.1)?
∀m,sp,hr ∃s s.t. P(s | pro(sp, m))×P(m | rec(hr, s,)) = 1 (4.7)
If individual signals only ever mapped to a single meaning—no homonymy—
the condition in (4.7) is trivially true: no signals are ambiguous. Otherwise, the
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problem is that optimal signalling requires that both the ‘production term’ and the
‘reception term’ be maximised for some m,s and minimised for all others. Again,
this is a system-level property, not the micro-level description we are looking for.
Moreover, the state-space of signalling games is necessarily vast if we consider
macro-states, as outlined below.
State-space of signalling games
Even the simplest two-agent pure-strategy signalling game has 16 states, of which
only two are optimal. When we increase the number of meanings and signals, the
total number of pure-strategies increases more than exponentially: the number of
pure strategies is |M||S| · |S||M|, |S|! of which are optimal. The proportion of pure





As n→ ∞, n!nn → 0, and so (4.8) will approach zero much faster than this
even. So, as we increase the number of signals and meanings an increasingly small
5This is calculated as follows: the number of pure strategies is the number of |M| × |S| pro-
duction matrices which have one populated cell per row multiplied by the equivalent number of
|S|× |M| reception matrices.
The number of pure strategies which are optimal is the number of |M|× |M| permutation ma-
trices, |M|!, then taking into account |S|!|M|! ways of including redundant rows (with all zero-value
cells - otherwise they would not be pure strategies), giving |S|!. For the latter, there is no need to
multiply for production and reception matrices: each optimal reception matrix identifies a unique
optimal production matrix.
A further point is that the total number of non-pure optimal strategies is infinite for S >M due to
the possibility of synonymy, however these will all correspond to one of the |S|! optimal reception
matrices, assuming every signal is used. This is a slightly counter-intuitive result which relies on
the fact that the number of pure production strategies accounting for unused signals is the same as
the number of pure reception strategies accounting for multiply-used signals.
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proportion of pure-strategy states will be optimal. In any case, enumeration of all
possible macro-states, determining which states are optimal, and then charting
the transitions between these states is a laborious process — and this is only for
the pure strategies, let alone more complex mixed or intermediate strategies. The
following section describes a different way of charting the dynamics which avoids
these problems.
4.4.1 Introducing the entropy state space
There is a way of reducing the size of the space described above and still tracking
the degree of ‘optimality’ of a signalling system. Instead of directly measuring the
communicative accuracy of a population as given in (4.1), we can use a measure of
conditional entropy between signals and meanings. We derive this from the popu-
lation average signalling behaviour, which is calculated by taking the mean values
of the meaning/signal probability from the production and reception matrices of
the whole population.
We know from Fig. (4.4) that matrices with the ‘optimal characteristic’, for
example, PROopt might potentially allow synonymy but never homonymy: every
signal must unambiguously map to either one or zero meanings. A concise way
to describe this exists in information theory. From the production matrix P(M|S),
we can first calculate the distribution of signals P(S). Then, assuming a uniform
distribution of meanings for P(M) (this is the case in most of the models we have
surveyed, but is easily incorporated if not), we can use Bayes’ rule to calculate the
distribution of meanings conditional on signals, P(M|S):
P(M|S) = P(S|M) P(M)
P(S)
(4.9)
From these, we can now derive H(M|S), the conditional entropy of meanings
given signals, Eq. (4.10).





p(m|s) log2 p(m|s) (4.10)
This is a direct measure of recoverability: when H(M|S) = 0, we know that
every produced signal can be mapped back to a single meaning, i.e. there is no
ambiguity. When we consider only signal production, this satisfies the require-
ment that all signals produced are unambiguous as to which meaning triggered
them. However, this is not yet sufficient to guarantee optimality.
H(M|S) = 0 by itself does not necessarily satisfy the requirement that all
meanings are covered, i.e. that every meaning has at least one corresponding sig-
nal. It could equally well be the case that every signal maps back unambiguously
to the same meaning, which is far from optimal. The only way to avoid this is
by making a strong assumption: every meaning will always produce some signal.
Fortunately, every signalling model we have discussed in the previous chapter has
made this assumption. This is one of the key factors which allows us to use the
conditional entropy measure as a proxy for the optimality of the whole system.
What this gives us, then, is a measure that lets us track the optimality of pro-
duction behaviour: when the conditional entropy H(M|S) = 0, we know that the
population as a whole has coordinated on a signal production which has the ‘op-
timal property’. Production, however, is only half the story: signals must also be
interpreted.
4.4.2 Optimal reception and preserving reference
A functional signalling system has similar requirements for the optimality of both
signal production and reception. For production, all signals must map back to a
single meaning each, and all meanings must produce at least one signal. Likewise,
for reception to be optimal, all signals should map to only a single interpretation
with at least one signal for each interpreted meaning. On top of these, however,
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there is a third, critically important factor: reference must be preserved. The
intended meaning and the interpreted meaning must be the same for each used
signal.
The measure of conditional entropy for production which has been outlined
above only tells us about the optimality of production behaviour. What we need
is a way to extrapolate this measure, and show that optimal production implies
both optimal reception, and that reference is preserved. The first apparent set-
back is that we can not simply use an equivalent conditional entropy measure for
signal reception. This is because, in the case of reception, there is no reason-
able constraint that every interpreted meaning is covered by a signal. This means
that H(I|S) = 0 can be true of highly non-optimal systems, for example where all
signals map unambiguously to the same meaning.
Similarly, conditional entropy measures of the mapping between intended and
interpreted meanings are of no use: H(I|M) = 0 can be true of trivially non-
optimal systems (e.g. all intended meanings lead to the same interpretation).
Reversing the conditionality and using H(M|I) = 0 as a criterion, we can again
rely on the fact that every meaning produces at least one signal. Unfortunately,
this again falls prey to the fact that information theory is blind to reference, as
described in Section 4.3.2. As an illustration, consider the situation where the
speaker always sends signal a for State 1, and signal b for State 2; If the hearer
always interprets signal a as State 2, and signal b as State 1, the correct reference
is never communicated. In terms of Shannon’s conditional entropy, however, the
system is perfectly informative: there is never any uncertainty about how any sig-
nal is interpreted. Despite this apparent setback, the subsequent section presents
a way of ensuring that reference is preserved.
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Signal production as a proxy for the system
To summarise: we can’t use the conditional entropy measures for the population
reception matrix, or to map between intended and interpreted meanings. However,
we can make a second assumption which allows us to avoid the problems involved
with preserving reference. As outlined in Section 4.2.1, production and reception
behaviour are both derived from the same set of observed signal/meaning pair-
ings. This does not, however, imply that production and reception behaviour are
equivalent: in fact, for any random set of observations, the behaviours will often
translate to quite different signal/meaning mappings, as seen for example in Fig.
4.3 (C).
However, the situation is different when we consider ‘optimal’ production and
reception. It turns out that when production and reception are a monotonic func-
tion of the same set of observed pairings, and if both production and reception
functions have the optimal characteristic, then those optimal matrices must coin-
cide exactly with each other. This means that for any meaning/signal association,
the corresponding signal/interpretation association is such that the meaning and
interpretation are the same. In this way, reference is preserved between optimal
production and reception.
Functions are monotonic when they preserve the relative order of points in
a dataset between input and output. Stochastic and WTA functions both have
this property: while stochastic functions are directly proportional to the observed
data, WTA preserves only the peaks of that distribution and sets all other values
at zero6.
6Actually, both of these functions are just two possible points along a continuous spectrum
of more or less regularising functions. One way of describing this cline mathematically is by
using a beta-binomial function such as in Reali & Griffiths (2010). Within this model, stochastic
functions correspond to α2 = 1, and WTA functions to
α
2 = 0. Another possibility, not seen in
signalling game models, is for α2 = ∞, which would correspond to an anti-regularisation bias: all
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To define the optimal characteristic for production matrices we first use the
P(S|M) matrix to construct the P(M|S) matrix. We then require that every row of
this matrix can form part of a subset which is a permutation matrix. As discussed
in Section 4.2.1, this guarantees both that all signals are unambiguous, and that
every meaning is covered. We can represent this as an (|S|× |M|) matrix.
We can describe three matrices: 1) the matrix of observed meaning/signal pairs
DATA, 2) the matrix PRO′ = P(M|S) and 3) the matrix REC = P(I|S). To guar-
antee that reference is preserved, we must first specify that PRO′ and REC have
the optimal property as described above. Before doing this, however, I should
re-clarify the relationship between PRO and PRO′: the former is an agent’s pro-
duction system, while the latter is a measure of meaning recoverability for that
production system.
In the first case, with stochastic production, it is trivial that if both are optimal
then PRO′ = REC: the DATA matrix which produces an optimal PRO′ must have
zero values everywhere except for where PRO′ has 1 values. This in turn means
that DATA must specify a unique matrix REC which is identical to PRO′, as seen
in Fig. 4.8.
Showing that reference is preserved between production and reception for
WTA agents is more involved. Komarova & Niyogi (2004, p. 14) prove that
PRO′ = REC if both are optimal for any finite measure (i.e. monotonic function)
on DATA which has unique maxima.7
variants are produced according to a uniform distribution regardless of the stored frequencies.
7As a brief sketch of this proof: if optimal PRO’ and REC are different, there must be a 1 in
PRO’ which represents a row maximum r1 in DATA, but not a column maximum because it is not
a 1 in REC. This maximum of that column, c1 in DATA, in turn, must not be a row maximum.
Again, the corresponding maximum r2 in that row must have a corresponding larger value in the
respective column, and so on. This leads to a chain of inequalities, but since there are a finite
number of cells in the matrix, we eventually end up with r1 > r1, causing a contradiction, i.e. PRO
and REC must be the same. Also, notice that we are discussing PRO rather than PRO’ here: this
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PRO’ m1 m2 m3

s1 0 0 1
s2 0 1 0
s3 0 0 1
s4 0 1 0
s5 1 0 0
←−
DATA m1 m2 m3

s1 0 0 23
s2 0 16 0
s3 0 0 31
s4 0 4 0
s5 11 0 0
−→
REC i1 i2 i3

s1 0 0 1
s2 0 1 0
s3 0 0 1
s4 0 1 0
s5 1 0 0
Figure 4.8: For stochastic production/reception, if DATA maps to an optimal REC matrix, then
it must necessarily map to an identical optimal PRO’ matrix. This is because any given signals can
only map to a single meaning, which is the only populated cell in that row.
This leaves two problematic cases for WTA: i) when PRO is optimal but REC
is not, and ii) when either PRO or REC have more than one maximum, e.g. when
two values in a row or column of DATA are the same. Later, in Section 4.7.3, we
will demonstrate that states like this are only temporary, at least for the systems
we are interested in.
For most other order-preserving functions on DATA, the same argument ap-
plies as for basic stochastic production: if optimal PRO and REC exist, they must
be the same as all non-maximal values in DATA must be zero. This is true even
for floor functions. If, for example, data points under a certain value were mapped
to zero, with the rest to non-zero probabilities, we can simply regard those values
as being equivalent to zero. In any case, none of the particular models we looked
at so far have included such a feature.
The result of this is that, under the assumptions outlined above, we can mea-
is because optimal stochastic matrices can exhibit synonymy, but WTA will not (as long as there
are unique maxima). This means that we need to use PRO’ to evaluate the optimal characteristic
for stochastic matrices, but this is not so for WTA.
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sure the optimality of a signalling system in terms of H(M|S) instead of the usual
Communicative Accuracy. This allows us to significantly simplify the overall dy-
namics of signalling games, both in terms of a single interaction, and as a result
also for populations of interacting agents. If we can show that the population
average PRO′pop satisfies:
Hpop(M|S)→ 0 (4.11)
That is, that it will eventually reach a zero value. For any sufficiently well-
defined signalling game, that is sufficient to guarantee that it will reliably develop
optimal signalling.
4.5 Population entropy: two sources
As previously discussed in Section 4.2.1 in reference to communicative accuracy
measures, there are two main components to the optimality of a system. The
first is whether agents have internally optimal signalling systems, i.e. the optimal
characteristic. The second is the degree to which signalling systems are shared
between agents in the population. Communicative accuracy, being a macro-level
measure, has no simple way of separating these two factors. Conditional entropy,
on the other hand, is a micro-level feature which allows us to measure both the
internal optimality and the difference between agents in the population.
To clarify, we can calculate the population production and reception matrices,
PROpop and RECpop respectively, by taking the mean value of each cell over the
population: from the former we can then calculate PRO′pop using Bayes rule. As
laid out in Eq. (4.11), we now know that if Hpop(M|S) = 0, the population has
converged on an optimal signal production behaviour.
Now, as we have just discussed, the population entropy Hpop(M|S) is actu-
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ally comprised of two distinct sources of referential uncertainty, which we term
individual and alignment entropy, Hind and Halign. As an illustration, see the ‘pop-
ulations’ of 2 biased coins shown in Table 4.2.
Each coin has a chance of landing on heads pi(h), leading to a population
average of landing on heads Ppop(h). We can use this to calculate the population
entropy Hpop. However, we can also calculate the individual entropies for each
coin, H1,H2, and hence the mean individual entropy Hind . The important thing
to note is that Hpop ≥ Hind . The missing entropy comes from the misalignment
of coins Halign. In Table 4.2, we can see that in Population 1, the individual
entropy of each coin is maximised, but there is no entropy from misalignment.
For Population 2, however, individual coins have no entropy, but the misalignment
term is maximised. Population 3 and 4 show intermediate situations, where the
system entropy is shared between the individual and alignment terms.
Population Coin 1 p1(h) Coin 2 p2(h) Ppop(h) Hpop H1,H2 Hind Halign
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0, 1.0 1.0 0.0
2 1.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0, 0.0 0.0 1.0
3 0.7 0.3 0.5 1.0 0.88, 0.88 0.88 0.12
4 1.0 0.5 0.75 0.81 0.0, 1.0 0.5 0.31
Table 4.2: Coin ‘populations’ of two coins each: each coin has a chance of landing on heads
pa(h) and population Ppop(h). The population entropy is Hpop. Individual entropies for each coin,
H1,H2, provide the mean individual entropy Hind . The entropy from misalignment of coins is
Halign. Note that Hpop ≥ Hind .
The population average probability of heads, Ph, is simply:
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We calculate the population entropy using the probabilities for heads and tails,
Ph and Pt :
Hpop = ∑
k∈{h,t}
−Pk log Pk (4.13)






pak log pak (4.14)
As stated, the average of the individual entropies Hind is always equal to or
less than the entropy of the population average matrix, Hpop. This extra entropy
is the uncertainty caused by misalignment between members of the population,
Halign. The easiest way to calculate this is simply:
Halign = Hpop−Hind (4.15)
This definition seems somewhat arbitrary, but it is possible to specify its char-
acter more precisely. The entropy from misalignment is actually the average
Kullback-Leibler divergence from Ppop to the individual probabilities pa:









The KL-distance is an unusual measure: it is asymmetric, so DKL(A||B) 6=
DKL(B||A). One way of understanding it is as follows: the population average
probability distribution Ppop can be regarded as a ‘model’ of the actual data. The
KL-distance of any other distribution from the average tells us how well or badly
the average models the data: it measures how much extra information we need to
provide to describe the new distribution using the average/model as a baseline. As
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such, if the new distribution is the same as the model, the KL-distance DKL = 0.
If, as with Population 2 in Table 4.2, the new distribution is maximally different,
the KL-distance reflects that.
In any case, the key point is that we now have a way to divide the overall
population entropy into separate components for individual entropy Hind and the
population alignment entropy Halign. To restate Eq. 4.5 differently:
Hpop = Hind +Halign (4.17)
As we will see in the next sections, an important property of Halign is that it
always approaches zero under certain conditions. There are a number of facts
we can state about the terms which have been isolated on the right hand of this
equation. This essential step is what lets us describe the overall dynamics of
signalling games by analysing only pairwise interactions.
4.6 Separating entropy dynamics
In all of the models of the emergence of signalling that we have surveyed un-
til now, agents learn from the behaviour of other agents and accommodate that
information into their own behaviour. Despite apparent differences between the
different models, central to all the instantiations of learning is some element of
imitation. This is always shaped by other processes, for example learning biases
or rational optimisation, but this is always a modification of learned as opposed to
purely novel behaviour.
It turns out that whenever agents learn in this way, consensus in that population
becomes inevitable. This is not to say, however, that there will be consensus
on an optimal set of conventions. However, what it does mean is that the term
representing alignment entropy in Eq. 4.17, Halign, will always be reduced to zero
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in an interacting population of imitating learners. Ultimately, what this allows us
to do is concentrate on the term for optimality, Hind . Before doing this, we will
take a look at how the minimisation of alignment entropy happens.
Xue (2006) analysed a model of interacting Pólya urns. The urns were placed
on a directed ring-graph in which interaction took place between successive urns
over many cycles of the graph. Pólya urns are an even more simplified version
of the urn models used in the basic framework for signalling games. An urn is
filled with a number of differently coloured balls in some proportion. When a
ball is sampled from each urn (and returned), a ball of the same colour is added
to the next urn in the sequence, and so on. Xue’s main result is that, after suffi-
cient time, the proportion of ball colours will be the same in all of the interacting
urns. Moreover, this is true “irrespective of the initial conditions, and the imitat-
ing probabilities... as long as groups imitate each other with positive probabilities”
(Xue, 2006, p.1). This result is echoed by Pra et al. (2014), who investigate a sim-
ilar scenario in a fully-connected population of urns, but where a parameter α is
set over the likelihood of imitating the rest of the population, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
and α = 0 defines a population of non-interacting urns. They show that for any
α > 0, populations will almost surely converge on the same composition. In both
cases, then, the convergence on a set of shared conventions relies on the existence
of imitating behaviour, but that imitating behaviour does not need to be strictly
applied.
We can now take a look at this in practice. Fig. 4.9 demonstrates the time-
course for the three conditional entropy measures from a population of simple
imitation learners. The total entropy remains very stable at a high value through-
out, but this is not the case for the other measures. The individual entropy has
an initial spike: this is when an agent has only sampled a small number of times
from other agents’ behaviour, their own behaviour will be reasonably determinis-
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Figure 4.9: The entropy measures for a population of 100 imitator learners with stochastic
production. The total entropy measures the conditional entropy H(M|S) for the population average
production matrix. The individual entropy is the average entropy H(M|S) across all agents in the
population. Finally, the alignment entropy is the difference between the former two measures,
equivalent to the mean Kulback-Leibler divergence from the population average production matrix
to the individual production matrices.
tic. However, as each agent has more learning experiences, they begin to resemble
each other. As there is no systemic bias at work, the behaviour of individual agents
becomes similar to the overall, highly random behaviour across the whole popula-
tion. In this way, all agents become extremely similar (causing alignment entropy
to almost disappear) but very random (hence the high levels of total and individual
entropy).
Similarly, we can look at what happens in a population of slightly more ad-
vanced agents in Fig. 4.10. The WTA-production of the agents does force much
more deterministic behaviour, and we do see a significant drop in overall entropy.
However, because the main effect of the WTA mechanic is to eliminate synonyms
but has no direct effect upon homonyms8 , this does not result in a reliable mech-
8Although it will normally reduce homonymy due to the limited number of signals available:
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Figure 4.10: Entropy measures for a population of 100 imitator learners with WTA production.
anism for reducing the level of individual entropy to zero. Agents do however
become highly similar to each other, sending the alignment entropy to zero. One
way to think of this is that while signal production becomes completely determin-
istic, this does not result in a signalling system which has a deterministic decoding
strategy.
Still looking at imitator learners, a further effect can be seen when we limit
memory to 35 exemplars for a population of stochastic agents. Fig. 4.11 shows
that this extra source of stochasticity prevents agents from becoming too self-
similar, in effect acting as a floor value for alignment entropy. This value remains
relatively stable. Manipulating the size of the exemplar memory to 70 exemplars
(not shown here) had the effect of lowering this floor value. This is worth noting,
because we know that the stochastic effect of information loss plays an important
role: it provides the necessary plasticity for the anti-ambiguity bias to take effect.
On the other hand, we can see here that noise actually counteracts the emergence
of consensus/homogeneous behaviour.
of all of the possible states without synonymy, most have a reduced level of homonymy.
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Figure 4.11: Entropy measures for a population of 100 imitator learners with stochastic produc-
tion and a memory limited to 35 exemplars.
In Fig. 4.12, we can look at populations with the necessary bias against am-
biguity. The reinforcement learners on the left become highly self-similar, but
the lack of an information loss mechanism means that the learning rate slows
down too much, and the individual entropy levels out. The anti-homonymy ob-
servational learners in the middle have both of the extra biases needed, and both
individual and alignment entropy slowly decrease over time to zero. The figure
on the right hand side is an example of when WTA obverter learners sometimes
fail to converge on a signalling system (∼ 10% of the time). Obverter production
provides a bias against ambiguity, but is not always strong enough to drive the
individual entropy to zero. As we know, including any form of information loss
would provide the necessary plasticity for both the reinforcement and obverter
models to reliably develop signalling.
Finally, we can see what happens when agents do not imitate each other. In
Fig. 4.13, a population of observational learners have the necessary bias against
homonyms. However, in this population only speakers learn after an interaction,
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Figure 4.12: Entropy measures for populations of 100 agents with an anti-ambiguity bias. On
the left, a basic reinforcement learning model; in the middle, observational learners with an anti-
homonymy bias; on the right, WTA obverter learners with no information loss.
i.e. people are entirely solipsistic learners who only ever listen to themselves. The
effect of this is that individual agents develop internal systems which are internally
optimal, but not shared with others. As a result, we see individual entropy drop to
zero: without any imitation the alignment entropy never decreases, until it is the
only source of entropy in the population. The extremely defective self-copying
learners on the right have no learning bias at all: agents are neither similar to each
other nor internally optimal.
Figure 4.13: Entropy measures for a population of 100 observational learners where only speak-
ers update after an interaction. On the left, agents have a bias against homonymy, while on the
self-imitators on the right have no learning bias.
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4.7 The entropy state space visualised
The previous section demonstrated that as long as agents imitate each other to
some degree, alignment entropy will inevitably be reduced to zero (as long as no
stochastic source is allowed to dominate, as in Fig. 4.11). The important factor,
then, is the presence of a bias against ambiguity. With this in mind, we can track
the dynamics of populations using their population average production matrix.
Two measures from this, H(M|S) and H(S|M), corresponding to the degree of
homonymy and synonymy, allow us to plot the current state of a population as a
point within this 2-dimensional space.
Populations which are initialised as blank agents will have uniformly-distributed,
maximally non-deterministic behaviour, and begin in the top right corner of the
space laid out in Fig. 4.14. As signalling systems develop, the population navi-
gates the space towards lower levels of homonymy and synonymy. When homonymy
is eliminated, the population will reside on the baseline where H(M|S) = 0. Sim-
ilarly, populations on the y-axis denote a lack of synonymy, and when the popula-
tion is at the origin neither homonymy nor synonymy will remain.
One point which should be clarified is that each point in entropy space maps
to multiple equivalent states of the population. One reason for this is that the
identity of signal/meaning mappings are irrelevant, only the degree of ambiguity
they represent. Secondly, because the point in space represents the population
average production matrix, there are a huge number of ways that this can map to
individuals within that population. What is certain, however, is that H(M|S) = 0
represents a population with absolute consensus on an optimal signalling system.
This section will show how the three properties which we identified earlier
drive the dynamics of populations within the entropy space. Populations are rep-
resented as a point in a three-dimensional space, the third dimension being time.
Each simulation plot below represents a typical transition through the space seen
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Figure 4.14: The entropy state-space of signalling games. The y-axis measures the overall
level of homonymy, and the x-axis the level of synonymy. Any population which as developed
optimal signalling will reside on the baseline of the space, where H(M|S) = 0. A population
which has eliminated synonyms will be represented by a point on the left axis. When there is
neither homonymy or synonymy, the population will be represented by a point in the lower left
corner.
from 3 perspectives: homonymy vs. synonymy, homonymy vs. time, and syn-
onymy vs. time. This perspective provides several advantages. For example, the
time dimension displays the effects of learning rate and slowdown, and the pure
entropy space provides information about correlations between homonymy and
synonymy.
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Figure 4.15: Entropy dynamics for a population of 100 imitatation learners. The left figure
shows the passage of the population through entropy-space: the initial state of a population is at
the top right-hand corner of the first graph, representing maximal entropy for both H(M|S) and
H(S|M), and proceeds to move towards the centre of the graph as the entropies are reduced. The
middle and right hand figures show how the population travels through the homonym and synonym
dimensions over time.
4.7.1 Information loss is drift and eliminates synonymy
The population of imitation learners in Fig. 4.15 shows two important effects.
The first is that, even without any systemic bias, the population is drawn towards
less entropic states. Any chance irregularities (for example, some signals happen
by chance to be less ambiguous than others) which are retained in the population
will cause this to happen. Secondly, and more importantly, we can see the effect
of learning slowdown. This is a natural consequence of the urn-model learner
when there is no information loss: the initial ability to move through the space
disappears, and the population is locked into a sub-optimal state.
In contrast, the population of imitator learners in Fig. 4.16 shows us that with
information loss, the population is able to navigate the whole space: learning
slowdown does not occur. This figure is a particularly clear demonstration that
the dynamics of information loss in signalling populations are directly equivalent
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Figure 4.16: Entropy dynamics for a population of 2 imitation learners with a memory of 80
exemplars.
to genetic drift9. Both information loss in these models and genetic drift are pro-
cesses which sample from populations to create their next stage. In both cases,
they lead to fixation: variation is lost. Because of the nature of (most) signalling
games, the loss of variation is in terms of synonymy rather than homonymy. New
signals are produced in some relation to their proportional association with each
meaning. These proportions will drift randomly, but once a particular associa-
tion has been lost in a population, any synonyms will be eliminated. Just as with
genetic drift, this process is inevitable, unless there is some mechanism to reintro-
duce variation.
In Fig. 4.17, also a population of imitator learners but this time with a very
small and unstable memory of 25 exemplars, we again see the way that informa-
tion loss acts against synonymy. In this case, however, the limitations placed on
memory lead to the frequent loss of signal/meaning associations. In this case, a
new signal association is innovated at random, reintroducing variation. This al-
lows ‘fixated’ populations to re-enter the space, before fixating elsewhere, and so
on — even sometimes temporarily eliminating homonymy. The subsequent dy-
9In this case, because there is a hard limit on the number of exemplars stored by any agent, it
is analogous to the symmetric birth/death process modelled by Moran (1962)
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Figure 4.17: Entropy dynamics of a population of 2 imitation learners with a memory of 25
exemplars.
namics suggests that the possible positions of the population are not uniformly
distributed within the space: this is in fact true, as will be shown later.
As a final point, it should be pointed out that information loss is not the only
process which leads to the loss of synonymy. WTA production has a similar effect,
as does (unsurprisingly) the explicit inhibition of synonyms. Similar observations
have been made in the literature addressing linguistic regularisation, where some
proponents argue for a stronger role for drift-like processes (e.g. Reali & Griffiths,
2010) and others for cognitive biases (e.g. Ferdinand et al., 2013). This discussion
is not immediately relevant here, but it is important to recognise that information
loss is not a completely neutral force: it implicitly acts against synonymy by driv-
ing out variation.
4.7.2 The bias against homonymy
Fig. 4.18 is another example of how, even with the necessary bias, a lack of
information loss slows down learning. Although convergence is quick at first, it
slows dramatically, not even within 10% of optimality after 1 million interactions.
As seen before, the bias against ambiguity is not in itself sufficient.
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Figure 4.18: Entropy dynamics of population of 10 reinforcement learners without
information loss.
Fig. 4.19 (reinforcement learners with a limited memory) and Fig. 4.20 (ob-
servational learners with a bias against homonyms) show the importance of infor-
mation loss in the presence of the necessary bias. A further observation is that the
trajectory through entropy-space reveals that, when a bias against homonymy ex-
ists, the amount of synonymy and homonymy are highly correlated, to the point of
equality. This is only the case when there is a bias against homonymy: the biases
against synonymy leave the population relatively unconstrained in their passage
through the space.
Figure 4.19: Entropy dynamics of 100 reinforcement learners with a 40 exemplar memory.
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Figure 4.20: Entropy dynamics of population of 100 observational learners with an anti-
homonymy bias.
What is this imbalance between synonymy and homonymy? It comes down to
the fact that every meaning is always associated with some signal, but the reverse
is not true. This has two implications: i) the population has many more states
with a given level of synonymy than the equivalent level of homonymy, and ii)
maximising the homonymy results in maximised synonymy, but not vice versa.
To illustrate this using the models we have been using (where there are an equal
number of meanings and signals), take the state where H(M|S) = 0. In this case,
the lack of homonyms guarantees that no synonyms exist: there are no signals
left free to associate with more than a single meaning. The alternative, when
H(S|M) = 0 can exist for numerous levels of homonymy, because it is perfectly
possible for meanings to associate with the same signal, leaving some signals
unused. This is why, when homonymy is maximised by individual agents, this
leads to the maximum possible synonymy. This has the effects of restricting the
trajectories of populations to the linear path we observe them make through the
entropy-space.
Fig. 4.21 shows the structure of the entropy space. Starting with only 2 signals
and meanings, the graph displays the possible states for populations of increasing
size. Firstly, it is clear that the space is not uniformly distributed. Secondly, the
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Figure 4.21: Possible states for populations with WTA production. The left hand figure shows
the possible states for 2 signals and meanings, the right hand side for 3 signals and meanings. The
dot colour represents possible states for populations with the corresponding number of agents: for
example i the left figure, one agent populations can only have totally optimal systems (bottom left
corner) or defunct systems (top right). Introducing more agents increases the number of states and
possible positions within the space. Image courtesy of Kevin Stadler
effect of guaranteeing that all meanings produce a signal can be clearly seen: there
are no possible states below the diagonal. This shows again why the bias against
ambiguity acts to simultaneously minimise synonymy, restricting populations to a
trajectory along the diagonal.
4.7.3 Optimal production leads to optimal reception
To summarise the results so far: as long as agents imitate each other with positive
probability, there is some bias against ambiguous mappings, and information loss
is able to provide the necessary plasticity, then a situation will arise where the
population converges on an identical optimal signal production system. However,
as pointed out in Section 4.4.2, it is possible to have optimal production systems
which do not correspond to an optimal reception system. This directly implies a
non-optimal system. A second problem is that is there are non-unique maxima
CHAPTER 4. INFORMATION DYNAMICS OF LEARNED SIGNALLING104
(A) s1 s2 s3( )
m1 3 1 3
m2 1 2 1
(B) s1 s2( )
m1 1 2
m2 4 3
Figure 4.22: Two problematic association matrices: (A) has multiple maxima (shown in bold),
and (B) maps to an optimal matrix for production, but not reception: production maxima are shown
in bold and reception maxima in italics.
in the underlying association matrix, so the proof given in Komarova & Niyogi
(2004) which guarantees that reference is preserved no longer holds for WTA
learners. Fig. 4.22 gives an example for each of these defective cases.
At this point, it helps to take a micro-level view of the three requirements, as
illustrated in Fig. 4.23. Firstly, although the various models implement the bias
against ambiguity differently, they all lead to the same effect internally: a single
meaning is maximised for each signal, while competing meanings are weakened
either by direct inhibition or information loss. At the same time, every meaning
will continue to produce new signals, and hence new associations. With WTA pro-
duction, its implicit bias against synonymy ensures that each meaning maximises
exactly one signal, while stochastic production reinforces multiple signals in pro-
portion to their weights. Finally, information loss continually weakens association
which are not being strengthened.
As we know, the net effect is to produce matrices with the optimal character-
istic. Although stochastic production can result in multiple optima, this is not a
problem: as outlined earlier in Section 4.4.2, the optimal PRO′ matrices derived
from production matrices must always map to an identical optimal reception ma-
trix. For WTA production, on the other hand, the three pressures guarantee that
each meaning will develop a single, unambiguous association with a signal, and
that all other associations will be decremented over time. Because it is production
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Figure 4.23: The internal forces on an association matrix under WTA and stochastic production:
WTA production strengthens a single maximum per meaning, and stochastic production multiple
maxima. The bias against ambiguity strengthens a single maximum per signal, while information
loss weakens all associations which are not being strengthened.
and not reception which drives the development of agents over time, the subop-
timal situations displayed in Fig. 4.22 are guaranteed to be transitional for any
learners with the three necessary properties.
4.8 Diagnosing the optimality of a system
In this chapter I have outlined a way of describing the dynamics of populations of
learning signallers by using micro-level, as opposed to the usual macro-level dy-
namics. The dynamics employ information-theoretic measures. The measures are
able to avoid the normal problems with information theory and reference. They
can do this thanks to two observations: first, by ensuring that agents will always
produce a signal for a prompted meaning, and secondly by showing that the av-
erage production matrix of the population can be used as a proxy for the whole
system. This measures the optimality of interacting populations using conditional
entropy. We then saw that the population average entropy is actually comprised
of two separate sources, individual entropy and alignment entropy. In any in-
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teracting population of agents which imitate each other with positive probability,
alignment entropy will always be reduced to zero. In order to guarantee that opti-
mality develops reliably, we need to show that individual entropy also reduces to
zero. Critically, however, some form of information loss must also be present in
order to provide the necessary plasticity to the system.
We are now in a position to restate the three requirements more precisely. To
recap, we previously observed that reliable optimality required all systems to 1)
create and transfer referential information, 2) have a bias against ambiguity, and
3) provide some form of information loss. We have now shown:
1. Agents must imitate each other’s referential signalling with non-negative
probability, as this drives alignment entropy to zero.
2. We can therefore expect agents to become very similar. Given this, the
conditional entropy P(M|S) of a pair of similar, interacting agents must
decrease on average.
3. Information loss is necessary to prevent the learning rate from slowing
down.
More formally:
1. Agents imitate with positive probability:
DKL(Pindividual||Ppopulation)→ 0
2. Interactions reduce individual entropy:
E[∆H(M|S)]< 0
3. The learning rate must allow convergence on optimality:
∆H(M|S) 6→ 0 if H(M|S)> ε ∀ ε > 0
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How can we apply this to a particular model? Simply by using these criteria to
evaluate the course of a typical pairwise interaction. For example, if we consider
a classic Roth-Erev reinforcement learner such as described by Skyrms (2010):
• Q: In an interaction, if a speaker produces a signal s for meaning m at time
t, is the hearer more likely to imitate that action at time t +1?
pt+1(m|s)> pt(m|s)?
A: After success, both hearer and speaker reinforcement learners strengthen
that association, so it is certainly true. After failure, no associations are
reinforced. On average, then, agents do imitate with positive probability.
• Q: If two agents associate a meaning with signals in the same ranked order
(which is guaranteed to happen if they imitate each other), will an interac-
tion reduce H(M|S) overall for the pair?
A: Reinforcement learners strengthen successful associations, i.e. those
which are de facto most likely to be the least ambiguous. Because the agents
in the interaction are highly similar, the likelihood is that the strongest asso-
ciation for that meaning is also the strongest association for that particular
signal, i.e. the signal with the lowest H(m|s). Strengthening that association
will reduce the overall H(M|S).
• Q: Does the learning rate slow down?
A: Yes, in the case of classic Roth-Erev reinforcement learning. However,
applying a memory limit removes the problem, and we can expect conver-
gence.
It is possible (and easier) to perform this procedure with the other models,
and indeed any signalling game: as long as the details of interaction and learning
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are fully specified, the micro-level interaction will diagnose whether the system
as a whole is able to self-organise an optimal signalling system. This also holds
for models with referential uncertainty: as observed in Chapter 2, the important
thing is that the model of learning is able to extract reliable referential information
across contexts in a way which doesn’t increase entropy, both in terms of H(M|S)
and H(S|M). For example, consider the investigations of cross-situational learn-
ing in the last chapter: models which relied upon adding multiple exemplars af-
ter every learning experience necessarily increase the internal entropy with every
step, and hence require another mechanism in order to reduce this.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter has established the entropy state-space for analysing the dynamics
of learned signalling games, and in particular has isolated two sources of entropy,
individual and alignment entropy. This simplification gives us a way of deter-
mining the long-range dynamics of any such system without needing to resort to
exhaustive simulations.
However, there are still some drawbacks. Firstly, this dynamical analysis is
strictly tied to models which are based on agents which have a unified set of
meaning/signal associations. Some models have historically used multiple, sep-
arate representations for signal production and reception: the arguments used in
the previous sections do not necessarily apply to such models. On the other hand,
the description should not be restricted to Roth-Erev style non-parametric mod-
els: Bush-Mosteller reinforcement learning, for example, still represents a set of
meaning/signal associations which we can interpret in terms of conditional en-
tropy. In fact, we can see that Bush-Mosteller learners will only reliably develop
signalling systems if they also have the necessary bias against ambiguity and a
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mechanism of information loss, for example a noise parameter, but this warrants
further investigation.
Another issue is that what is presented here is not a formal mathematical proof,
although it incorporates a number of them. The main source of this is the problem
of learning slowdown: it is not clear whether — in the limit — slowdown is
eventually overcome, or whether the learning rate eventually does effectively stop.
For all practical purposes, however, we can see that learning slows dramatically
over short time-scales and does not recover over very long time-scales.
On the other hand, the basic associative model underlies many more com-
plex representations of signalling behaviour, for example neural networks and
Bayesian statistical models. Whenever the issue of optimality comes up, any sys-
tem which can be stripped down to its associative centre means that we can use
these tools to analyse it and determine whether it will develop consensus on a
functional signalling system. It is hoped that this ability — to predict aspects
of model behaviour in advance without recourse to lengthy numerical work —
should help clarify certain aspects of the various fields which investigate the emer-




Duality of patterning is the design feature that Hockett (1955, 1959) proposed
to be unique to human language. I will depart from Hockett’s original definition
(more discussion later), and take duality of patterning to refer to the two levels of
systematicity — one involving meaningful units and one meaningless — which
are a characteristic of almost all human languages. The study of how these levels
are structured (e.g. phonology vs. morphosyntax) constitutes much of modern
linguistic theory. However, there has been much less of a focus on the study of
duality as a property in and of itself. Recently, however, the resurgence of work
in language evolution has brought with it a renewed interest in explaining abstract
features of language like this. In particular, there is a growing body of work
attempting to explain the emergence of combinatoriality and compositionality.
This has in turn brought duality itself into the spotlight.
The main argument of this chapter is that we can define duality as the pres-
ence of both combinatoriality and compositionality, and that both are a functional
adaptation which maintains learnability and expressivity in the face of noise. This
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draws heavily on work such as K. Smith et al. (2013) and Kirby et al. (2015),
who show that compositional structure emerges under learnability and expressiv-
ity pressures. I extend these ideas to look at combinatoriality as well, and argue
that noise plays a crucial determining role in the emergence of structure, demon-
strating this with a computational model of the emergence of duality.
Before doing this, I will need to provide an overview of the three central no-
tions involved in this chapter. All three — duality of patterning (henceforth DoP),
compositionality and combinatoriality — are topical issues in language evolution,
linguistics, and the philosophy of language. Because of this, there is no absolute
consensus on even their definitions. My focus will be on evolutionary explana-
tions for their emergence, for which there are a similar range of proposals: I aim
to show that, for the most part, the different accounts are reconcilable.
As such, Section 5.2 is devoted to looking at past theoretical, empirical and
modelling work on DoP, compositionality and combinatoriality, with a section
taking each in turn. Section 5.3 is devoted to new modelling work. This includes
a description of the model in Section 5.3.1, after which I outline the results in
Section 5.3.3. Finally, Section 5.4 discusses these results: In Section 5.4.2 I look
at implications for other related work, for example theories of proto-language, the
role of the information bottleneck, and the difference between superficial and pro-
ductive structure, and Section 5.4.3 makes some more model-specific comments.
5.2 Review
There is a broad literature dedicated to the fields of combinatoriality, composition-
ality and duality of patterning in language. Not all of this is restricted to studies
of language evolution, although that will be my focus. I should also point out that
the order of presentation differs from their historical appearance: I have done this
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mainly for reasons of theoretical coherence.
I begin with a look at duality of patterning in Section 5.2.1, including Hock-
ett’s original observation and some more recent discussion of how that applies to
modern linguistic and philosophical thought. There is only one integrated model
(Tria et al., 2012) which expressly focusses on the emergence of duality of pat-
terning: most discussion of the relevant parts of that model (devoted to combina-
toriality and compositionality) appear in the relevant sections. Likewise, I look at
several pieces of empirical and experimental work focussing on duality, but will
examine their analyses of combinatoriality and compositionality in those sections.
My main aim here is to clarify and motivate the definition of duality of patterning
I will be working with, as this will affect my approach to the individual levels of
patterning. In particular, I will take the position of Ladd (2012) that duality of
patterning — contrary to Hockett (1960) — describes two levels of systematicity,
one of which (combinatoriality) is completely embedded in the other (composi-
tionality).
Section 5.2.2 takes in the previous work on combinatoriality. There is less to
review here, simply because this is the most recent of the three areas to appear
in the literature. However, there has been a good deal of recent empirical and
modelling work in this area which is of immediate relevance to this study, both
in terms of what combinatoriality is, and of how it appeared. Although there is
some discussion of the adaptivity of combinatorial signalling in terms of natural
selection (e.g. Scott-Phillips & Blythe, 2013), I will mainly look at learning-based
accounts of its emergence. Zuidema & de Boer (2009) provide an insightful anal-
ysis of different aspects of combinatoriality which I will use as the basis for the
modelling work in later sections.
I address compositionality in Section 5.2.3. This represents a large body of
work spanning a number of disciplines, much falling within the philosophy of
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language. There are numerous computational models and experimental studies
of the cultural evolution of compositionality: these are my main focus. Several
topics within this field intersect with larger debates in evolutionary linguistics,
for example the respective roles of interaction, learning, and cognitive bias. Im-
portantly, one group of models (N. Smith et al., 2013; Kirby et al., 2015) is of
crucial importance in defining the key pressures of expressivity and learnability,
although I argue that these pressures can be seen in almost all of the theories of
the emergence of compositionality reviewed here.
Finally, both the sections on combinatoriality and compositionality outline
some more formal approaches used to describe them, and how this applies to their
definitions, measures, and explanations.
5.2.1 Duality of patterning - history
In his comprehensive survey of duality of patterning, Ladd (2012) points out that
Hjelmslev (1961, 1st English edition) was the first to describe human language as
consisting of a meaningful ‘content plane’ and a meaningless ‘expression plane’,
and that these two levels of structure appeared to operate separately according to
their own rules. This was likely the influence for both Hockett (1959) and Martinet
(1984) when they formulated their closely related ideas of duality of patterning
and double articulation. Although there are a number of distinctions between
these two ideas, they both represent an attempt to capture an abstract property
which appears to exist in human language but not in any other communication
system found in nature. This leads to a number of questions: firstly, how exactly
do we define these two levels, and how can we distinguish between them? Sec-
ondly, given that this duality appears to be a design feature of almost all human
languages, is there some functional or evolutionary explanation which accounts
for its presence? Stated differently, does the fact that duality exists tell us some-
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thing about the nature of language? If some functional aspect of duality in and of
itself can be identified, then it might be the result of genetic or cultural evolution.
On the other hand, it is possible that each level of systematicity arose indepen-
dently, and human language just happens to feature both. Before addressing these
concerns, we should first take a look at the differences between the accounts of
Hockett and Martinet.
Hockett (1959, p.33) defines duality of patterning as “a set of conventions in
terms of smallest meaningful elements ... and also a set of conventions in terms of
minimum meaningless but differentiating ingredients.” This requires some clari-
fication. Why is it necessary to identify the smallest/minimal elements, and what
are they in any case? As Blevins (2014) remarks, the systematicity found in both
meaningful and meaningless components of language is spread across several lev-
els of analysis. Both morphemes and words are uncontroversially recognised as
distinct meaningful units, and a thorough analysis of language considers both.
Likewise, meaningless aspects of language show organisation at different levels
from phonetic features and phonological categories to suprasegmental features
such as tone, stress and pitch. This does not appear to pose a problem for Hockett
who, as Ladd (2012) says, is focussed on the issue of how human communication
is unique. From this perspective, it is enough to say that both meaningful and
meaningless elements exist, regardless of whether they exist at different levels of
analysis.
This contrasts with Martinet (1984) who draws a distinction between primary
articulation, the system governing the organisation of meaningful elements, and
secondary articulation, the system which mediates meaningless elements. Cru-
cially, Martinet sees the secondary system as being completely embedded within
the first. This is quite far from Hockett’s position, in which the two levels of sys-
tematicity could in theory exist independently of each other, possibly even without
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interaction. Martinet describes a serial process in which language is comprised of
discrete meaningful elements, and those elements are made up of meaningless el-
ements. To reiterate, the key distinction is that, for Hockett, all language is made
up of meaningful and meaningless elements, whereas for Martinet all language
is made up of meaningful elements and all meaningful elements are made up of
meaningless elements. The distinction might seem slight, but has a number of
implications. The first regards how language is perceived as a process: for exam-
ple a situation where some phonological mechanism exists which operates over
strings of meaningless elements and outputting the result to a separate morpho-
syntactic mechanism process (the Martinet view) versus two mechanisms which
apply simultaneously to linguistic representations (the Hockett view).
Further to this, and as clearly aid out by Ladd (2012), there is an interesting in-
teraction here with the second of Hockett’s proposed design features (1960), pro-
ductivity. This is the capacity of human language to produce and understand novel
utterances by compositional combination of meaningful elements. Hockett’s ex-
planation of duality seems to focus only on the meaning-free aspect of language
alone, with productivity explaining the systematicity of meaningful elements. His
example for a non-productive system which displays duality is in line with this
interpretation: he describes a system of five lamps, each of which can be set to
one of three colours. This is a system capable of communicating 35 = 243 differ-
ent messages, but which is not productive beyond this hard limit. This is a system
with 3 meaningless elements (the lamp colours) and potentially 243 meaningful
elements (the configurations), which satisfies Hockett’s interpretation of duality.
However, while some (minimal) systematicity exists in the way meaningless el-
ements are combined, no such thing exists for the meaningful elements. This is
another key point of divergence from Martinet’s double articulation, which makes
specific reference to the process by which meaningful and meaningless elements
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are recombined.
A further implication of Martinet’s perspective is that the emergence of mean-
ingful systems preceded that of meaningless elements, while this does not follow
from a strict interpretation of Hockett’s concept of duality. However, Hockett
(1960) also argues that combinatorial systematicity was likely the last human-
specific design feature to emerge. In both cases, this is closely connected to their
proposals for a functional role of combinatorial communication. Hockett (1959)
proposed that it was a ‘great convenience’ for communication systems with large
signal inventories to be composed of a limited number of meaningless elements,
and that these large vocabularies were probably the most recent development.
Martinet’s explanation is similar, picking out the advantages of having a ‘syn-
chronically stable’ set of meaningless elements available to play the key role of
disambiguating between meaningful elements, while stressing the functionality of
productive combination of meaningful elements. For both Hockett and Martinet,
then, the idea is that productivity is an initial stage: this leads to an ever-increasing
number of meaningful, re-combinable signal elements, necessitating a final stage
in which systematic recombination of discrete, meaningless elements emerges.
At this point, it is worth pointing out that duality of patterning is not an ab-
solute universal within human language. Blevins (2014) focuses on this problem,
and observes that some sign languages feature no corollary to phonology, for ex-
ample Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language (Sandler et al., 2005). In this case, the
language is expressive and compositionally productive, but there appears to be lit-
tle internal structure to the signs themselves, which also display a high degree of
iconicity. This is despite the fact that a large sign inventory exists, contradicting
Hockett’s proposal that limiting the number of meaningless elements is a func-
tional response to a large vocabulary. In a different apparent contradiction to du-
ality, Blevins lists a number of languages in which minimal distinguishing units
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are also meaningful, for example /P/ in Kabardian (‘say’) and a more extreme
case where grammatical inflection for 3rd person in Isthmus Mixe is expressed
through palatalisation of the stem-initial consonant. Although these are rare phe-
nomena, they do invalidate a very strong interpretation of Martinet’s claim that all
meaningful elements are composed of meaningless ones. Furthermore, sometimes
the distinction between meaningful and meaningless is hard to clearly distinguish.
For example, phonesthemes such as the word-initial /gl/ cluster in English are
strongly associated with semantic properties of light and vision, but it is not clear
where they lie on the dividing line between meaningful and meaningless. At the
other end of the scale, there are meaningful elements of spoken languages which
appear to be holistic, such as the positive and negative interjections [P2̃"h2̃] and
[P2̃"P2̃] in English. Both feature unconditioned nasalised vowels and a contrastive
glottal stop, neither of which appear in other English words. This proves to be
a common phenomenon cross-linguistically, particularly within interjections. As
for how these phenomena impact on duality of patterning, Blevins (in parallel with
both Martinet and Hockett) argues that ABSL’s lack of duality is likely due to its
age, and that sub-lexical structure is a secondary development which should be
expected to emerge over time. Similarly, we should not be surprised by the pres-
ence of many apparent violations of duality found throughout more established
languages: while duality of patterning appears to play a strong functional role
towards creating large, productive lexicons, there is no reason why it should be
expected to be absolutely ubiquitous.
It is impossible to continue much further without addressing exactly what the
levels in duality of patterning are, and how they have been treated in the literature.
Up to this point, I have only been referring to ‘meaningful’ and ‘meaningless’
elements: henceforth, I will follow de Boer et al. (2012) in referring to the mean-
ingless level as combinatoriality and the meaningful level as compositionality. I
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will also be working with a definition of duality of patterning which is interme-
diate between Hockett and Martinet’s: unlike Hockett, I will focus on the emer-
gence of systematicity at both combinatorial and compositional levels of analysis.
Unlike Martinet, however, I will not assume that combinatorial systematicity is
entirely encapsulated within discrete compositional elements. Finally, unlike both
scholars, I will not assume that either feature appeared before the other.
Aside from Tria et al. (2012), all of the studies reviewed below focus on the
emergence of combinatoriality and compositionality in isolation. However, most
make some implicit assumption about the nature of the other level, although this
often boils down to whether the other level is present in the model. The nature
of what entails combinatorial and compositional structure shows quite a lot of
variation in the literature, along with the various proposals which have been put
forward for the emergence of each. Because of this, I will review the two fields
separately.
5.2.2 Combinatoriality
A broad definition for combinatorial signalling is simple: signals are composed
of two or more concatenated discrete forms, chosen from a closed set of forms.
We will first look at how there have been a number of different approaches to
defining combinatoriality. The following section will outline how combinatorial
communication is rare within the natural kingdom. After this I will outline sev-
eral explanations which have been proposed for the emergence of combinatorial
communication. Many of these are phrased in terms of optimality for learning
or perception/production, but there are also a number of natural-selection based
accounts. This leads into a more formal description of combinatoriality, how it
emerged, and how to measure it. We will then take a look at how the different
approaches we have surveyed interface with the idea of duality of patterning, and
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the existence of compositional mapping between the signal and meaning spaces.
This leads into a more formal description of combinatoriality, how it emerged,
and how to measure it.
Defining combinatorial communication
As we have seen in Section 5.2.1, Hockett (1959, 1960) and Martinet (1984) both
assume a level of analysis which involves the recombination of discrete, mean-
ingless elements, the development of which they see as both secondary to and
subsequent to that of meaningful elements. As such, the process of discretisation
would seem to be the fundamental step in the development of combinatoriality.
This is not the whole story, however: while the emergence of discrete elements
from a continuous form-space is an essential step, they are then combined. The
nature of the process leading to combination needs to be considered.
Zuidema & de Boer (2009) take a comprehensive look at different aspects
of combinatoriality, identifying three distinct stages. Firstly, a stage in which
discrete elements form out of a continuous form space; secondly, a superficially
combinatorial stage in which these discrete elements are reused over different
signals; finally, a stage of productive re-use and perception, in which the elements
are perceptually recognised and novel signals can be composed of these elements.
I would add a fourth stage to these, in which the systems of recombination become
“rule-based”, but this will not be the focus of the study at hand.
The apparatus employed by humans to convey language (whether spoken or
signed) has an inherently analogue nature: articulators move through a continu-
ous, multi-dimensional space. The time dimension plays a particularly important
role, not just in terms of allowing for an extra degree of freedom, but also because
it complicates issues of perception: when there is no distinct boundary marker be-
tween elements (as there usually is not), the matter of where one segment ends and
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another begins is far from trivial. However, almost all human linguistic signalling
behaviour is composed of discrete, re-combinable, non-semantic elements. At a
first approximation, then, we need to account for how discrete elements resolved
out of the continuous space. Some of the studies below (Oudeyer, 2006; Oudeyer
& Kaplan, 2007; Studdert-Kennedy, 2005) focus solely on this, while in other
studies it is a key, if not focal aspect (de Boer & Verhoef, 2012; Galantucci et al.,
2010; Zuidema & de Boer, 2009; Verhoef, 2012; Verhoef et al., 2014).
The second property of combinatoriality is that these discrete elements prop-
agate through the signalling system. As a very simple example of this, we can
imagine a system in which signals can be composed from two different behaviours,
A and B, and there is a closed set of signals S = AA,BB,AB,BA. In this case, be-
cause we are able to decompose all four signals into two component elements, we
can describe it as being superficially combinatorial. However, there is as yet no
real motivation for claiming the elements possess any psychological reality. This
is, in fact, precisely the case with the minimally combinatorial call-system used
by the putty-nosed money described in Section 5.2.2. There is no a priori reason
to suspect that the monkey composes the combinatorial signal through some ac-
tive cognitive process. The simplest assumption is that the monkeys have access
to three holistic behaviours, one of which happens to be analysable into the others
from an external perspective. For this reason, Zuidema & de Boer characterise this
as a property of E-language1: that is, an external, observable property of language
which does not represent an ‘internal/generative’ facility.
The next stage is productive combinatoriality. In contrast to its superficial
counterpart, this is characterised as an I-language property. The discrete analytic
components of signals are perceptually salient, optionally leading to the ability
to construct novel signals out of the same building blocks. If, for example, the
1The I-language/E-language terminology is borrowed from Chomsky (1986)
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putty-nosed monkeys began to create a succession of novel, meaningful signals
constructed from ‘pyow/hack’ sequences, this would be compelling evidence that
productive combinatoriality had arisen. However, as Verhoef (2012) observes,
evidence of the psychological reality of segments is not necessarily derived from
signal production alone: if evidence can be found of perceptual awareness of the
segments, this would suffice as, but would likely be harder to prove.
Zuidema & de Boer (2009) stop at this point. Elsewhere, they and a num-
ber of other authors (Verhoef et al., 2014; Oudeyer, 2006; Berwick et al., 2011;
Kirby, 2013) identify a fourth stage: the development of phonotactic constraints
(which Oudeyer refers to as strong combinatoriality). This requires not just that
the discrete elements can be recombined, but that the way in which this is done ap-
pears to be rule-governed in some sense: for example, restricting certain elements
from appearing together sequentially within a meaningful unit, or in certain orders
(e.g. in English, no morphemes contain an /Nh/ or /hN/ sequence). However, just
as with the distinction between superficial and productive combinatoriality, there
must be some appreciation of the fact that apparently rule-based behaviour can
have multiple explanations. The fact that there are constraints on which elements
can occur together does not imply the existence of a generative faculty such as pro-
posed by Berwick et al. (2011). Other possible explanations might be that some
form of articulatory pressure disfavours certain sequences: Ohala (2005) goes as
far as arguing that most phonological rules are the product of phonetic constraints.
Likewise, even in the case that an internal rule-set exists but the signalling system
has an inventory of limited size, it might simply be that what looks like a con-
straint is the result of a random gap. As is always the case when inferring internal
properties from external evidence, the amount of data available must be taken into
account before making any strong claims.
In the modelling work later in this chapter, I concentrate specifically on super-
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ficial combinatoriality. This is not meant in any way to discount previous work on
the emergence of discrete elements from continuous forms, as this is an absolute
prerequisite for the study here. However, I do show in Section 5.2.2 that mech-
anisms leading to combinatoriality (essentially, a response to a noisy channel) is
explanatory for both the emergence of discreteness and increasing combinatorial-
ity. Turning to the third and fourth stages, simple and rule-based productivity pose
a different type of problem: as attention moves from properties of observed se-
quences towards properties of the mechanisms which produced those sequences,
we are confronted with a multi-level inferential problem. Can we determine that
a system exists, rather than random recombination? Similarly, assuming a system
does exist, what is it? What is the best way of inferring and modelling the system?
These are important issues, but I will set them aside for the time being.
Combinatorial communication in nature
In the vast majority of cases, combinatorial signalling is not a feature of animal
signals, which are typically holistic and do not appear to be comprised of individ-
ual shared sub-elements. However, there are a number of notable exceptions. An
example of this is the call system of the putty-nosed monkey, in which a ‘pyow’
call represents a warning about leopards, a ‘hack’ call warns about eagles, while
a ‘pyow/hack’ sequence has an entirely different function, signalling to the group
to relocate as food is scarce (Arnold & Zuberbühler, 2006, 2008). Importantly,
the recombination of different forms does not lead to a composition of the respec-
tive meanings, and it is the ability to decompose the third signal into component
parts shared by other signals which qualifies it as combinatorial. Aside from hu-
man communication, however, the canonical example of combinatorial signalling
is found in birdsong. Many birds, for example the Bengalese finch, have songs
which not only can be analysed into a number of discrete elements, where these
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individual elements do not themselves contribute to meaning, but that behaviour
also appears to be productively rule-governed (Berwick et al., 2011; ten Cate &
Okanoya, 2012). Tools developed by Kakishita et al. (2008) are able to first break
the continuous signals down into discrete components and then infer finite-state
grammars which produce them — we will return to some of these methods in the
next chapter.
Remaining with birdsong, Collier et al. (2014) points out a difficulty in as-
sociating birdsong with human combinatorial communication: because none of
this variation is associated with different signal/response behaviour, i.e. different
‘meanings’, it is not possible to make a comparison with phenomena such as min-
imal pairs in human natural languages. However, this may not ultimately pose a
great problem. Firstly, it is more of an argument against the existence of duality
of patterning than combinatoriality itself. Secondly, minimal pairs mainly serve
as a useful inferential tool for identifying units, but other techniques are available.
Finally, evidence such as presented by Engesser et al. (2015) points to the pres-
ence of exactly this kind of meaningful “phonemic” distinction in some birdsong:
the chestnut-crowned babbler appears to distinguish between existing signals and
novel ones where an extra signal element is inserted at some point within the
original. The authors suggest that this is a possible intermediate stage prior to a
phonological capacity with generative properties.
Previous explanations for the emergence of combinatorial signalling
Hockett (1959) proposed that the discrete combinatorial aspect of duality is well-
designed for communication systems consisting of large numbers of messages:
keeping the number of discriminating elements small is described as a “great con-
venience”, but he does not clearly state exactly what the convenience is beyond
“economy”. This might seem to appeal to a more ‘cognitive’ perspective, i.e.
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fewer elements need to be learned. However, in Hockett (1960) he is more ex-
plicit and motivates the economy as having a physical source: because the human
articulatory/perceptual system has a finite resolution, any holistic signalling sys-
tem of a sufficient size will inevitably run out of space for distinctive messages.
Martinet (1984) also refers to its “obvious economical role”: he argues that the
discrete elements allow the maintenance of a synchronically stable system. He
proposes that this would be impossible if meaningful elements were composed of
“unanalysable grunts”, as they would be subject to a form of iconicity-driven emo-
tive modulation (i.e. the word for wind could vary in various qualities to express
different strengths and types of wind), and the resulting variation would preclude
the development of any shared signalling system.
Like Hockett, Nowak, Krakauer, & Dress (1999) and Nowak & Krakauer
(1999) explore the idea that physical constraints interact with pressures for ex-
pressivity to produce combinatoriality. They outline an evolutionary game-theory
analysis which proposes an error-limit explanation for the emergence of discrete
forms. The authors define fitness in terms of the probability of successful commu-
nication and attain two main results. Firstly, discrete signalling strategies will al-
ways be more informative in the presence of any level of noise. Secondly, there is
a ‘maximally fit’ number of discrete elements which is determined by the amount
of noise, beyond which there are diminishing returns. As it turns out, this argu-
ment is actually a special case of channel capacity (Shannon, 1948) which we will
look at in more detail in Section 5.2.2.
Another study relying on physical explanation is de Boer (2005), which fo-
cusses on vowel systems in a physiologically-inspired model. The study shows
that a pressure for distinctiveness drives the emergence of plausibly human-like
vowel inventories. Wedel (2006) employs more abstract exemplar models to il-
lustrate a similar point: a pressure for distinctiveness combined with the physical
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limitations of an articulatory space results in the development of distinct vowel
categories. Zuidema & de Boer (2009) and de Boer & Zuidema (2010) employ
similarly abstract models including a time-dimension in which signals are plot-
ted as trajectories instead of simple points. Once again, signals are optimised for
expressivity, but the extra degree of freedom supplied by time has an interesting
effect: to quote the original, “trajectories become far apart where possible and
close together where necessary” (p.31). In the simulations, the corners of the two-
and three-dimensional spaces become attractors: individual trajectories consist of
periods of stasis in one of the corners interspersed by transitions between corners:
in essence, this is a demonstration of how signal trajectories transition from be-
ing continuous to discrete, with each corner and transition representing a discrete
element.
A number of accounts employ information theory. In particular, Fortuny &
Corominas-Murtra (2013) proposes an account of combinatoriality (strictly speak-
ing, they discuss duality of patterning, but in doing so they are referring to sub-
lexical discrete coding) as optimised for compressibility and (similarly to Nowak,
Krakauer, & Dress, 1999) robust transmission. The concept of robust transmis-
sion requires that signals are maximally distinct, in the same sense as the pressure
for distinctiveness which is found in de Boer & Zuidema (2010). Ay et al. (2007)
also propose that combinatorial coding allows for robust transmission, and that
robustness provides a flexibility which can be co-opted for productive re-use. In
their model of duality of patterning, Tria et al. (2012) show that the amount of
noise in transmission determines the degree of robust, combinatorial coding taken
on by the system in order to maintain expressivity: the more noise, the greater the
degree of combination.
Other accounts, however, are not based on physical constraints upon expres-
sivity. Oudeyer (2006) also uses vocal trajectories, the model consisting of cou-
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pled pairs of neural network agents. Oudeyer argues that his model demonstrates
that physical constraints are unnecessary, and that a ‘perceptual magnet’ effect
(e.g. Pierrehumbert, 2001) drives the formation of categories over repeated cycles
of reception and production between agents. However, as a core element of this
model is a Gaussian parameter which determines the likelihood of producing a
target output value given an input value, the number of categories which emerge
is a result of how large the parameter is: a large value means that categories will
have widely-spread activation distributions, while small values result in narrow
distributions: the former leads to few categories, while the latter leads to more.
As such, the number of distinct categories which come into being is constrained
by the size of the parameter in relation to the articulatory space. Since categories
are an emergent property of groups of mappings, and those mappings are not
‘tagged’ in any way, there is no meaningful sense in which signals can be under-
stood to be in competition — either they are grouped together or they aren’t.2 I
would argue that this represents an implicit pressure for distinctiveness: if similar
signals cannot be distinguished from each other, then multiple categories must be
distinctive.
Verhoef (2012); Verhoef et al. (2014) also suggest another non-physical pres-
2There are a number of abstract structural similarities between Wedel (2006) and Oudeyer
(2006), for the latter, particularly in the case of the two-dimensional simplifications found at the
end of Chapter 6. A key difference between them is that in Wedel’s model mappings are tagged
with a categorical symbol, whereas categories are purely emergent in Oudeyer’s model. This
explains a curious difference between the two models: Wedel’s models will collapse to a single
category if there is no pressure for distinctiveness, while Oudeyer’s models do not feature this
problem. This is because of the cue which serves as the basis of producing a new signal in each
model: in Wedel’s model, the cue is a categorical tag, while in Oudeyer’s model it is a random ‘Go!
signal’ (p.80) which can presumably take on any input value in the perceptron range. Because of
this, while categories are free to (and do) collapse into each other, new categories are guaranteed
to emerge because they are not constrained to be near any existing cloud of mappings.
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sure: learnability. In a series of experiments utilising an artificial articulator with
a completely continuous characteristic (a slide-whistle), participants are asked to
produce and repeat a series of initially randomly-produced slide-sequences (with
no meaning attached to them). The sequences quickly take on discrete, combina-
torial properties: distinguishable elements are repeated within and across individ-
ual signals. However, the number of sequences in Verhoef (2012), for example, is
only 12 and does not threaten to overcrowd the articulatory space: they argue that
“combinatorial structure is easier to learn and produce”.
This view is echoed by Roberts & Galantucci (2014) and Roberts et al. (2015),
who investigate the opposition between iconicity and combinatoriality. Iconic
signals, resembling their intended meaning, are easily interpreted and thus highly
expressive. On the other end of the spectrum, combinatorial signals display a
high degree of arbitrariness and do not resemble their target. From a different
perspective, however, because a set of combinatorial signals consists of a small
amount of repeated elements, the assumption is that this would place less pressure
on both memory and acquisition. They show that when the ability to produce
iconic signals is removed, signals become increasingly combinatorial.
From an abstract perspective, we can see a number of common threads running
through these accounts. A force for expressivity can be seen in the pressure to keep
signals distinct in the physically-motivated models such as Nowak, Krakauer, &
Dress (1999); Zuidema & de Boer (2009); de Boer & Zuidema (2010); Wedel
(2014), but it is also present (more or less implicitly) in Oudeyer (the Go! signal)
and Tria et al.’s simulations (when new words are invented in the event of com-
municative failure), and in the experimental design of Verhoef et al. (2014) and
Roberts et al. (2015).
A force for learnability can be also be discerned, but often less obviously.
Verhoef et al. (2014) and Roberts et al. (2015) are the most explicit, but Martinet’s
CHAPTER 5. DUALITY OF PATTERNING 128
appeal to language stability is an appeal to learnability, as are robustness in Tria
et al. (2012) and Ay et al. (2007), as is the compressibility constraint found in
Fortuny & Corominas-Murtra (2013). In both cases, we see in most work that
while neither pressure might be the focus of a study, it is still a component of the
explanation.3
At this point, it’s worth looking at what exactly a ‘learnable, expressive’ sys-
tem is. Learnability is a property of both signals and systems: signals themselves
must be perceivable and storable, while the system as a whole must also be reli-
ably attained and maintained. In both cases, signals and systems must be robust to
acquisition and storage in the face of information bottlenecks and noise. And so
the presence of different degrees of noise itself determines what makes a learnable
system: in the case of the noisy sampling effects of an transmission bottleneck it
leads to a preference for compact, highly regular systems. Expressivity, also, has
aspects relating to both signals and systems. Expressive signals (ignoring meaning
for the time being) must be maximally distinct — optimally with no shared ele-
3There are two exception to this: Studdert-Kennedy (2005) proposes that the relevant unique
adaptation in humans is that of the articulators, and that discreteness in spoken language is an
inevitable result of this: I am not entirely convinced by this argument, as many continuous pro-
cesses can be produced by discrete means: the orbit of the Moon around the Earth, for example,
and the tides which that produces. Taking quite a different tack, Scott-Phillips & Blythe (2013)
claim that combinatorial communication is unlikely to appear in species which do not engage in
ostensive/inferential communication: because so much of human communication requires prag-
matic inference, this is very likely to constantly produce novel signals in conjunction with each
other which are then ritualised, a process which does not occur in other animals. While I fully
agree with the fundamental importance of pragmatic inference and theory-of-mind in human com-
munication, the rest of the models here focus more on the process by which populations transition
from holistic to combinatorial signals, whereas Scott-Phillips & Blythe ask why such a thing might
happen: the contrast is between a proximate and an ultimate explanation, and I am focussing here
on the former.
CHAPTER 5. DUALITY OF PATTERNING 129
ments between signals. We again see the role of noise, which determines what is
robust to transmission. Likewise, expressivity requires that there must be enough
signals to cover the the whole system of meanings.
As an example of how these forces might work at extremes, an optimally learn-
able system might be a single signal consisting of a single perceivable element.
An optimally expressive system, on the other hand, would require that no ele-
ments are shared between signals (maximising distinctiveness), and that signals
consist of a maximal number of characters (maximising robustness to transmis-
sion). Looking at it like this, we can see how a simple compromise between the
two forces might lead to some form of combinatoriality: firstly, a small number
of distinct elements gives us the property of discreteness; when these are spread
across strings long enough to maintain sufficient distinctness, we see the emer-
gence of superficial combinatoriality. However, as we shall see, what constitutes
‘learnable’ depends on the context defined by noise within the system.
I will return to this theme later in this chapter, but not before noting that com-
binatoriality increases in response to pressures affecting only the signalling space:
either the number of signals overtakes the noise-determined capacity of the space
to remain distinct, or the number of elements overtakes memory capacity, as de-
fined by the number of tokens which are stable before noisy effects predominate.
In either case, a signal-specific pressure is preventing them from remaining learn-
able and expressive. Looking at this from another direction, if perception allowed
for infinitesimally different signals to be differentiated, and if memory was able
to store them, a non-combinatorial system would be able to handle an infinity of
distinct, learnable signals. Removing either of these capacities favours the devel-
opment of a combinatorial system, although once again affected by the interaction
between the number of unique signals needed and the amount of noise in the sys-
tem.
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Formal Descriptions of Combinatoriality
This section will look at combinatoriality from a more abstract perspective. Firstly,
I will show that the presence of noise in any continuous space will place a limit
on its information capacity, and hence on the maximum number of distinct signal
elements possible. Because of this, whenever expressivity requires more than this
capacity, the only option is to move towards some form of coding. I will then show
that we can regard memory capacity as representing another form of noisy chan-
nel, which also places an effective limit on the number of viable signal elements.
This leads into a description of learnability in terms of robustness in acquisition
and storage, and unifies competing accounts of combinatoriality as being adapta-
tions to noisy processes. Following this, I will have a look at different measures
of combinatoriality.
One way of modelling a perfect communication channel is that it consists of
an infinite set of distinguishable elements available for constructing signals. In the
complete absence of noise, an infinite number of different single-character strings
would remain learnable and expressive. As the perceptual resolution of the system
is decreased, however, only a certain number of characters are available: the only
way to remain expressive is by concatenating characters together. Reducing the
capacity of memory has the exact same effect, limiting the feasible number of
characters, again requiring that characters are concatenated to be expressive. The
upshot of this is that the apparent tension between accounts based on channel
capacity (e.g. Hockett) and learnability (e.g. Verhoef et al.) can be resolved at a
certain level of abstraction: they both limit the practical resolution of the signal
space, i.e. the number of ‘characters’ available, leading to combinatoriality as
signals are extended.
The Shannon-Hartley Theorem (Shannon, 1948) guarantees that an analogue
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channel can never reliably retain an amount of information which exceeds C bits.4
The only way to exceed this limit — in our case, the only way of increasing the
number of distinct signals — is via coding, i.e. concatenating symbols together.
Thus, the presence of noise (whatever the source) will always lead to the require-
ment that discrete elements are recombined once the channel capacity is exceeded
for expressivity to be maintained.
As remarked earlier in Section 5.2.2, these more general principles underlie
the game-theoretic approach of Nowak, Krakauer, & Dress (1999), who extend
them to look at a number of more specifically relevant applications. In particu-
lar, instead of considering analogue channels, they look at what happens when
transmission error is applied to signals across a number of different metric spaces.
They first consider signals embedded in a one-dimensional space xi ∈ [0,1]. Defin-
ing distance as di j, the similarity between any two points is e−αdi j , where α is a
noise parameter. On receiving a signal si, the distribution of interpretations for the





They show that, in this case, the maximally ‘fit’ number of signals Fmax —





This relation will hold for any linear space affected by noise, both guarantee-
ing discreteness and determining the optimal number of discrete elements. How-
ever, this seems to contrast with the effects of noise in the simulations of Zuidema
& de Boer (2009), in which there is no discretisation of the space and signals tend
4Related to this, Shannon’s Noisy Coding Theorem tells us the maximum amount of informa-
tion capacity given a certain tolerance for noise, which is always larger than C.
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to cluster at the corners of the available space. The reason for this is that in that
study distinctiveness is maximised within the 2-dimensional space but not in the
extra time-dimension, which is why they extend through that and maximise spa-
tial distance. Were this not the case, we would expect to see discreteness develop
in two dimensions according to the optimal condition shown in Eq. 5.2.
Nowak, Krakauer, & Dress (1999) also consider a space where signals have
a similarity of 1 to themselves and a similarity of some constant s to all other
signals. This seemingly abstract idealisation is actually a rather compact model
of exemplar memory, where representations compete with each other only on the
basis of total storage. Nowak, Krakauer, & Dress attain another neat result: the
maximally fit number of discrete signals within this space scales inversely with
the similarity constant. That is, the more likely signals are to be confused, the
smaller the number of maximally effective signals, and vice-versa.
If we look at this in terms of memory, this is equivalent to saying that when-
ever signals are assigned a constant weight, the system will have a corresponding
optimal number of signal elements. This observation plays a key role in the mod-
els in Section 5.3. Unfortunately, we can’t directly apply Eq. ?? to those models
because they define noise probabilistically instead of using a similarity metric.
However, we can use Shannon’s information theoretic definition of channel ca-
pacity to demonstrate that this feature of ‘maximal expressivity’ is also true for
the model here. The information capacity of a channel with distributions of sent
signals S and interpreted signals R is defined as their mutual information I(S;R)
(see Fig. 5.3). This employs the joint entropy measure H(S,R), which is the
overall uncertainty associated with both S and R.
I(S;R) = H(S,R)−H(R|S)−H(S|R) (5.3)
In a preview of the model described in 5.3.1, we can use this equation to
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Figure 5.1: The information capacity of a ‘discrete memory channel’ where noise
is determined by the parameter λ and the number of equiprobable symbols N such
that p(Flip) = e
−λ
N
analyse the effects of noise in that model. Fig 5.1 describes a probabilistic version
of the exemplar memory given in Eq. ??, which includes a noise parameter λ. As
this parameter increases (higher values corresponding to less probability of noise),
we see the maximum information capacity defines a certain ‘peak’ number of
symbols—literally the peaks of the individual curves here—beyond which noise
takes over and the channel becomes increasingly less informative. In the absence
of noise (λ = ∞), the information capacity of a channel converges to its standard
information theoretic definition for N equiprobable signals, log N. Even in this
more abstractly-defined memory space, noise determines the maximum number
of characters.
Finally, Fortuny & Corominas-Murtra (2013) also point out that Hockett’s ar-
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gument has strong parallels with Shannon’s noisy channel theorem, but they ar-
gue that channel capacity alone cannot account for the emergence of code-like
discretisation. Fortuny states that coding allows for both data compression and
robust transmission, and hence should be desirable as soon as any discreteness
becomes available. For example, discrete coding means that more frequent mean-
ings can be associated with shorter codes, an assumption which goes back to Zipf
(1936). Fortuny’s claim is a sound one, as long as we assume that signals are
coded to be productively optimal, which relies (realistically) on the probabilities
of meanings being different: short signals for frequent meanings, long signals for
infrequent ones. However, in the absence of noise it is possible to have an infinite
number of basic signals, all with the same minimal length: a completely optimal
system. Because of this, noise must play an essential part in any explanation of
combinatoriality.
Measures of Combinatoriality
As we have outlined previously, the concept of combinatoriality involves more
than one concept. These are detailed below:
• The emergence of discrete elements from a formerly continuous space
• The appearance of these elements within and across different signals
• The productive recombination of these elements, possibly involving novel
signals, entailing the mental ‘reality’ of the segments
• The emergence of rule-like behaviour governing the recombination of those
strings
In the work surveyed previously, the focus was placed on one or both of the
first two phenomena, because without investigating them first it is not possible to
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investigate the second pair. I will focus on the first two and look at the different
ways in which they have been measured.
Detecting discrete elements
Determining whether continuous signals have developed discrete elements is much
more challenging than might be expected. The fundamental issue is a problem of
scale. Any regular, repeated features found in a continuous signal may themselves
be composed of other regular, repeated features, and so on. To use English as an
analogue, syllables, phonemes and features are all drawn from a finite set, but
(most) analysis tends to regard the phoneme as the combinatorial unit. When we
turn from language to the data from models, experiments, and animal studies, we
have neither the amount of data nor any other linguistic cues available when work-
ing with natural languages, making the task highly non-trivial. Notwithstanding
this, researchers have found a number of ways to detect discreteness. We will
survey these now.
We can first look at methods used in comparative animal studies. Because
the elements of the ‘pyow-hack’ monkey calls studied by Arnold & Zuberbühler
(2006, 2008) were themselves produced in isolation, segmentation did not pose a
problem. However, addressing the possibility that some undetected feature of the
combined calls was triggering the different response, the researchers created their
own synthetic calls by combining the isolated ones. When these were played to
the monkeys it triggered a highly similar response, indicating the salience of the
components. Although continuous birdsong presumably presents a more difficult
problem, the techniques by which Kakishita et al. (2008) extract individual notes
from waveform files is not reported, while Engesser et al. (2015) utilised software
specifically designed for birdsong (Bioacoustics Research Program, 2011).
Moving to experimental work, Verhoef & Kirby (2010); Verhoef (2012); Ver-
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hoef et al. (2014) analyse their slide-whistle data using several techniques. They
identify silence-separated segments, and then place them into categories using a
different types of clustering models. Verhoef (2012) observed that participants
were apparently paying more attention to the movement of the whistle-plunger
than the sounds themselves. This inspired a measure mapping to this movement,
which proved to be a significantly more reliable method of extracting combina-
torial elements. In the visual modality, Roberts & Galantucci (2014); Roberts et
al. (2015) also use separation as a criterion, in this case white-space between fig-
ures, before categorisation by a clustering algorithm. Giudice (2012) also uses a
distance measure based on dynamic time-warping to calculate distances across all
signals in a set, with higher similarity interpreted as greater combinatoriality.
In modelling work, Oudeyer (2006) uses Shannon entropy to analyse the ac-
tivation levels across the agents’ neural map outputs. As such, maximal entropy
(uniform distributions) represent a complete lack of clustering, and decreasing
entropy (more ‘peaky’ distributions) indicates increased discreteness. Zuidema &
de Boer (2009) measure the distinctiveness of signal trajectories via confusabil-
ity probabilities, in which parameterised Gaussian noise around any point of the
trajectory is used to calculate the chance of being misinterpreted as its nearest
neighbour. Straddling the boundary between the detection of individual elements
and the measurement of combinatoriality itself, de Boer & Zuidema (2010) outline
a measure of ‘phonemicity’ for the trajectories in their model. They observe that
in combinatorial systems where trajectories are from point to point in a straight
line, the endpoints of trajectories are more likely on average to be closer to each
other than intermediate points are, and instantiate a composite measure for this.
Due to the difficulty of detecting discrete elements, most of the methods sur-
veyed above either involve some human interaction (for example with the birdsong
analysis software), miss out on possible further segmentation (when physical sep-
CHAPTER 5. DUALITY OF PATTERNING 137
aration is used as the criterion), or rely on proxy measures in place of identifying
actual elements. There is a philosophical issue at stake here: if we assume that
the segments possess some psychological reality, the task is more than a sim-
ple mechanical one, as it requires inference about cognition. But if cognition is
ignored, the problems of scale discussed at the beginning of this section become
significant. In fact, identifying the fundamental units of speech is contentious even
within mainstream linguistics: the phonetic realisation of phonemes are cloud-like
and vary over multiple dimensions, overlapping significantly (e.g. Pierrehumbert,
2001), and the mental reality of the phoneme has been disputed since its inception
(e.g. Twaddell, 1935).
Measuring superficial combinatoriality
Once a set of discrete elements has been established (whether this is through de-
tection or if they are simply assumed), we need to establish a measure of com-
binatoriality. Again, this is not as simple as it might seem: combinatoriality is
much easier to establish as a property than a scalar measure. To illustrate this, we
can take a recent (de Boer & Zuidema, 2010) definition of combinatoriality: “...it
combines a limited number of basic sounds into a potentially infinite set of com-
plex utterances that all differ in meaning”. Assuming the set of ‘basic sounds’,
any measure must concentrate on the degree of combination, but what exactly this
means is not immediately clear. Because there is no obvious measure, none of the
various methods employed in the literature are exactly the same.
Verhoef (2012); Verhoef et al. (2014) define combinatoriality in terms of com-
pression: the smaller the set of elements used to construct the entire signal space,
the more combinatorially structured it is. Defined like this, Shannon entropy pro-
vides an ideal measure: they simply take the proportion of each element pi across
all signal strings and calculate H = −∑ pi log2 pi. Lower entropy values are
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reached when there is a greater concentration on smaller sets of building blocks.
There are some drawbacks with this particular measure, however: firstly, by tak-
ing the overall proportion of each element across all strings, there is no way of
determining that elements are re-used in different strings. For example, the signal
set S1 = {AAA,BBB,CCC} would render an identical measurement as the signal
set S2 = {ABC,BCA,CAB}. Secondly, a maximum value of combinatoriality is
reached for H = 0, implying that everything is made of a single element. There are
situations for which this does not pose a problem, for example S3 = {A,AA,AAA},
but it would also hold true for S4 = {A,A,A} or even S5 = {A}: at this point, max-
imally ‘combinatorial’ systems cease to appear combinatorial at all.
Zuidema & de Boer (2009) suggest an example measure for the ‘degree of
combination’: “φ = Nk , where φ is the measure of recombination (phonemicity),
N is the number of words in the repertoire and k the number of building blocks.”
This would render high values for small sets of basic elements, and minimal val-
ues for larger sets. We’re still faced with a problem, however: there are a number
of confounding factors which will affect the value of φ. Firstly, just as with Ver-
hoef et al.’s measure, it can’t distinguish between elements being re-used within
or across strings. Secondly, as another example, take S1 = {ABC,CAB} and
S2 = {ABC,CAB,BCA,ACB}. Although all strings maximally re-use the avail-
able elements, φ(S1) = 0.66 and φ(S2) = 1.33: the number of strings directly
affects the score, and the nature of the measure means that there is no way to nor-
malise for this. Similarly, both S3 = {ABC,BAC,CBA} and S4 = {A,B,C} produce
φ(S3) = φ(S4) = 1, but S4 bears the hallmark of holistic rather than combinatorial
signalling.
In Galantucci (2005); Roberts & Galantucci (2014); Roberts et al. (2015), the
Form Recombination Index (FRI) is used. After determining the set of elementary
elements, the FRI provides a count of re-use across signals. This is done by first
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eliminating any repeated elements within signals, and then counting the number
of times each unit features in a signal F alongside the number of times an ele-
ment could have featured in a signal P, and then calculating FRI = FP . This has
some nice properties, in that it takes into account re-use across and within strings.
There are some possible drawbacks, however: one is that its maximal value of 1
is reached when there is only one element, for example in the case of a one-word
system composed of a single holistic character. A second is that, while the mea-
sure is more robust against string-length than others, it can still fall short: compare
S1 = {ABC,CAB,BCA} and S2 = {AB,BC,AC}. While elements are maximally
re-used across strings in S1, if we consider that (for some reason) string-length is
constrained to 2 in S2, then elements are being maximally re-used for that string
length.
Tria et al. (2012) also define a measure of combinatoriality C, where there are
F distinct word-forms, M meanings, and m( fi) is the number of distinct meanings





The term (m( fi)− 1) is used so that only elements which are used for two
meanings are taken into account. One minor implication of the measure is that it
suffers from the same problem as FRI, in that it can be affected by word length.
However, it does a good job of registering combinatoriality across strings.
Finally, we could also define a measure of optimal combinatorial re-use Cx
across strings. This is essentially a measure of compression, using the relationship
between the optimal number of bits to store a lexicon expressing all meanings
without using any coding/compression techniques log |M| as a proportion of the
number of bits encodable by the total number of signal elements log |C|multiplied
by the average word length ∑ |w||W | .





This value for Cx could also be taken as an indicator of redundancy: the lower
the value, the greater the degree of redundancy, and hence the more likely the
signalling system is to be robust to noise.
In Section 5.3, both overall character entropy and Tria’s combinatoriality mea-
sure will be used. Due to the fact that string length doesn’t vary in the model, the
measure for optimal combinatoriality is not used here, as it is better suited to sys-
tems which have more ability to adapt in this respect.
Implications for duality of patterning
Both Hockett (1959, 1960) and Martinet (1984) explicitly state that combinatorial
structure in language would have developed as a separate step, secondary to pro-
ductive compositionality. A recent animal study sharing this hypothesis is given
a paper by Collier et al. (2014). They propose a re-interpretation of Campbell
monkey’s compound call systems (Arnold & Zuberbühler, 2006, 2008) as actu-
ally possessing a type of “syntactic blending”, in which the semantics of eagle and
snake signals are synthesised into a ‘move on’ signal. They argue that the human
phonological capacity is likely a subsequent development to this kind of semantic
compositionality, and the result of pressures of cultural transmission rather than
genetics. In contrast to this, Engesser et al. (2015) claim that putty-nosed mon-
keys do possess a phonological capacity, and that they are even able to distinguish
between established and artificial recombinations. Berwick et al. (2011) also con-
centrate on combinatoriality found in the natural world, suggesting that the main
difference between the combinatorial ability found in birdsong, for example, and
that of humans is that in humans it is wedded to compositional semantics. Accord-
ing to this view, both shared brain regions and convergent evolution probably play
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some role in the shared aspect of combinatorial ability. In placing emphasis on
the combinatorial faculty, however, the focus is on the question of how it gained
semanticity at all, whether productive or not. Ladd (2012) echoes this sentiment,
putting forth the idea that duality of patterning is simply the combinatorial abil-
ity applied to different levels of structure. In contrast to this view, Kirby (2013)
proposes the emergence of combinatorial and compositional structure as two in-
dependent major transitions in the evolution of language; he is keen to point out
that neither change pre-supposes the other. In the theoretical literature at least,
there is no consensus on whether compositionality preceded combinatoriality or
vice versa, or indeed whether separate steps were necessary.
Looking at experimental and modelling work, there are few assumptions made
about the existence of productive compositionality, which features only in the
work of Tria et al. (2012). The main split lies between work which assumes Hock-
ett’s version of duality, i.e. the existence of a meaningful stratum, and that which
doesn’t. In the former camp, the experiments of Galantucci (2005); Roberts &
Galantucci (2014); Roberts et al. (2015); de Boer & Verhoef (2012) all include
the expression of meaning. Most modelling work lies in the latter camp, how-
ever: Oudeyer (2006); de Boer & Zuidema (2010); Zuidema & de Boer (2009)
concentrate directly on the signal space. This is also the case in the experiments
of Verhoef & Kirby (2010); Verhoef (2012); Verhoef et al. (2014). By distin-
guishing signals through form alone, no assumptions are made about the role of
meaning, and hence duality. Returning to Tria et al. (2012), combinatorial and
compositional structure are proposed to be the result of different pressures: either
can emerge in isolation.
We can see, then, that literature on combinatoriality can be divided into three
camps on the issue of duality: i) combinatorial systems pre-suppose composi-
tional ones ii) the combinatorial capacity underlies both combinatorial and com-
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positional systems, and iii) no commitment to duality by ignoring meaning. We
will now turn to studies on the emergence of compositionality.
5.2.3 Compositionality
This section will proceed in a similar fashion to the one on combinatoriality: after
a survey of semantic compositionality in nature, we will have a look at previous
definitions, explanations and measures of compositionality, before looking at how
work in this field interacts with theories of duality of patterning.
Defining compositionality
The first description of the compositional property of human language is often
attributed to Frege (1884), but similar ideas can be traced back as far as Plato
(Janssen, 2012). An informal definition of compositionality is:
“The meaning of a complex expression is determined by its struc-
ture and the meanings of its constituents.” (Szabó, 2013)
This definition of compositionality can be further analysed into:
1. There are multiple constituents.
2. Constituents can be combined.
3. Constituents are meaningful.
4. Combinations of constituents have meaning.
5. Constituents contribute towards the meaning of combinations.
6. The way constituents are combined also contributes meaning.
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The first two aspects of compositionality describe its combinatorial proper-
ties. It is the meaningfulness of constituents, and their contribution towards a
larger meaning which distinguishes compositionality from the combinatoriality
discussed in the previous section. However, we do see in both cases that the
manner of combination plays a key role (e.g. combinatorial dog vs. god and com-
positional ‘man bites dog’ vs.‘dog bites man’). Seen like this, compositionality is
what Hockett (1959, 1960) referred to as productivity, and what Martinet (1984)
as described as primary articulation, and the compositional syntax which it entails
is fundamental to human language.
More formally, Montague (1970) defined compositionality as a homomor-
phism between meaning and form. A homomorphism is a mapping from one
structured space to another in which some aspect of the original structure is pre-
served. As an example from cartography, projecting maps from the surface of a
sphere to a flat plane distorts many of the original features. By using different pro-
jections, certain properties of the original, such as direction, shape, or area can be
preserved, usually at the expense of others. Each of these projections is a different
homomorphism. Montague’s formulation involves more technical apparatus than
is needed here, but a simplified version (based on Szabó, 2013) defines expres-
sions e, a meaning function m, a semantic operation G, and a syntactic operation
F , and defines a compositional mapping as:
m( F(e1, . . . ,ek) ) = G( m(e1), . . . ,m(ek) ) (5.6)
Working from the left, this says that the meaning of a particular syntactic
combination of expressions is the same as a particular semantic combination of
the meaning of the individual expressions. In a fully compositional language,
then, the homomorphism implies that every semantic operation G necessarily has
a matching syntactic operation F .
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In this way, Montague is addressing more than just the productivity of lan-
guage, but also its systematicity: the syntactic and semantic operations are of
crucial importance. However, in line with much (but not all) previous work exam-
ining the emergence of compositional language, I will avoid complex operations
for the time being and instead focus on a more restricted version of composition-
ality. This does not mean that I will ignore systematicity, just that my focus on
a highly restricted version which assumes only concatenation of both form and
meaning. As such, we can further simplify our definition of compositionality.
Assuming a simple additive and transitive model of semantics5, we can define a
compositional mapping as:
m(e1, ...,ek) = m(e1)+ . . .+m(ek) (5.7)
A signalling system which is compositional in this way, then, needs to have
an analytic property: every expression with a complex meaning must be decom-
posable into a set of smaller sub-meanings and sub-expressions, with each sub-
meaning mapping to a distinct sub-element. This does not imply that there is
only a single way to decompose either meanings or expressions: the composi-
tional homomorphism requires only that one particular decomposition of each has
this property. In practice, the majority of the models described below assume a
fixed semantic structure, with most decomposition/recombination involving form
elements: the model in the following section will also make this assumption.
We can use this simplified version of compositionality to develop a definition
for compositional systems. Complex meanings m ∈M are composed of features
f ∈ F , and expression-strings s ∈ S are composed of sub-strings si j. A fully com-
positional system must satisfy:
5i.e. GREEN DOG = GREEN + DOG = DOG + GREEN
CHAPTER 5. DUALITY OF PATTERNING 145
∀ f ∈ F ∃ si j such that p( f |si j) = 1 ∧ p(si j| f ) = 1 (5.8)
This says simply that every meaning feature is always associated with a par-
ticular sub-string, and that sub-string is always associated with the same meaning
feature (note that this leaves open the possibility that some sub-strings are redun-
dant, and do not form part of the compositional system). Referring back to the
work on simple signalling games in Chapter 1, this basically says that an unam-
biguous, synonymy-free set of mappings exists on the level of individual meaning
features. Note that this definition of compositionality implies completely optimal-
ity. Other optimal but non-compositional signalling systems are also possible, but
they do not satisfy Eq. 5.8. This is because although it is true that every feature
is associated with an unambiguous signal (p( f |si jk) = 1), the non-analyticity of
holistic signals means that instances of that feature found in different complex
meaning combinations will have no consistent associated signal (p(si jk| f ) 6= 1).
In Section 5.3.1, we will use this definition of compositionality to construct a
relevant measure.
The issue of synonymy is worth addressing, as the simplified version of com-





It is easy to infer meanings for ‘dog’ and ‘fish’, and hence by process of elimina-
tion the other terms. However, it is hard to tell exactly whether this is fully com-
positional: within the context of this small system, terms like ‘small’ and ‘big’
have the character of so-called cranberry morphs: they reliably indicate a partic-
ular property, but not in a systematically predictable way. A similar problem is
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seen with synonymy: introducing ‘bigcat’ and ‘littlecat’ would reveal a degree of
systematicity, but not a system-wide one. Certainly, this would still not represent
a fully compositional system, as Eq. 5.8 cannot distinguish between degrees of
systematic synonymy. In fact, this ‘argument from synonymy’ has been used to
attack the existence of a strict interpretation of the principle of compositionality:
see (Pelletier, 1994), who argues that any good working definition of composition-
ality should be able to deal with only partially systematic relationships between
meaning and form, as we see in all natural languages. Later, in section 5.3.1, the
measure of compositionality we construct deals with this by measuring the degree
to which form maps onto meaning probabilistically.
Pagin & Westerståhl (2010) build on the foundations laid by Frege (1884)
and Montague (1970). They survey a number of discussions within philosophy
on whether compositionality is a true feature of natural languages. Many of the
arguments — especially the idea that compositionality is a requirement for lan-
guage to be learnable, productive, and systematic — are well-established in other
fields. One argument in particular, that compositionality minimises complexity
has especially strong parallels with work such as Kirby et al. (2015). Assessing
arguments against compositionality, they find the strongest case in a number of
apparent natural language exceptions to the rule, including some tricky technical
problems with the truth-conditionality of embedded clauses such as ‘John believes
X’, the syntactic status of quotations, and the varying degrees to which idioms are
analytic. On the whole, their assessment is that compositionality is not an unprob-
lematic notion. Luckily, most of these problems do not affect the current study,
apart from the issue of idioms. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, the appearance of
systematicity (as is found in idioms) does not imply an active systematic process.
We will revisit this distinction between internal and external systematicity (c.f.
K. Smith, 2003b) in the model section later on.
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Finally, up till this point we have been referring to abstract associations be-
tween meaning and signal. However, just as synonymous terms result in produc-
tive signalling which is not entirely systematic (i.e., more than one productive
form for any given meaning), it is possible to describe systems which satisfy Eq.
5.8 which are systematic but not productive. For example, a completely system-
atic signalling system can be learned holistically, by rote. In this case, although
the system itself bears all the hallmarks of compositionality, in cognitive terms it
is not. K. Smith (2003b), recognising this fact, contrasts I-compositionality with
E-compositionality, the former an internal cognitive property, and the latter an
external systematic property. The model described in section 5.3.1 blurs the line
somewhat between these two, but makes use of both.
Previous accounts for the emergence of compositionality
There is a large literature devoted to the emergence of compositionality in human
language, spread over a number of disciplines. This encompasses a widely diver-
gent set of perspectives, but discussion tends to centre around certain key issues,
including i) the nature of proto-language, ii) which cognitive, social and envi-
ronmental prerequisites are necessary, and iii) the role of compositionality in the
emergence of linguistic systematicity. Particular attention has been focussed on
the relative importance of cognitive biases and interaction, and along with this the
roles of horizontal vs. vertical transmission and the effect of information bottle-
necks. Although there has been a good deal of theoretical and comparative work
on these issues, studies employing computational and mathematical modelling are
particularly well-established in the field, and (partially inspired by this work) there
is a fast-growing body of experimental work. The following section surveys this
work, with particular emphasis on previous modelling and experimental accounts.
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Comparative work
Compositional communication (as opposed to combinatorial) is a much less promi-
nent topic of discussion in animal comparative studies. The primary reason for
this is that there is scarce evidence that any non-human species employs com-
positional communication at all. Collier et al. (2014) put forward the strongest
argument, claiming that Campbell monkeys utilise a ‘lexical affix’ which mod-
ifies their normal alarm calls to become more general. For example, instead of
the normal ‘eagle overhead’, the affix would render ‘something overhead’, which
would give the affix something akin to the semantics of a lexical modifier. In a
related but more tentative claim, they offer up a compositional re-analysis of the
putty-nosed monkey data (Arnold & Zuberbühler, 2008): the ‘pyow-hack’ sig-
nal, traditionally regarded as combinatorial could also be seen as compositional,
where the two more specific warning calls merge into a more general one. The real
problem with all such claims is the issue of internal/external systematicity just dis-
cussed: given the highly limited signalling systems, there simply isn’t much data
to work with due to the small size of the signalling repertoires, and any appeal
to productive compositionality is on shaky ground. Berwick et al. (2013) argue
along similar lines: the ‘compositional creativity’ of human language sets it apart
from both highly combinatorial but non-meaningful birdsong and the meaningful
but apparently non-creative signalling found elsewhere.
Protolanguage
The issue of protolanguage — i.e. the existence of an intermediate stage between
an initial, presumably simple form of human communication and its full mod-
ern complexity — is highly contentious. There is strong disagreement between
proponents of the idea that the language capacity is based on a single, transforma-
tive ability to manipulate mental symbols and hence must have appeared suddenly
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(e.g. Hauser et al., 2002, 2014), and those who suggest a more gradual emergence
(e.g. Pinker, 1984; Jackendoff & Pinker, 2005; Hurford, 2011). This is a debate
which has taken on a wider philosophical dimension, highly influenced by the
model of language which is assumed. Because the work I am presenting here is
an investigation into how linguistic structure can emerge as the result of processes
of learning and cultural transmission, it is inevitably biased towards the second,
gradualist perspective. This being the case, I will not take part in the debate, apart
from pointing out my implicit position.
Within the gradualist tradition, another ongoing discussion regards the nature
of protolanguage. The main point of contention revolves around its putative de-
velopment, either i) an initial stage in which simple, atomic semantic units began
to combine with each other (e.g. Tallerman, 2007, 2008; Hurford, 2011), or ii) a
‘fractionating’ process in which semantically complex holistic signals were grad-
ually re-analysed into smaller compositional parts (e.g. Wray, 1998; Kirby, 2000;
K. Smith, 2008; Arbib, 2011). While neither hypothesis is disprovable, much of
the argument hinges on the emergence of the recombinatory process. In the atomic
account, the ability to combine elements is all-or-nothing: in the case of holistic
protolanguage, some degree of combination is also necessary, but allows for the
possibility that the appearance of structure (i.e. similar to what Zuidema & de
Boer (2009) describe as ‘superficial’ structure) can arise first. However, unlike
the case of emergent combinatoriality, which can be driven by entirely random
processes such as noise, any process leading to even the appearance of composi-
tional structure requires some form of combinatorial re-use. The question, then, is
how sophisticated that process is. Croft (2004) remarks that most ‘holistic-first’
models rely on a pre-existent ‘representation of meaning’, and that the general-
isation process represents a movement towards an ‘iconic mapping’: hence, the
process is not so much one of transformation but more one of replication. To
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illustrate this point, instead of invoking a complex set of partial internal represen-
tations which are subsequently manipulated, simply partial repetition of similar
utterances should, by itself, be able to lead to compositionality. This is arguably
the simplest form of recombination, and forms the basis of the model presented
later in this chapter.
Models of the emergence of compositionality
Since several foundational works in the late 1990s, use of mathematical and com-
putational modelling has been a mainstay of research into the evolution of com-
positionality. This encompasses a wide variety of approaches, working under
seemingly quite different assumptions. Much of the work assumes either the It-
erated Learning framework (Kirby, 2001, henceforth IL) or interaction-based ac-
counts (surveyed in Steels, 2012). A number of studies cannot be easily classified
into one of these camps: while I will address them, the division between IL and
interaction-based will be my primary focus. My main purpose in this survey is to
show that despite the apparently conflicting methodologies and theories, a number
of common assumptions underlie most of the models. These have much in com-
mon with the philosophical arguments outlined in Section 5.2.3: compositional
systematicity has the benefit of being learnable and productive. These notions are
expressed in various different but related ways in the literature, often resulting in
some nuance: take, for example, the terms ‘learnability’, ‘simplicity’, ‘compress-
ibility’, and ‘low complexity’. Similarly, ‘productivity’ can be grouped together
with ideas of ‘expressivity’, ’novelty’, ‘functionality’ and ‘a desire to communi-
cate’. I will clarify how these terms relate to each other, but will first survey the
previous models.
Nowak & Krakauer (1999) describe an evolutionary game-theoretic model of
the emergence of ‘basic grammatical rules’ which boils down to an analysis of
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the relative stability of holistic vs. compositional languages in the face of noisy
interference affecting the signal such that every word has an equal probability of
being misunderstood. Their first finding is that ‘grammatical’ (compositional) lan-
guages are ‘fittest’ up to a certain noise threshold, after which holistic languages
are better.6 This is an interesting result, in that it runs contrary to arguments that
syntactic communication is more robust to noisy processes. The reason for this is
that noise in this model specifically affects signals, rather than associations: when
noise levels are too high, using more words increases the likelihood of interfer-
ence: I will discuss this further in section 5.4. Their second result is that for a
compositional language to be preferable, the number of states which need to be
described must be larger than the total number of individual signals. Although this
may seem somewhat redundant, it does capture the idea that the benefits of com-
positionality are not simply that events must be described using multiple signals,
but that by limiting the number of signals overall, the system is more robust to
“mistakes in implementation and comprehension” (p.8031): it is more learnable.
They further develop this result in Nowak et al. (2000), and derive a result show-
ing that applying a learnability parameter to the model places a more complex
limit on when compositional signalling is more adaptive than holistic strategies.
The IL framework (Kirby, 2001) is a development of earlier work looking
at the evolution of linguistic syntax and compositionality (Kirby, 1996; Kirby &
Hurford, 1997a,b; Kirby, 1998, 1999a,b, 2000). The key insight is that when ask-
ing where structure in language comes from, it is not enough to simply ascribe
it to some mental faculty. Language is a cultural product, transmitted between
people and down the generations. These repeated cycles of expression and infer-
6More specifically, the chance of mistaking any word is defined by an error rate ε. When ε = 0
then holistic and compositional languages are equally fit, and compositional languages are fitter
up to a certain threshold 0 < ε < εmax.
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ence from limited data shape the linguistic system as it is passed along. As well
as simply being expressive, languages must be learnable. Although many studies
(modelling and experimental) employ the metaphor of intergenerational transmis-
sion, this is not the essential aspect of the framework: work using IL attempts to
determine how different cognitive, interactive and transmission pressures shape
the structure of culturally transmitted communication systems.
One trend that can be seen in IL models is a gradual increase in abstraction.
Early studies (such as Kirby, 2000, 2001) model learning in terms of grammati-
cal inference. Chance correspondences between holistic signals with some shared
meaning feature lead to a grammatical re-analysis using a chunking algorithm:
this creates not just new ‘lexemes’, but also rules with intermediate categorical
projections (e.g. the equivalent of noun phrases). The emphasis at this stage
is on language as adaptive system: as it undergoes successive jumps between I-
language and E-language, it adapts to survive this process, becoming more learn-
able over time.
Brighton & Kirby (2001); Brighton (2002, 2003) take a closer look at the re-
lationship between learnability, the nature of induction, and a transmission bottle-
neck. This varies the amount of linguistic data which passes between generations,
i.e. how many linguistic exposures a learning agent is provided with in order to
infer their own signalling system. In particular, the idea that learning equates to
simplicity is explored. Using an induction algorithm which generates finite-state
transducers to describe the linguistic data, these grammars are then evaluated us-
ing a Minimum-Description-Length criterion, and the grammar with the smallest
size is chosen at each generation. This bias towards simplicity drives the develop-
ment of compositional grammars, in line with Kirby’s earlier hypothesis that these
are more learnable than holistic languages are. Moreover, they also investigate the
stability conditions determined by the size of a transmission bottleneck, and show
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that compositional grammars remain stable under much smaller bottlenecks than
do holistic ones.
Developing from these models, K. Smith (2003a,b) uses an associative net-
work model to show that when agents are equipped with two learning biases, one
in favour of one-to-one mappings between signals and meaning, and another bias
to ‘exploit regularities in the input data’.7, He explores Kirby’s insight that the
emergence of compositional languages depends on the transmission bottleneck
and shows that when it is large enough, languages will remain holistic, but that
they become compositional under the pressure of a reduced bottleneck. Moreover,
as this model is able to manipulate biases which were implicit in earlier work, it
expands on the idea that compositionality favours learnability, but also that the
biases reinforce systematicity and expressivity.
The bias for one-to-one mappings (further discussed in Brighton et al., 2005) is
a direct analogue of Montague (1970), who defines compositionality as structure-
preserving homomorphisms between form and meaning (see Section 5.2.3). This
is explored in more abstract terms by Brighton & Kirby (2006), who model the
cultural transmission of signals as topographical mappings between two continu-
ous two-dimensional spaces. Initial mappings are completely random, and every
generation a new set of signals must be transmitted for arbitrarily-chosen points
in the meaning space. As the meaning space is continuous, every new meaning is
novel and must be generated by analogy based on the three nearest signal/meaning
vectors. Over the course of several generations, the topographical structure of
both spaces become steadily more similar: moreover, the smaller the bottleneck,
the faster this occurs.
7This is further explored in K. Smith et al. (2003), in which the authors show that the develop-
ment of compositionality depends on the degree to which the agent perceives the world as being
structured — the more structured, the more compositionality develops
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This theme, that compositional structure is an adaptive response to maintain
learnable, expressive systems, forms the basis of K. Smith et al. (2013); Kirby et
al. (2015). A Bayesian model is used to directly control pressures for expressiv-
ity and learnability/compressibility, and shows three possible end-states depend-
ing on the pressures applied. When there is only a pressure for compressibility,
degenerate non-communicative languages emerge whose high learnability stems
from their consisting of only a single term. When there is only a pressure for ex-
pressivity, non-systematic holistic languages result. When both pressures apply,
on the other hand, systematic compositional languages result.
Turning to work which focusses on the role of interaction, the stress is placed
not so much on learnability but more on the idea that language structure fa-
cilitates optimal interpersonal communication. As a result, while these studies
also use agent-based methodologies, they tend to use closed population structures
and emphasise the role of self-organisation. The “Talking Heads” program of
Steels (2012), features computational and embodied robotic agents which nego-
tiate language bottom-up, all the way from a shared set of signals and categories
to mutually-agreed syntactic and semantic systems. Due to the ambitious scale
of this project, compositionality is not often the sole focus of this work, but of-
ten an implicit stepping-stone. However, some work within this paradigm has
concentrated on compositionality alone.
Vogt (2005) directly compares intergenerational IL with closed population
structures: using a version of the Naming Game (Steels, 1997) alongside a frame-
work capable of fully recursive phrase-structure grammar, agents re-combine sig-
nals to form compositional mappings. A key difference between this model and
others we have looked at (e.g. K. Smith, 2003a; K. Smith et al., 2013) is that
agents will attempt to construct compositional signals whenever they are able to,
even if they have access to a holistic signal for the target meaning. Because of
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this, compositional signalling happens both with and without iterated learning,
although in the case of IL with multiple teachers a bottleneck is still needed to
eliminate excess variation. In subsequent work, Vogt (2005) shows that semantic
overextensions play a key role in the development of compositional signalling,
echoing the ‘systematicity bias’ described by K. Smith (2003b).
De Beule & Bergen (2006) and De Beule (2008a) also employ interacting
populations of agents who use a chunking model capable of processing hierar-
chical syntax. In De Beule & Bergen (2006), the model puts holistic grammars
in competition with compositional ones. Both ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ topics are
possible, the proportion determined by a ratio parameter between 0 and 1. As in
other models, the language develops via gradual fractionation of utterances, but in
this case only when a simple topic is compared with a complex one.8 This being
the case, they find that compositional languages will only develop when complex
and simple topics are mixed, and furthermore that a high ratio of simple topics
(what they describe as ‘low task complexity’) is required for compositionality to
have any advantage.
De Beule (2008b) argues against the role of vertical transmission. When
agents process input strings, they interact to evaluate their communicative suc-
cess, and weight the resulting chunk accordingly. As this process of gradual ne-
gotiation succeeds in creating compositional language, the author proposes that
this shows that only a ‘desire to communicate’ is required for the emergence of
language structure. As such, the weight of the argument in this case is on ex-
pressivity as opposed to learnability. However, as with Vogt’s models, the agent
architecture of both models guarantees that compositional systems will be created
whenever possible: chunking always takes place, no matter whether holistic sig-
8For example, if ‘buba’ means ‘red fox’, and ‘bu’ means red, an agent will infer that ‘ba’ means
‘fox’. However, if an agent only sees ‘buku’ meaning ‘red fish’ and not ’bu’, it will infer nothing.
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nals are available. Moreover, chunks are not only weighted for success, but for
synonymy as well: this, along with the chunking, is an explicit bias for the devel-
opment of what will always be a minimally sized, and hence maximally learnable
compositional system.
Gong (2010) does not focus specifically on the emergence of compositional-
ity, but this forms part of his model comparing the effects of vertical, horizontal
and oblique transmission (where vertical is strictly parent-child, oblique is any in-
tergenerational transmission). Subsequently, in Gong (2011), he explicitly looks
at the possibility that the co-evolution of compositionality and word-order lead
to syntax. Gong shows that (as with all of the models surveyed here) the com-
positional aspect of the model develops via analogy with the semantic structure.
Finally, although Gong stresses the role of ‘socio-cultural factors’ at work in his
model, along with the role of interactivity, he ultimately points out that this is
only one possible route to modern linguistic structure. In both of his papers, how-
ever, rather sophisticated mechanisms of syntactic manipulation and inference are
involved.
Mechanism is a key concern of both Tria et al. (2012) and Franke (2014, 2016).
Instead of the complex inference used in many of the other models, Tria et al. use
a simple ‘blending/repair’ strategy. The semantic space is modelled as a random
network, and agents initially send holistic strings to each other. Upon commu-
nicative failure, agents create new, compositional strings by blending terms for
connecting nodes on the semantic network. This proceeds as follows: every node
in the network represents a meaning, which can be associated with a string. If
a particular meaning does not have an associated string, the model will create a
new one by choosing two connected nodes which do have associated strings, and
belding those together by taking a random sequence from the start of one and the
end of the other. Tria et al. (2012) find that the degree of compositionality which
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develops depends on the degree of connectedness for the semantic network, simi-
larly to K. Smith et al. (2003). However, there is an interesting divergence between
this model and most of the others here in the relationship between compositional-
ity and productivity. While compositional recombination is used to construct new
terms, once they are established and shared throughout the population, they are
used holistically. Because of this, signalling systems which appear highly com-
positional are only so externally: apparently compositional systematicity is not
matched by an underlying compositionally productive system. This highlights the
distinction between I-language and E-language raised by Kirby (2000), K. Smith
(2003b) and others.
Franke (2014) raises an important question: all of the models surveyed here in-
volve a productive, creative mechanism of various degrees of complexity. Franke
asks what the minimal form of productive creativity might be, and in particular
how observed pairings of meaning and form extend to unobserved ones. Franke
settles on a model of reinforcement learning with ‘spillover’, a type of semantic
overextension in which signals for seen complex meanings associate with unseen
meanings on the basis of similarity. Arguing that this is an even less sophisti-
cated mechanism than basic reinforcement learning, possibly due to “an inability
to distinguish sharply”, Franke shows that when lateral inhibition of competing
synonyms and homonyms is applied sufficiently, there is a domain in which com-
positional signalling is the dominant strategy. This argument is actually very sim-
ilar in both character and implementation to that of K. Smith (2003a,b): both
over-extension to novel meanings and a bias for one-to-one signalling drives the
emergent compositional mappings.
Finally, while not a model of compositionality per se, Johansson (2008) points
out that the fractionation process involved in many of the models may not be em-
pirically feasible. By randomly generating strings (of a fixed length) and complex
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meanings from a fixed pool of characters, he shows that the likelihood of coin-
cidental form/meaning matches is increasingly unlikely as the number of terms
increases. Johansson uses this to argue that counterexamples to compositional-
ity would vastly outnumber positive ones since for any reasonably large vocabu-
lary, statistically-influenced individuals would be swamped under negative data.
This is a reasonable analysis, but there are several arguments against Johansson’s
position. An initial observation is that an initially small vocabulary and sound
inventory are not unreasonable assumptions, and would allow for many possible
overlaps, as would intergenerational cultural transmission over longer timescales.
Perhaps more important, however, is the critique relating to inference: as Johans-
son states, there is a large body of work showing that humans are sensitive to
low-level statistical correlations. It does not follow, however, that humans will
abandon any correlations they experience because the majority of evidence is not
correlated. In fact, the opposite is true: humans often perceive patterns where
none exist (e.g. Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). It is reasonable to expect that earlier
humans would exhibit similar tendencies, and have had a bias towards structural
homomorphisms.
Experimental work
Empirical work has recently played an increasingly important role in investigat-
ing the cultural evolution of linguistic structure. This has been inspired by models
such as those surveyed above, and also by work in both the experimental semiotics
paradigm (surveyed in Galantucci & Garrod, 2011) and from cultural transmission
experiments looking at human cultural evolution (surveyed in Mesoudi & Whiten,
2008). Using a variety of artificial population structures, human participants are
typically presented with initially random artificial languages: over the course of
multiple transmission events (either to new learners or interactively), composi-
CHAPTER 5. DUALITY OF PATTERNING 159
tionally structured languages begin to emerge.
The canonical IL experiment is Kirby et al. (2008): participants are presented
with stimulae from a structured meaning space alongside random signals and are
asked to reproduce those signals for transmission to the next generation (another
participant). This process continues over the course of multiple generations. In an
initial condition, the authors found that the signalling system tended to undergo
collapse and become highly degenerate, with one shared label for most items.
However, when an artificial pressure for expressivity was added (by removing
homonyms and replacing them with new random signals), the languages quickly
took on compositional structure. This proved to be the starting point for many
more studies, a recent survey of which is provided by Tamariz & Kirby (2016).
These manipulate a wide range of conditions, including the nature of the signal
(e.g. linguistic vs.non-linguistic, gestural vs. written, the frequency distribution
of terms), the task involved, the population dynamics (e.g. transmission chains
vs. dyads vs. micro-societies, see Theisen-White et al., 2011), and the structure
of the meaning space. These experiments found that cultural transmission resulted
in compositionally structured systems under pressures of learnability and expres-
sivity (Kirby et al., 2015), and moreover that this was influenced by the structure
of the meaning space and the contextual relevance of certain meanings (Winters
et al., 2015). As such, experimental work broadly holds up the over-arching hy-
pothesis that signals take on compositional structure as a functional adaptation,
and that this happens under pressures for expressivity and learnability.
Overview and issues
Having surveyed the field, there is much more overlap than might have been ex-
pected. In fact, most of the difference in opinion is down to the particular focus
of individual studies, rather than any fundamental theoretical clash. Assuming the
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position that compositionality does exist in natural language (while holding on to
certain caveats such as pointed out by Pagin & Westerståhl, 2010), we are now in
a position to see exactly where opinion converges or divides.
A primary observation is that, from the original formulation of Montague
(1970) onwards, the conceptualisation of compositionality as a homomorphic re-
lation between structure in the meaning and signal spaces is pervasive throughout
the literature. When this is explicit, this can be expressed in more or less con-
crete terms (compare Brighton, 2002 and Brighton & Kirby, 2006), but it is an
assumption in all formal modelling work and experimental analysis. However,
the ‘homomorphism assumption’ doesn’t take a central position in many of the
studies we have just looked at. The focus generally falls elsewhere, mainly be-
cause of different theoretical assumptions about both the protolanguage debate
and the respective roles of interaction, transmission and learning in the cultural
evolution of language. To a lesser degree, we also see larger issues intervene,
such as the nature of semantic representation and the complexity of the cognitive
abilities available. Whatever the approach, however, the fundamental question is
how and why a homomorphic system arises.
Firstly, the protolanguage debate — and by extension, assumptions about the
emergence of novel languages such as NSL and ABSL — is often more concerned
with how compositional language emerged. The two opposing positions, regard-
ing an initial stage that is atomic vs. holistic, require different processes. The
holistic story requires a ‘fractionation’ stage, while the atomic-first narrative re-
quires that some recombinatory mechanism comes into existence. Because of this,
the homomorphism assumption is taken for granted in the atomic-first account, but
is the optimal ‘target’ for the holistic-first one. However, this does not necessarily
mean that the only difference between them is that the holistic account assumes
a possibly superfluous initial stage before an equivalent atomic stage. Depend-
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ing on the particulars of the fractionating mechanism, it is possible for signalling
systems to develop which exhibit superficial but only limited productive compo-
sitionality. Because of this, the holistic-first path can be seen not so much as the
emergence of atomic units, but as the gradual emergence of rule-like structure:
compare this to the atomic-first account in which the recombination mechanism is
either present or not. Because of this, theories which assume an initial presence of
atomic units focus on the relative optimality of holistic vs. compositional coding,
unlike holistic-first accounts which concentrate on processes of inferring simple
units from larger ones.
In both cases, however, the implication is that some functional pressure must
be responsible for the compositional homomorphism of modern human language.
Holistic-first accounts tend to refer to simplicity in terms of either acquisition
(typically IL work) or efficient storage (interaction-based work). Atomic-first ac-
counts compare the relative efficiency of holistic and compositional systems, and
tend to find that compositional systems are optimal for highly-structured seman-
tic spaces. It is not surprising that a focus on vertical or horizontal transmission
leads to different conclusions: in the case of vertical learning, the importance of
learnability is inevitably stressed. When interactivity is available, productive, ef-
ficient coding is argued to be optimal for that purpose. Whenever we see this
appeal for learnable/compressible systems, we can interpret it as a response to
some noise/bottleneck process. The information bottleneck, then, is not simply
a matter of intergenerational learning, but is equally a factor in horizontal acqui-
sition, whether that relates to limitations of memory or interaction (e.g. smaller
systems spread through populations more quickly). Certain views can be found in
both camps, for example the role of structured meanings, and De Beule & Bergen
(2006) stress the fact that learnability plays a critical role in the emergence of com-
positionality, albeit not necessarily as the result of an inter-generational process.
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However, it is worth stressing that in all of these studies, we see both learnabil-
ity and expressivity forming part of the argument that compositional one-to-one
mappings are optimal, and that the type of system which emerges depends on the
presence of some noisy process.
Finally, some mention must be made of mechanism. The theories and models
here involve everything from rather powerful frameworks capable of complex hi-
erarchical representations at one extreme down to basic reinforcement learning at
the other. These mechanisms are not usually presented as being accurate cogni-
tive models, but more because they serve to demonstrate certain theoretical ideas,
for example compressible grammars. However, as pointed out by Franke (2013),
there is a strong argument for identifying a minimal model. This is the motivation
behind the model presented below.
5.2.4 Summary
There have been many evolutionary explanations for duality of patterning and its
combinatorial and compositional components. I have focussed on cultural evolu-
tionary explanations, but even here we see a wide range of apparently incompati-
ble explanations. In particular, it is not clear whether combinatoriality is driven by
physical or learning-based constraints on expressivity. In the case of composition-
ality, most accounts favour an appeal to learnability, compressibility, or economy,
but there is no agreement about the role of transmission and/or interaction. My
argue that we can abstract away from most of this by recognising the presence of
noise in various guises. Structure, then, is an adaptive response to this noise. The
model of the next section is a minimal account of the emergence of duality under
these pressures.
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5.3 Model
In Section 5.3.1, I provide a formal description of a model of the emergence of
duality of patterning. The principle underpinning the model is simple: signalling
systems are affected by noise at different levels. Minimal processes (of inhibition
and recombination) act to preserve expressivity and learnability in the face of this
noise, resulting in differently structured systems.
5.3.1 Model Description
In keeping with previous chapters, the fundamentals of the models are based on
an exemplar-theoretic framework. A major difference, however, is that this model
involves only a single agent which interacts with itself. The main reason for this
decision is that, unlike previous sections, my focus is not on how agents estab-
lish a shared signalling system, but on internal properties of the signalling system
itself: whether the system is combinatorial and/or compositional. The require-
ments established in the previous sections which ensure the development of op-
timal signalling systems (referential information, a bias against ambiguity and
information loss) are all properties of the model presented here, which allows me
to dispense with the agent-based methodology. Furthermore, models employing
a self-interacting agent are established within the field, in particular the percep-
tion/production loop utilised in the exemplar models of Wedel (2003, 2006).
The fundamental basis of the model is that exemplars associate complex mean-
ings and complex signals. There is no explicit representation of compositional
mappings between between individual meaning features and sub-strings, and sub-
string units are not stored separately. These intermediate aspects of the system
appear only through analysis of the whole system. The reason for this design is, in
part, theoretically motivated: exemplars typically represent observed events rather
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than internally generated representations. However, a more specific motivation is
that restricting internal representation to observed complex exemplars allows for
a tighter understanding of how information bottlenecks affect the development of
structure. Previously, the information bottleneck was very clearly defined in the
case of intergenerational transmission (typical of most iterated learning models),
but much less so in other types of transmission, for example closed populations.
In the iterated learning studies, the amount of information transmitted to the next
generation is clearly specified, whereas in closed populations the main informa-
tion bottleneck is individual agents’ memory. This means that while internal rep-
resentation has little effect on the bottleneck for intergenerational transmission, it
is of crucial importance for memory bottlenecks. If we are able to avoid using
internally generated representations (apart from those generated on the fly during
production and interpretation), we can draw a direct analogy between the trans-
mission bottlenecks and memory bottlenecks: in both cases, any structure will be
inferred from the totality of the data, and the distinction between the two forms of
bottleneck disappears. As such, the model can be seen as an abstraction of both
processes. The collection of exemplars representing an agent can thus be seen as
either the whole body of data passed between generations, or the memory of an
individual agent.
Exemplars
The representation of an agent is simple: a set of exemplars E associating strings
of characters with complex n-dimensional meanings M. All other features of the
model are mechanisms which act over these exemplars, resulting in only three
operations: the production, modification (via noise), and deletion of exemplars.
The signal aspect of each exemplar e ∈ E consists of a string with a fixed
length of k characters c ∈ C. C is unbounded in size: |C| = ∞. An individual
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string is an ordered set s = {c1, ..., ck}.
The meaning space consists of d ∈ {1,2} dimensions, each of which is as-
signed a single feature, f ∈ F . The number of features per dimension |F | = φ.
Individual complex meanings m ∈M are ordered sets of features, m = { f1, f2}.
An exemplar is an association between a single complex meaning and a single
string, represented as the set e = {mi, si}.
Exemplar initialisation, string storage, and noise
It is first crucial to implement an initialisation stage. Population models are able
to create a large amount of initial variation. Because there is no population in this
model, if there is no random initialisation then processes leading to combinatori-
ality and compositionality would apply from the outset. As soon as any partially
similar meaning is prompted, the model will attempt to construct a new com-
positional exemplar, composed of already present signal elements. Because of
this, some degree of combinatoriality and compositionality is actually guaranteed
without an initialisation stage.
The exemplar store is initialised by creating a number of exemplars equal to
the maximum memory size. Complex meanings are produced randomly with uni-
form probability over all of the features of each dimension. Strings are concate-
nations of characters drawn from the infinite set C. Because of this, there is zero
chance of any characters repeating either in or across strings: no combinatoriality
or compositionality exists initially.
After the initialisation stage, the model starts to produce new exemplars. This
process involves several stages, and so its description will be held back until the
following section. When a new exemplar is created, strings are subject to noise.
Noise represents an abstraction of both noisy transmission and noisy memory.
The core concept of noise has been outlined previously in Section 5.2.2: limi-
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Figure 5.2: Demonstrating how the two parameters affect the relationship between the propor-
tion of a character pc and the probability of it flipping to another character Pf lip. On the left,
we see the effects of varying N, while keeping λ = 2. On the right, we hold N = 1 and plot for
different values of λ.
tations of both production/perception and memory place a practical limit on the
number of usable signal elements. A similar concept is used by Tria et al. (2012),
who implement noise by modulating probability that a character will be flipped
to another depending on the number of times which that character has been ex-
perienced. This model instantiates noise differently, along the lines of Nowak,
Krakauer, & Dress (1999): when a new string is stored, there is a probability that
each character will flip to another stored character. This probability Pf lip that this
happens is:
Pf lip = N e−λ pc (5.9)
where pc is the overall proportion of character c across all stored exemplars in
E. There are two parameters. As can be seen in Fig. 5.2, N limits the maximum
probability of noise and takes values 0 < N < 1. The λ parameter controls how
much pc affects Pf lip and takes values −∞ < λ < ∞. When λ is large, higher
values of pc are affected much less than lower ones. When λ is small, higher
values of pc are affected similarly to lower ones.
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If a character does flip, it is incorrectly stored as another previously-seen char-
acter. The probability P(c| f lip) of this is proportional to pc:
P(c| f lip) = pc
∑i∈C pi
(5.10)
Noise in this model is not implemented to affect the perception of meanings,
only the associated signal. As with before, the reason for this idealisation is that
we are focussing on the emergence of structures in the signal space, and are not (at
this point) concerned with issues of reference or noisy perception of meanings.9
Signal production and interpretation
A basic principle of the model is that stored exemplars are compared with each
other to create and interpret novel signals. When a prompted meaning does not
perfectly match any exemplar in memory, the agent creates new signals by com-
bining sub-strings. The sub-strings composing the new signal are those which,
together, have the strongest association with the target meaning. Interpretation
of novel signals is the inverse of this process: the agent finds the segmentation
of the string which has the highest associations over all meaning dimensions and
chooses that interpretation.
At each iteration of the model, a random meaning is provided as a prompt.
The agent then examines its memory: if none of the features of any meaning
dimension match any of the stored exemplars, the agent simply produces a new
string comprised entirely of new characters drawn from C.
If, however, some features do partially match those of stored exemplars, the
9Note that structure and noise in the meaning space is a factor in several models, for example
Brighton & Kirby (2006). These tend to involve a metric over signals and meanings which does
not form a part of this model. In both cases, compositional mapping is the result of isomorphic
mapping between structure in the signal and meaning spaces.
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Figure 5.3: Demonstrating how conditional n-gram probabilities are used to produce new ex-
emplars. The exemplars on the left produce the conditional probabilities P(F |S). These are then
used to produce new signals: when the prompted meaning is an already-stored exemplar, that will
be used (this would be the case even if a compositional construction was available, as the model
always selects sub-strings with maximal length for each meaning feature: in the case of holistic
signals, both features map to a sub-string of length 4, while in compositional signals the length for
each would be 2). The agent then chooses to combine exemplars which have the highest chance
of correct interpretation. As shown in the model, there is no string ordering applied.
agent attempts to construct a new string which maximises the probability of cor-
rect interpretation. This probability-maximisation is equivalent to the obverter
process described in previous chapters. The construction process creates new
strings by trying to combine sub-strings from already-stored exemplars associated
with the target features, and choosing the most expressive string. This proceeds
as follows:
1. Assemble the set of candidate exemplars associated with at least one target
feature.
2. Create a new set containing all possible decompositions of every string into
d sub-strings (where d is the number of dimensions).
3. Use the previous set to create a new one which contains every possible com-
bination of sub-strings which have length k. Thus, if d = 2 & k = 4, we
could see all combinations of length 1 and 3, and 2 and 2.
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Figure 5.4: Demonstrating how exemplars are constructed, ignoring probabilities. Each ex-
emplar is broken into d sub-strings. All of the possible re-combinations of sub-strings from the
two different strings are created. Then, the combinations which maximise the average sub-string
length for each meaning feature are selected, and a signal is chosen from them.
4. For each sub-string s of each new string combination, use the probabil-
ity Pi j of each target feature fi j to create a vector of probabilities Vsub =
〈p1 j, ..., pd j〉. This represents the relative frequency of each target feature
given that sub-string in the existing set of exemplars. Thus, when a sub-
string is always associated with a particular feature, it registers 1; if never,
then 0, 50 % of the time, then 0.5, and so on.
5. For each string combination, create a vector Vbest which takes the highest
value for each feature from the individual sub-string vectors, and calculate
the mean value Pavg over this vector.
6. Assemble a set of candidate string combinations which have the maximum
values for Pavg.
7. Transmit the most robust of these candidate string combinations: this max-
imises the length of sub-string for each target feature. As such, a holistic
signal would always be selected if one is stored (as it maximises the sub-
string length for all target features), but when choosing between a 3-1 length
combination and a 2-2 length combination the latter will always be selected.
Figure 5.3 provides an illustration of how sub-string probabilities contribute to
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the process, while Figure 5.4 gives an example of how sub-strings are re-combined
to form new strings. We can now turn to signal interpretation, which involves the
inverse process:
1. Generate all possible segmentations of the received string into d sub-strings.
2. For each sub-string, calculate the vector Vsub for the strongest association
probability associated with that substring and Vf eature to record which mean-
ing feature it relates to. If there is more than one, choose between them at
random.
3. For each segmentation, create a vector Vbest which takes the highest value
for each feature from the individual sub-string vectors, and Vbest f eature record-
ing which meaning features these relate to.
4. Calculate the mean value Pavg for all Vbest , and choose the segmentation
with the highest value of Pavg, then interpret the signal as the corresponding
Vbest f eature.
As can be seen, neither of these processes store structural information: all
structure is inferred from the set of stored exemplars, but results only in a new
signal/meaning association. At this stage, the process may not appear minimal:
most of the structure has been shifted onto the mechanism of recombination. How-
ever, it represents two main operations: firstly, the simple fact that sub-strings are
recombined, and secondly that the sub-strings with the strongest association with
the target meanings are chosen. This is basically a recombinatory version of the
obverter process described in the first chapter.
One design decision which warrants discussion is that all strings are of a spe-
cific length. This is certainly unrealistic: all natural languages feature variation in
word length. Variation in word length is not the target of the present study, and
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is not directly informative about the emergence of duality of patterning. Another
reason for limiting the length of words is simply that of computational complex-
ity: if string lengths are allowed to vary, the number of possible combinations
undergoes combinatorial explosion. In this model, a robustness constraint selects
the longest segmentation for each meaning feature: if string length was allowed
to vary, an opposing constraint (likely memory-based) would be necessary. All of
these considerations are avoided by pre-determining the string length.
Finally, we should address two more design decisions: firstly, there is no as-
sumption of order. Two sub-strings can be concatenated in any order without any
impact on meaning. This is still consistent with a broad definition of composi-
tionality, which states that meaning is a function of both individual parts and the
rules of combination. It is just that, in this case, the rules of combination are very
simple: two things placed together have the meaning of both. 10
Secondly, unlike some previous models (and features of some natural lan-
guages), the model assumes that meaningful features are encoded by contiguous
sub-strings. Meaningful units are cannot be distributed over non-contiguous parts
of the string, patterned as 1− 2− 1 for example. Computational complexity is
again the main reason for the second decision, but in both cases there is theo-
retical support for the idea that simple concatenation preceded more complicated
ordered or distributed structures (e.g. Jackendoff, 1999).
Inhibition and memory
Memory is instantiated by placing a limit on the number of exemplars which can
be stored by the agent. When this limit is exceeded by adding a new exemplar, an
10In practice, however, this feature was actually relaxed to produce the illustrations in the results
section: this is because Mantel tests were used for comparative purposes. These use Levenshtein
edit distances which are unable to recognise (without parsing) that two swapped strings are equiv-
alent. All results continue to hold when this is not the case, however.
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old exemplar is selected at random and deleted.
A final feature of the model is a type of synonymy inhibition: when an exem-
plar is stored, it triggers the deletion of a competing synonym. This may seem
unnecessary, but is used for the following reason. Take the following substrings
and their strongest meaning associations: {AB : 1,BC : 1,EF : 2}. To create the
compositional meaning {1&2}, both ABEF and BCEF are viable options. This
is technically a compositional system: meaning are a function of their parts. Typ-
ically, however, a requirement made in previous models and the theoretical liter-
ature is that signal-meaning relationships in optimally compositional systems are
one-to-one: see Section 5.2.3 for more on this. As it stands, there is no explicit
pressure in the model to drive this effect: meanings can be multiply expressed. In
line with the principle of learnability, the simplest possible compositional system
might require that synonymy is inhibited: this is tested in section 5.3.2 and found
to be only partially true.
Similarly, there is a form of lateral inhibition against homonyms. Because
sub-strings are not independently represented in the model, inhibition requires
that whole exemplars are deleted. When a new exemplar is created, the best seg-
mentation of the string may contain sub-strings which have the same probability
of matching the target meaning. In this case, a single exemplar containing one of
the competing sub-strings is then selected at random for deletion. As systematic
compositionality emerges, only one sub-string will exist for any given complex
meaning and inhibition will cease.
Diagnostics
The combinatoriality of a system employs two measures: the form recombination
index (FRI) described by Tria et al. (2012) and in Section 5.2.2, and the over-
all character entropy. All of these measures are performed over both individual
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strings and over segments.
The compositionality of the system is measured in two ways. Firstly, in line
with much work in the literature (e.g. Kirby et al., 2015), a Mantel test is used.
This proceeds as follows: First the Levenshtein edit distance between all possible
strings and the number of different meaning features is calculated, and the cor-
relation between these two sets of values is calculated using Pearson’s product
moment (Pearson’s r). This is then compared with similar correlations between
multiple re-shufflings of the meaning features and the resulting Levenshtein edit
distances. This creates a distribution of correlation measures, and the significance
of the original correlation is measured using a z-score. In this way, the correla-
tion tells us how similar the two spaces are, and the z-score tells us the level of
significance at which to treat the correlation score.
However, it should be pointed out that there is a potential issue with the Mantel
test when applied to combinatorial data which arises from segmentation problems.
As an example, take the following set of exemplars:
S = { {AAAB : 1,1},{AABA : 1,2},{BBAB : 2,1},{BBBA : 2,2} } (5.11)
We can infer from this that the system is compositional, with the following
elements:
AA = (1,∗), BB = (2,∗), AB = (∗,1), BA = (∗,2) (5.12)
However, if we calculate the Levenshtein distances without taking this seg-
mentation into account we see the problem shown in Table 5.1:
How can this problem be avoided? The problem lies with a mis-match be-
tween variable-length string edits and the discrete dimensionality of the meaning
space, but disappears once we know the internal elements. The best solution, then,
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Signal - Meaning AAAB - 1,1 AABA - 1,2 BBAB - 2,1 BBBA - 2,2
AAAB - 1,1 0 1 vs. 1 2 vs.1 4 vs. 2
AABA - 1,2 1 vs. 1 0 4 vs. 2 2 vs. 1
BBAB - 2,1 2 vs. 1 4 vs. 2 0 2 vs. 1
BBBA - 2,2 4 vs. 2 2 vs. 1 2 vs. 1 0
Table 5.1: An example of how Levenshtein edit distance in the string space is not necessarily
compatible with the edit distance in the meaning space: highlighted in bold is one case where —
without segmentation — the same distance in the meaning space can map to different distances in
the signal space.
is to infer the best set of elements which correspond to the dimensionality of the
meaning space before performing the Mantel test.
An ‘internal’ measure of compositionality would be somewhat trivial in this
model, only needing to register whether a holistic or compositional strategy is
used by the agent for each possible meaning. Given the exemplar-based nature
of the model, a fully compositional ‘internal’ strategy is impossible. Because ex-
emplars represent mappings between complex meanings and strings, any complex
meanings which are already stored are just produced holistically.
As an ‘external’ alternative to this, we can check the degree to which the defi-
nition of compositionality given in Eq. 5.8 is true. There are two ways to do this,
one more strict than the other.
A compositional sub-mapping exists for a meaning feature it it can be unam-
biguously associated with some sub-string. That is to say:
∃ si j ∈ S s.t. p( f |si j) = 1 ∧ p(si j| f ) = 1 (5.13)
As such, a measurement of compositionality checks the degree to which map-
pings between sub-strings and meaning features are bijective. We need to specify
a function comp( f ,S)→ [0,1], and calculate the compositionality of the system





comp( f ,S) (5.14)
This leaves us to define the function comp( f ,S). A strict version of the mea-
sure checks for each feature and all sub-strings whether a bijective mapping exists
or not, i.e. compstrict( f ,S) = 1 if Eq. 5.13 is true, otherwise compstrict( f ,S) = 0.
A more fine-grained measure, on the other hand is:
comp( f ,S) = ∀si j ∈ S, max
(
p( f |si j) · p(si j| f )
)
(5.15)
One way of seeing Eq. 5.15 is that it scans through all sub-strings and their
mappings to meaning features to find the most bijective set. Looking at it like this,
it is actually very close to the measures of communicative accuracy employed
in previous chapters, except for two things: firstly, it penalises synonymy, and
secondly, it is based only on mappings to individual meaning features instead of
complete meanings. As such, this measure is really showing the degree to which
a synonymy-free signalling system exists at the level of features, rather than for
complex meanings.
The information bottleneck
As outlined in Section 5.3.1, the information bottleneck is an abstraction of both
intergenerational transmission and a limited memory: at any stage, the set of ex-
emplars can be seen as the training data provided to a new generation, or as the
internal representation of an agent. This has been done with the intention of show-
ing that it is the existence of a bottleneck which is a driving force behind structure,
rather than a particular instantiation of it.
The total number of possible complex meanings k = Fd . We can then analyse
the information bottleneck by working out the expected proportion of meanings
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Figure 5.5: Demonstrating how the information bottleneck affects holistic and compositional
systems. On the left, for a system with 2 meaning dimensions with 5 features each, a compositional
system would require 5×2 = 10 terms, while a holistic system would require 52 = 25 terms. The
graph shows the expected proportion of all terms to be seen after a given number of samples.
The graph on the right shows the expected proportions for a 2× 10 meaning system, with 20
compositional and 100 holistic terms required.
to be sampled given a certain bottleneck size n. If there are k meanings, the







Because all meanings have an equal chance of being sampled, we can see that
Eq. 5.16 also gives the overall expected proportion of unseen meanings after n








Fig. 5.5 gives a numerical example of the bottleneck in action. As can be
seen, the bottleneck becomes increasingly important as the size of the meaning
11The proportion R = p(¬mi)× |M||M| = p(¬mi)
12A very similar result can be found in Brighton (2003)
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space increases. This is also valuable information about what type of system to
expect from different parameters: for example, given a 2× 10 meaning space,
we would expect bottlenecks of around 100 exemplars to preserve stable compo-
sitional systems, and bottleneck sizes of over 500 exemplars to preserve stable
holistic systems.
5.3.2 Model Results
The primary aim of this section is to show that different levels of structure —
compostional and combinatorial — emerge when learnable, expressive signalling
is put under pressures from noisy processes. These pressures can be seen as af-
fecting either acquisition and/or storage. Pressures in the signal space alone drive
combinatorial structure, while pressures related to the signal/meaning associa-
tion space — the ‘system’ space — drive compositional structure. Because of
this, we can see the development of four distinct classes of signalling system.
This includes i) systems which are entirely holistic, i.e. non-compositional and
non-combinatorial, like most animal communication, ii) combinatorial but non-
compositional systems, similar to that of putty-nosed monkeys, iii) non-combinatorial
but compositional systems, similar to ABSL, iv) combinatorial, compositional
systems as found in human languages, and finally v) degenerate languages when
the noise is such that no learnable languages are expressive and no expressive
languages are learnable. Models which lead to these five types of system will be
demonstrated in turn over the following sections, including an analysis of how
particular model mechanisms (e.g. inhibition) affect this process, and how cer-
tain parameters (e.g. noise) determine stable configurations of the model. A final
note: in the following sections, illustrations refer to individual results, but all
broad statements refer to robust properties of the model over many runs. Aggre-
gate results are presented when meaningful, and omitted when they add nothing
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Figure 5.6: In the absence of any noise (N = 0) or complex meanings (d = 1, |F | = 5 with
a 60 exemplar memory), there are no shared characters between any strings, and the blue line
shows that combinatoriality (as defined by Tria et al., 2012) never develops. The right hand axis
(red) demonstrates how the number of individual strings gradually reduces through memory loss,
eventually leading to a single string per non-complex meaning. This also serves as a demonstration
of how the combinatoriality measure is not affected by the number of strings or by synonymy.
to the analysis.
Combinatoriality alone
The prediction is that, in the absence of noise affecting the signal space or the
system space, neither combinatoriality nor compositionality will result. Pressure
in the signal space is applied via noise parameters, N and λ: We will see that
the greater the amount of noise, the greater the degree of combinatoriality in the
system, up until a point at which noise takes over and the system becomes degen-
erate.
The simplest possible system which we can use to illustrate maximally non-
combinatorial signalling is when we set N = 0, removing the effects of noise from
signalling entirely, and set d = 1, |F | = 5, so only holistic signalling is possi-
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(A) (B)
(C) (D)
Figure 5.7: The effect of changing the λ noise parameter, keeping N = 0.5 and without complex
meanings (d = 1, |F | = 5, |E| = 60 ) . λ = 200 (A), 60 (B), 20 (C) and 10 (D). The blue line
indicates the level of combinatoriality (Tria et al., 2012), while the red line shows the entropy over
the character probability distribution. In (A) we see that when λ is high, the system is tolerant of
many low probabilities and combinatoriality never develops. Increasing λ in (B) and (C) leads to
gradually increasing levels of combinatoriality, but when λ is too high the system collapses to a
single character and combinatoriality is lost.
ble. This is particularly enlightening example: the only scope for change in this
configuration of the model is when a certain meaning/signal association is lost.
However, the lack of complex meanings means that new signals cannot be formed
by recombination, and will always consist of a new string of novel characters.
This is demonstrated in Figure 5.6, where we can see that combinatoriality never
develops. The only change that occurs in the model is the number of individual
strings in the system, which gradually reduces via random memory deletion in a
drift-like process.
We can now look at what happens when we allow a degree of noise (N = 0.5)
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and manipulate the value of λ. As previously discussed, different values of λ
directly determine the maximum number of stable elements that a combinatorial
system can have, while N determines the overall level of noise. We can see this in
Figure 5.7, which demonstrates the effects on combinatoriality for four different
levels of λ. When λ is very high, elements are unaffected by noise (A). As λ is
increased, the number of stable elements will also do so (B,C). If λ is too low, the
system will not even tolerate elements with a proportion p ≈ 0.5, meaning that
not even binary coding remains stable (D).
It is important to understand that because λ operates over character proba-
bilities, it directly determines the stable level of character entropy Hc, which is
simply the classic entropy measure over the distribution of characters across all
strings. The number of characters will vary somewhat, but will be in the region
of |C| ≈ 2Hc . The level of combinatoriality, on the other hand, is more variable.
Because there is no restriction on where characters appear across strings, it is a
matter of chance whether they are evenly distributed. For example, four charac-
ters are sufficient to create a maximally combinatorial system across five strings
of length four, but any repeated characters would result in a lower level of combi-
natoriality.13
The way λ constrains character entropy more than combinatoriality can be
seen in Figure 5.8, which shows the aggregate behaviour of different values of λ
over 100 runs each. There is a clear inverse relationship between the stable level
of character entropy and the relative combinatoriality, but the random aspect of the
latter leads to much wider and overlapping distributions. This is seen especially
clearly in the case of when λ = 20, as the occasional collapse from binary coding
13The same would actually be the case for any maximally efficient system: take a binary coding
across four strings of length 2, S = {AA,AB,BA,BB}, which would have a combinatoriality score
of 0.75.
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50,000 iterations
100,000 iterations
Figure 5.8: The distributions of final character entropy Hc and combinatoriality scores after
50,000 and 100,000 iterations for different values of the λ noise parameter, keeping N = 0.5 and
without complex meanings (d = 1, |F | = 5, |E| = 60 ) with 100 simulation runs per condition.
Note that while there is some drift towards lower entropy regimes, this has only a minimal effect
on the amount of combinatoriality, and that both distributions are mostly stable over time.
to a single character means that the distribution is split between values of exactly
1 and 0.
To summarise: the system’s tolerance to noise on the basis of individual char-
acter probabilities — i.e. the ‘memory channel’ — determines the levels of char-
acter entropy which remain stable over time. The character entropy roughly de-
termines the number of characters, and this in turn has an effect on the combi-
natoriality of the signalling system, the exact relationship also depending on the
number of strings overall and their length. There are two opposing regimes, one
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(A) (B)
(C) (D)
Figure 5.9: The effect of the bottleneck on the emergence of compositionality. (d = 2, |F | =
5,N = 0). The bottleneck sizes are 200 (A), 100 (B), 60(c) and 20 (D). Note how the two measures
of compositionality track each other, and in (A) in particular, where the increased level of Pearson’s
r indicates that a very limited degree of compositional recombination has occurred, but this is only
partial and not systematic. Also, while both (B) and (C) achieve compositionality, the time-scale
at which this occurs differs by a factor of 10.
where the level of noise is too high to permit even two stable characters (de-
generate), and one where noise is low enough that a completely non-analysable
non-combinatorial system is stable. Between these regimes, lower levels of stable
character entropy lead to higher combinatoriality.
Compositionality alone
We can now turn to compositional systematicity, which we expect to be driven by
another noisy process, the information bottleneck. As previously discussed, the
size of the bottleneck should determine whether the system that develops is holis-
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tic, compositional, or whether no stable system is possible. To investigate this, the
overall noise parameter N is set at zero. The number of meaning dimensions d is
increased to 2: we will compare values of |F | = 5 and 10, and look at how these
interact with bottleneck sizes to produce more or less compositional systems, us-
ing the information shown in Figure 5.5 to guide us. Finally, we will have a look
at the effect of removing the anti-synonymy bias.
Figure 5.9 demonstrates the effect of the information bottleneck. When the
bottleneck is large enough, the initial holistic system remains stable. Beyond a
certain threshold, however, holistic systems are not stable and compositional sys-
tems take over. Finally, there is another threshold, the ‘expressive limit’, where
not even compositional systems remain stable (again, the only stable systems are
degenerate). The bottleneck size corresponding to these thresholds directly de-
pends on the size of the meaning dimensions, as previously illustrated in Fig. 5.5
(p.176).
One point that should be made here relates to the fact that the compositional
recombinatory process only happens when a given complex meaning is not avail-
able (basically, when a ‘memory gap’ exists). Because the bottleneck is inher-
ently noisy, even extremely large bottlenecks will occasionally experience a gap
like this. This means that as long as a pressure for expressivity exists, the amount
of compositionality in the system will increase, simply much more slowly as the
bottleneck ratio increases.
The model includes anti-synonymy inhibition. This is designed to promote
systematic one-to-one mappings between meanings and signals, and works by
deleting a single exemplar which contains a sub-string which expresses a part-
meaning equally well. However, there is reason to suspect that this inhibition is
unnecessary. In the models of simple signalling in Chapter 1 and 2, a direct bias
against synonymy was not required, as drift-like processes related to information
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Figure 5.10: Showing the effects of removing anti-synonymy inhibition: under the same condi-
tions as before, (d = 2, |F |= 5, |E|= 60 on the left and 100 on the right), stable compositionality
still develops, just slightly more slowly than with inhibition.
loss inevitably lead to loss of synonymous variation. In Figure 5.10 we can see that
this is also the case here: even without explicit inhibition, gradual information loss
leads to the eventual elimination of synonyms, and one-to-one mappings reliably
emerge.
To summarise, in the absence of character noise, the pressure for expressivity
leads to the emergence of compositional systems when under sufficient pressure
from noise due to the information bottleneck. When the information bottleneck
is to small, no stable signalling system is possible. Beyond a certain size of bot-
tleneck, only compositional signalling systems are stable, while holistic systems
become more stable as the bottleneck size increases. However, as noisy processes
always lead to the chance deletion of certain associations, compositional systems
always develop eventually, albeit over increasingly large timescales. Finally, in
the absence of character-based noise, anti-synonymy inhibition is not a necessary
requirement for the development of compositionality.
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Figure 5.11: Compositionality (left) according to different measures for a completely holistic,
combinatorial system (right). d = 2, |F | = 5, |E| = 200, λ = 40, N = 0.5. Note in particular the
Pearson’s r correlation which is supported by a z-score of 4.40, corresponding to significance at
p 0.01.
5.3.3 Duality of patterning
So far, we have looked at the emergence of combinatoriality and compositionality
in isolation, and shown that combinatoriality and compositionality are both func-
tional adaptations to noise in the signal-space and the signal-meaning association
space respectively. As our working definition of duality of patterning is where
both levels of structure exist, we will now take a look at what happens when both
sources of noise are accounted for.
First of all, we need to look at some baseline cases: according to our measures,
what degree of compositionality emerges in our combinatorial models, and vice
versa? Figure 5.11 shows results for a combinatorial, completely holistic system.
The measure for compositionality developed in section 5.3.1 registers nothing, but
(perhaps unexpectedly) the correlation using Pearson’s r appears to pick up a de-
gree of compositional regularity which is supported by a Mantel test with a z-score
of 4.40, which is significant at p 0.01. This is the result of chance correspon-
dences between patterns in the holistic signals and the structure of the meaning
space. Importantly, the fact that the z-score is so high only serves to support a cor-
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Figure 5.12: Combinatoriality (right) according to different measures for a compositional, non-
combinatorial system (left). d = 2, |F | = 5, |E| = 60, λ = 0.0, N = 0.0. Note that 1) a compositional
system where two characters are assigned to each feature requires 2× 10 = 20 characters, and
log2(20) = 4.3 bits, which corresponds to the figure; 2) The combinatoriality measure registers
the fact that compositional re-combination leads to some degree of combinatoriality.
relation which is actually rather low. Simply put, we can have high confidence in
a low correlation. However, this result may highlight some issues for models and
experiments which use the z-score as the primary measure of compositionality: I
will return to this topic in Section 5.4.
Similarly, Figure 5.12 shows that the measures of combinatoriality we have
been using are not completely independent of compositional structure. Firstly, the
measure of combinatoriality developed by Tria et al. (2012) picks up on the fact
that compositional re-use entails a degree of combinatoriality: this fact should be
kept in mind when looking at the combinatoriality of any compositional system.
The fact that the entropy measure roughly specifies the number of characters being
used can also be taken into account: in the figure, the value of Hc ≈ 4.3 bits
corresponds to around 20 characters. This is how many characters would exist in
a system which was non-combinatorial at the level of meaningful segments, but
where some degree of combinatoriality exists at the complex word level by virtue
of the shared meaningful elemnts across a compositional system. However, this is
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Figure 5.13: A system displaying duality of patterning. d = 2, |F | = 5, |E| = 60, λ = 40, N = 0.5.
Compare with Figs. 5.11 and 5.12 which develop significantly more slowly. Note that although
the system is perfectly compositional, the edit-distance problem discussed in Section 5.2.3 means
that the Pearson’s r measure never registers a perfect correlation.
not so say that these measures of combinatoriality and compositionality are fatally
flawed, but just that some of them are not always independent of each other and
that this should be kept in mind.
We can now look at what happens when we allow noisy processes to affect
both the signal space and the signal-meaning space. Figure 5.13 shows that dual-
ity of patterning does indeed develop, with perfectly compositional, highly com-
binatorial systems arising. Another unexpected observation is that twin pressures
which drive emergence of both levels of structure appear to feed off each other.
Combinatoriality and compositionality both appear more quickly together than
alone. On reflection, this is not so surprising: as shown in Figure 5.11, charac-
ter based-noise inevitably brings about chance correlation between meanings and
signals, while the gradual deletion of exemplars via noise contributes to drift-like
processes of character loss.
Another example of the interaction between combinatoriality and composi-
tionality can be seen in Figure 5.15. Because the system has stabilised on a char-
acter entropy of 2.3 bits, equivalent to 5 characters, this restricts the expressivity of
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Figure 5.14: A system displaying duality of patterning. d = 2, |F | = 5, |E| = 100, λ = 60, N =
0.5. Unlike Fig. 5.13, the character entropy has stabilised at 2.3 bits≈ 5 characters. This limits the
expressivity of sub-strings to 25 possible expressive strings, and the system struggles to maintain
complete compositionality.
any length-2 sub-string to 25 possible character permutations. This is only slightly
more than the 20 distinct sub-strings which are required to maintain a composi-
tional system for this dimensionality of meaning, and thus the system struggles to
maintain absolute compositionality.
Finally, Figure 5.15 shows that, unlike non-combinatorial systems, anti-synonym
inhibition is required for perfect compositionality to develop in the presence of
combinatoriality. This is because the character-level noise which leads to combi-
natoriality constantly mutates sub-strings. As long as this process continues some




The models of clearly demonstrate that both aspects of duality of patterning can
be understood as a functional adaptation preserving expressivity and learnabil-
CHAPTER 5. DUALITY OF PATTERNING 189
Figure 5.15: A system displaying duality of patterning without anti-synonymy inhibition. d = 2,
|F | = 5, |E| = 60, λ = 100, N = 0.5. Unlike Fig. 5.13, the lack of inhibition means that synonymy
reduces the level of compositionality.
ity in the face of noisy processes at different levels. At this point, it is worth
having another look at exactly how we understand these two terms. My inten-
tion here is to rephrase them slightly, and see both in terms of how they relate
to noisy processes. To do this, I am going to refer to the noise which applies
directly to the character-level as signal-directed noise, and the noise due to the
acquisition/storage bottlenecks will be called system-directed noise.
For a signalling system to be expressive, it requires both that every mean-
ing has a corresponding signal, and that those signals are unambiguous. Signal-
directed noise leads to a situation where signals which are more similar to each
other, and hence more ambiguous. System-directed noise, whether memory or in-
tergenerational learning, threatens the stability and permanence of signal-meaning
associations. If either of these pressures are too strong, signalling systems are re-
duced to an incomplete set of ambiguous associations. In the models, we can see
this for values of λ which are too high and for restrictively small bottlenecks. In
fact, when noise is too high, no functional response is even possible, for example
when not even two characters can be reliably distinguished, or when memory is
smaller than the number of meanings. From this perspective, noise looks decid-
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edly anti-functional, and antithetical to communication.
Noise also interacts with the learnability of a system, another term which we
can separate into two components: learnability requires that signals can be both
acquired and reliably stored. The story is less simple here: signal-directed noise
can be seen as both acquisitional — physical limitations directly affecting the
sensory-motor process — and related to memory/storage, seen for example in the
experiments of Verhoef et al. (2014). In either case, the effect of signal-directed
noise on learnability is to bring about discreteness, and then to provide a practical
limit on the possible number of discrete elements. System-directed noise can re-
late to both acquisition (e.g. iterated learning bottlenecks) and storage (memory).
Once again, both have the same effect: a practical limit to the size of system which
can be stored.
We can now tie these ideas together. At both levels, noise acts to restrict the
stable size of the system. This works directly against expressivity and provides
a limit to what is learnable. When noise is too great, expressive and learnable
systems are impossible. In the absence of noise, maximally expressive systems of
arbitrary size can be learned. Structure emerges in the intermediate regimes, and
the type of structure is determined by an interaction between the amount of noise
and the size of the meaning space. If the number of signal elements determined
by noise is at least as large as the number of meanings, there is no motivation
for combinatorial signalling. If, on the other hand, this is not the case, combi-
natorial systems provide the only expressive, learnable solution. Similarly, if the
number of associations robust to system-directed noise is larger than the num-
ber of complex meanings, compositional systematicity has no advantages. When
system-directed noise is sufficiently large, only compositional systems are stable.
To restate: linguistic structure is a functional adaptation to maintain learnable,
expressive systems in the face of noisy processes.
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Figure 5.16: The hierarchy of robust systems as determined by noise. At low levels of noise, no
combinatorial or compositional structure will develop, while at high levels of either type of noise,
no expressive systems are possible. Between these extremes, the only stable systems which are
expressive and learnable are combinatorially and compositionally structured.
Following from this, I would like to propose a slight modification to the po-
sition advanced by Kirby et al. (2015), that linguistic structure is an evolutionary
trade-off between expressivity and learnability. I argue that robustness to noise
also plays a critical role. Fig. 5.16 is an illustration of how different forms of
noise determine the structure of learnable, expressive systems. Excepting when
levels of noise are so high that they result in inexpressive degenerate systems, sig-
nalling which is both learnable and expressive is possible in every region of the
graph.
5.4.2 Comparison with other theoreies
In Section 5.2, I argued that the apparently large diversity of opinion regarding
the origins of duality of patterning, combinatoriality, and compositionality could
be largely resolved by seeing the important role either learnability or expressivity
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plays in each. In the previous section I have shown that these factors, along with
noise, are sufficient to explain the different levels of structure. However, it is
worth briefly returning to some of the particular claims in the light of the previous
work.
Firstly, I should point out that the work here has much in common with foun-
dational studies carried out by Nowak and colleagues (e.g. Nowak, Plotkin, &
Krakauer, 1999; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999; Nowak, Krakauer, & Dress, 1999;
Nowak et al., 2000). In particular, the error-limit argument of Nowak, Krakauer,
& Dress (1999) provides a very similar explanation for the emergence of what
amounts to combinatorial structure, except phrased in terms of evolutionary game
theory. Of course, both Nowak’s analysis and the one here are really special cases
of the Channel Capacity Theorem developed by Shannon (1948).
Also by Nowak et al. (2000) but somewhat less similar is an argument for ‘syn-
tax’ (compositionality) which largely ignores noise and focuses on the increased
expressivity afforded by compositional communication. This is argued to be an
adaptive response to a expanding meaning space, and in particular where d ≥ 2
and |F | ≥ 3. This in perfect agreement with the model here, in whose terms it can
be restated as saying that that the regions where compositional systems and holis-
tic systems are robust completely overlap when there are less than three meanings.
They also remark that the compositionality of language depends on the degree of
structure in the meaning space, an argument which is echoed by Tria et al. (2012)
and to some extent by work such as K. Smith et al. (2003). It is fair to say that
my model takes the structured meanings for granted, but as I am looking at com-
positionality strictly in terms of homomorphisms between complex meaning and
signals, I would argue that this does not present a real problem, as long as what
structure there is within meanings is mirrored by structure within signals.
The role of robustness to noise as a determiner of structure allows a more
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abstract understanding of what previously appeared to be quite different hypothe-
ses regarding the genesis of both combinatoriality and compositionality. From this
perspective, there is no real dichotomy between the perception and learning-based
accounts of de Boer & Zuidema (2010) and Verhoef et al. (2014), as both involve
noisy processes, only differently situated (perception/production vs. memory).
Similarly, there is no conflict between intergenerational accounts of composition-
ality such as Kirby (2001) and interaction-based ones such as De Beule (2008b),
as in both cases compositional structure is motivated in terms of its compressibil-
ity, which entails robustness.
Finally, both Berwick et al. (2011) and Franke (2014) argue that the key inno-
vation is not compositional structure itself, but the creative or generative process
which underlies it. In particular, Franke remarks that models of compositionality
to date had required rather sophisticated mental representations and their associ-
ated machinery, which simply moves the onus for explanation onto those faculties.
The rather stripped-down reinforcement model Franke proposes as a response to
this makes few assumptions beyond a form of semantic overextension and lateral
inhibition. As the model presented here was also intended to be as simple as pos-
sible, now is a good time to evaluate whether this is so. Superficially at least,
the exemplar representations are close to minimal: unlike many previous mod-
els, there are no intermediate or internal representations with causal effect in the
model. To clarify this point, both the finite-state transducers of Brighton (2002)
and Franke’s association weights are internal properties of agents. In the exemplar
model, compositional production of a novel complex signal occurs almost entirely
on the basis of the set of signals which the agent has been exposed to. The sole
exception to this is lateral inhibition, which is certainly an internal process. How-
ever, as seen in the first chapter, some form of anti-homonymy is required for any
signalling system to reliably become optimal.
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Also, the recombinatory operation involves what amounts to a inference over
possible outputs. Certainly, the blending process modelled by Tria et al. (2012)
appears less sophisticated, simply splicing random sections of strings with related
meanings together. However, the inference process in this model may well be
more complex in implementation than reality. When agents output sub-strings
with the strongest associations to the target meaning, retrieving those associations
might require minimal computation compared to the algorithmic descriptions used
here. Much of the complexity is because strings are restricted to a certain length,
a design choice which reduces complexity in other areas. The discreteness of
characters is another possible issue, but one I hope to dealt via the channel ca-
pacity of any noise-affected continuous channel. As such, the representations and
mechanisms of the model are arguably close to minimal.
5.4.3 Model-specific comments
Outside of the larger theoretical context, the model raises a number of issues of a
more or less technical nature.
There are several manipulations of the model which could be suggested. I will
look at four of these in particular:
1. Unlike work such as K. Smith et al. (2013); Kirby et al. (2015), there is
no explicit manipulation of parameters for expressivity or learnability: ex-
pressivity is ‘baked in’, and the learnability of any system is simply a con-
sequence of noise. On the other hand, removing expressivity would have
a very predictable effect: without the relevant mechanisms, strings would
remain ambiguous and systematicity would not emerge.
2. On a related point, expressivity in this model operates at the string level, cal-
culated using the degree of association of sub-strings with target meanings.
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However, a more fine-grained measure of ambiguity is possible, where the
edit distance between different strings could be used to determine relative
closeness, and hence chance of reproduction. In fact, previous versions of
this model did include this feature. It was taken out for two reasons: firstly,
the edit-distance measurement is an inherently combinatorial operation, and
thus hard to justify on a platform of maximum simplicity. Secondly, it had
a rather trivial effect, that of minimising combinatoriality: the less shared
features between strings, the greater their mutual distance. Because of this,
I chose not to include an extra dynamic affecting the development of com-
binatoriality which itself operates combinatorially.
3. The character noise mechanism does not include the possibility of inter-
preting as an entirely new character. This leads to a ‘one-way’ drift-like
dynamic where characters can only ever be lost. However, I made the de-
cision not to implement this feature for similar reasons as for omitting edit-
distances: the feature would not change the region of stability for character
entropy, but only serve to add more noise to the system and make results
harder to interpret.
4. Signal-directed noise results in characters ‘flipping’. In the model, the prob-
ability of the new character is determined by the relative proportion of char-
acters in memory. Alternatively, this could have been implemented with a
parameter affecting ‘regularity bias’: for example, more common characters
could have a disproportionately large chance of being selected. The reason
for excluding this was again one of simplicity: selecting a ‘neutral model’
of noise is simply less theoretically demanding. In any case, there is good
deal of ongoing discussion regarding the respective roles of bias and drift
in regularisation processes (e.g. Ferdinand et al., 2014; Reali & Griffiths,
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2009), which is not the target of this particular study.
Less specific to the model is the observation that the Mantel score which is
typically used to measure the compositionality of model and experimental data is
potentially severely compromised when systems exhibit duality of patterning. As
shown above, inevitable random correlations between form and meaning spaces
result in highly significant, but reasonably small correlations even when systems
are completely holistic. The main problem here is that recent studies have chosen
to use not the correlation measure (Pearson’s r), but the significance (z-score) as
the structural metric. Because of this, it is important to minimize the chances
that random correlations like these are driving apparent effects. In practice, this
is unlikely to cause serious problems: the shortness of the strings in this model
is likely to be a factor in the strength of the random correlations, and in any case
the experimental data in question exhibits very clear structure. However, it is
worth keeping this in mind in order to reduce the chance of false positives. The
alternative, to adopt the measure of compositionality used here, has yet to be tested
against experimental data.
A further issue is the distinction between I/productive structure and E/superficial
structure, which is rather blurred in this model. All production is on the basis of
actually observed exemplars, and if a complex meaning has been seen before the
entire string is just produced holistically. As such — depending on the size of
the information bottleneck — it often happens that a signalling system can exhibit
complete compositionality, yet be produced almost completely holistically. This
apparent paradox can be resolved in two ways: firstly, compositional structure for
smaller systems has a strong advantage: it is highly robust to noise. This remains
true even if the chance of noise is relatively small. Secondly, this observation
is only really true for smaller dimensionalities, and the advantage of composi-
tional production explodes as the number of meaning dimensions and features
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increases. However, this robustness feature for smaller meaning spaces can be ar-
gued as a feasible intermediate stage, partially independent of productivity argu-
ments. Systems can attain structure piecemeal, only requiring minimal cognitive
computation, moving over to greater degrees of computation as the meaning space
expands. This gradualist account might be investigated in future theoretical and
experimental work.
Finally, as has been commented before, this model takes the particular struc-
ture of meaning spaces for granted. Just as signal-directed noise results in com-
binatorial structure and system-directed noise leads to compositionality, it might
well be the case that a parallel process of noise affecting only meanings might
be explanatory of categorical structure. Silvey et al. (2014) showed that cate-
gorical structure developed during communication games is not optimised along
categorically salient lines. One possible explanation for this is that task demand
introduces representational noise which causes conceptual spaces to collapse into
arbitrary non-functional structures. This hypothesis could easily be incorporated
into a future expansion of this model which includes dynamic meaning spaces.
5.5 Conclusion
The broad thesis of this chapter is that duality of patterning is a functional response
to maintain expressivity and learnability in the face of noisy processes affecting
both signals and signal/meaning associations. Structure emerges at different levels
depending on an interaction between the size/dimensionality of the meaning space
and the amount of noise at a specific level. Structure at one level does not imply
structure at the other, and either might be present or not. This gives us new insight
into phenomena such as the apparent lack of combinatoriality in ABSL (Sandler et
al., 2011), the presence of combinatoriality and the absence of compositionality in
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birdsong (Berwick et al., 2011), and the fully-fledged duality of human language.
Of course, it is not enough to just recognise that different theories have certain
abstract properties in common, described here in terms of learning, expressivity,
and robustness to noise. It is also important to identify the particular mechanisms
in effect, for example memory vs. perception. However, as in the previous chap-
ters, it is quite possible that multiple mechanisms are at play to similar effect.
In this case, the more abstract understanding helps dispel apparent conflicts of
analysis, methodology, and interpretation.
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